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PREFACE
When Reconstruction met its inglorious demise in 1877, it died unmourned
by most white Americans. The issue of the proper place and status of Afri-
can Americans in southern politics and society lay dormant throughout
the 1880s, as Democrats and Republicans split national political power and
the collective attention of the American people turned toward Gilded Age
economic issues. During that time, Bourbon political leaders cautiously
reestablished Democratic control over the southern states, obviating the
civil rights of their black denizens in various ways, including political dis-
franchisement, economic discrimination, and social ostracism. In 1889,
however, with the inauguration of GOP President Benjamin Harrison and
the convening of the Republican majority in the Fifty-first ("Billion Dol-
lar") Congress, attention reverted to what most observers alternately called
the "Negro question," the "southern question," or the "race problem." An
influential group of Republican leaders hoped to reinstate full suffrage rights
for black southerners by passing a strong federal elections law, which would
soon come to life under the title of the Federal Elections Bill. Democrats
wanted to prevent that possibility at all costs and to solve the race problem
in ways of their own choosing, such as promoting a federally funded pro-
gram to make it possible for black southerners who wished to leave the
United States for new homes abroad to do so. If that idea failed, as a last
resort they hoped to get away with rewriting southern state constitutions in
such a way as to nullify or negate the impact of any new federal elections law
the Republicans might pass without overtly violating the U.S. Constitution's
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
The Republican reformers would find their task complicated not only
by the obstinance of the Democrats but also by infighting in the ranks of
their own party, as half of the party's leaders pushed the continuation of a
Gilded Age economic agenda that included everything from tariff and pen-
sion reform to silver coinage and regulation of trusts. Then there was the
Republican wildcard, Senator Henry Blair of New Hampshire, who had his
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own agenda, which fit in neither the economic nor the racial reform cat-
egory. Beyond those obstacles, the reformers had to contend with an
American public that had grown increasingly apathetic to the issue of
black civil rights over the dozen years since Reconstruction ended, as well
as with a growing public awareness of the duplicity of the Republican
Party in dealing with Native Americans and Chinese Americans vis-a-vis
African Americans.
With such a host of problems facing the new Congress and adminis-
tration, would the reformers be able to accomplish their goal of reenforcing
the voting rights of African Americans? Or would they be consigned to
compromising with their opponents and merely salvaging some marginal
degree of civil rights for black southerners? Or would events unfold in ways
beyond their imagination, such that the majority party would be totally
and abjectly defeated in their quest for racial reform? The events in the
South—beginning with the Mississippi disfranchising constitution of
1890—that relegated American blacks to the back of the bus are well
known, but those happenings might not have become so entrenched in
American society had they not been reinforced by the Billion Dollar Con-
gress in the nation's capital. The parenting of the very un-American baby
Jim Crow required the efforts of both southern and national politicians
at the dawn of an era when the entire western world began to view itself
as encumbered with what British writer Rudyard Kipling called "the white
man's burden."
This book represents the culmination of more than five years of concep-
tualization, research, writing, and revision. It has been made possible be-
cause of the support, advice, encouragement, and constructive criticism of
several fellow historians, all of whom I highly respect for their wisdom,
experience, and knowledge. I thank Mark W. Summers of the University of
Kentucky, a true scholar in the field of late-nineteenth-century American
history, for freely giving his time to help me, a total stranger, by reading the
whole manuscript and offering the benefit of his expertise. His thirty-page
critique of my work was invaluable to the revision process. Reid Derr, a
good friend and fellow laborer in the history department of East Georgia
College, likewise read the whole manuscript and made some crucial obser-
vations that I incorporated in later drafts. Stanly Godbold, who is both a
true friend and a mentor, as well as the former southern history specialist
at Mississippi State University, read and re-read drafts of some chapters,
helped me mold and shape the thesis, and, more important, gave me en-
couragement to press on (over delicious cups of coffee often served at his
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home by his lovely wife Jeannie), which is the contribution that I thank
him for most. Bob Jenkins, my doctoral program advisor and specialist in
African American history, had the dubious task of reading the earliest drafts
of this manuscript. With the patience of a saint he did that thankless work,
so I thank him now. It was also he who encourag d me to inquire to the
University Press of Kentucky for publication of this manuscript, for which
I am equally grateful. Many thanks also go to John Marszalek, Ren Crowell,
and Jim Haug for serving as readers and critics, and to Bo Morgan for be-
ing the conduit through which I was introduced to some of the aforemen-
tioned readers of this manuscript. I also thank Jeff Howell for proofreading
the final draft.
I am appreciative of the fact that I rarely had to make research trips
alone, because some good friends and colleagues accompanied me: Steve
Belko made trips to North Carolina, Missouri, and Arkansas with me; Tim
Smith flew to Washington, D.C., with me; Ken Homer drove to South Caro-
lina with me; Craig Piper met me in Jackson, Mississippi; and my beautiful
and talented wife, Linda, served as my companion on trips to Colorado,
Washington, Georgia, Alabama, and South Carolina.
I am indebted to numerous librarians and archivists around the coun-
try, most of whom I do not know by name. I thank David Hays, the archi-
vist at the University of Colorado, for making my stay there especially
enjoyable and fruitful. Those at the Mitchell Memorial Library at Missis-
sippi State University, the Mississippi Department of Archives and History,
the Library of Congress, the Southern Historical Collection at the Univer-
sity of North Carolina, the Perkins Library at Duke University, the South
Caroliniana Library, the Missouri Historical Society, and the Georgia South-
ern University interlibrary loan office were also particularly helpful. Bill
Stern of Press Express in Statesboro, Georgia, also earned my gratitude for
his excellent work in preparing the illustrations for this book.
The faculties and staffs of the history departments of Mississippi State
University, Delta State University, and Holmes Community College, as well
as many former fellow graduate student friends, also merit recognition for
helping me through the "starving times" of my college education. I also thank
my friends and colleagues in the administration of East Georgia College for
providing the funds and moral support that got me through two important
research trips. And I especially appreciate my wife, Linda, my children, and
my extended family for standing by me through all the challenges that life
threw our way during the years this book was in gestation.
Finally, I thank the University of Alabama Press for use of excerpts
from an article of mine called, "Senator John Tyler Morgan and the Gen-
XIV Preface
esis of Jim Crow Ideology, 1889-1891" Alabama Review 57 (April 2004). I
also thank Southern Studies for use of excerpts from my article, "The Butler
Emigration Bill of 1890 and the Path Not Taken in Southern Race Rela-
tions" IX (1998): 37-68.
INTRODUCTION
The Grand Old Parly Faces the Grand Old Problem
Slavery restriction, emancipation, negro suffrage, civil rights, and fair elec-
tions are but the basic pillars of one political faith, and the stand men take
upon them, independent of their personal interest, is the measure of their
Republicanism.
—Philadelphia Press
For twenty years the Republican party has cracked the party whip with
more arrogance over the negro voter, as its political owner, than ever their
original owners did.
—Charles H. Mansur, Democratic representative of Missouri
As the 1880s gave way to the last decade of the nineteenth century, a new
mood began settling over the United States. The nation buzzed with the
excitement and anticipation that always looms in the air at the beginning
of a new era of history. This new spirit of the times, or Zeitgeist, signaled a
change in the air. The nation was still deep in the throes of the Gilded Age
of American history, in which the search for national economic growth, as
well as personal opulence, held a generation captive. Voices of reform could
be heard clamoring for regulation of the nation's corrupt corporations and
political process, but the nation was not ready to abandon its collective
quest for wealth. Politically, the nation was still led by many of the same
men who had guided the country through the tragic and troublesome years
of the Civil War and Reconstruction, but one by one they were gradually
1
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retiring, dying, or subsiding in influence. Under their watch, the very soul
of this mighty republic had been on trial, battling through the issues of
slavery and abolition, secession and reunion, reconstruction and disengage-
ment. Now on the horizon were the rumblings of various new forces, each
of which vied for a spot in the national polity—Populism, Progressivism,
new Nationalism, Imperialism, and Jim Crowism. Simultaneously, each of
these forces would make its grand appearance upon the stage of national
and world affairs. The 1890s would christen a new generation of Ameri-
cans destined to reunite the North and South in support of the Spanish-
American War, World War I, and, ultimately, the rise of this nation as a
global superpower.1
The political leaders of the United States, caught up in the conflicting
passions of the moment, failed to recognize and embrace the new Zeitgeist
of national unity. In Washington, D.C., the men of Capitol Hill and 1600
Pennsylvania Avenue had the responsibility of recognizing and welcoming
the new era, yet many of them either could not or simply refused to do so.
They had one last, great series of sectional battles to fight before they folded
the bloody shirt and tucked it away. Control of the national destiny in the
arena of race relations lay in the balance. The resulting clash of the titans at
the nation's capitol would capture the attention of the country for more
than a year, but it would leave a lasting imprint upon the fabric of Ameri-
can society and politics for the next seventy-five years.2
The elections of 1888 gave the Grand Old Party (GOP) both a major-
ity in Congress and a president of the United States for the first time since
1874. Not since then had the GOP enjoyed majorities in both houses of
Congress and the one-man majority that comes with control of the White
House. The Democrats had controlled the House for fourteen of the previ-
ous sixteen years while Republicans had controlled the Senate for fourteen
of the sixteen and the presidency for twelve of the sixteen. In the Fiftieth
Congress, the Democrats had enjoyed a majority of nineteen in the House,
while Republicans had held a two-man lead in the Senate. The Fifty-first
Congress gave the Republicans a majority of nineteen in the House and ten
in the Senate. Thus, from 1889 to 1891, a potential Republican juggernaut
controlled Washington, D.C.—one party that, if it flexed its muscles, would
enjoy hegemony over the federal government and would hold the power to
do whatever it should choose.3
Together, the Republican tandem of the Fifty-first Congress and Presi-
dent Benjamin Harrison expected to resolve a host of long-running prob-
lems, not the least of which was the South's "race problem," or "Negro
question," as politicians and the media alternately called it. The "problem"
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was that the proper status of African Americans had not been settled since
the emancipation of the slaves in 1865. Conflicting views about what rights
they should possess had caused outbreaks of violence and discrimination
of all types against them. Native white southern Democrats, most of whom
were ex-Confederates who had remained rebels at heart, controlled south-
ern state and local governments. They deprived most qualified African
Americans of the right to vote, and from that root grew all of the various
civil rights abuses and racial injustices common in the South, such as seg-
regation laws, lynchings, the convict lease system, educational deprivation,
and job discrimination, to say nothing of rampant alcoholism, poverty, and
despondency within the black community. The "question," which the fed-
eral government had ignored since the end of Reconstruction in 1877, was
what to do about it. The American public and political leaders from both
major parties were divided over the answer, and certainly no answer ex-
isted that would please everyone—black and white, northerner and
southerner, Democrat and Republican.
The Republican experiment to incorporate black southerners into the
national polity and the mainstream of American society had failed during
Reconstruction for a number of reasons, including white southern resistence
to such measures, opposition by the Democratic Party nationwide, disagree-
ment among Republican leaders about party priorities, and public pres-
sure to lay to rest issues leftover from the Civil War and move on to other
business. As the famed southern egalitarian writer George Washington Cable
put it: "The popular mind in the old free states, weary of strife at arm's
length, bewildered by its complications, vexed by many a blunder, eager to
turn to the cure of other evils, and even tinctured by that race feeling whose
grosser excesses it would as gladly see suppressed, has retreated from its
uncomfortable dictational attitude and thrown the whole matter over to
the states of the South." Cable went on to say that nearly by consensus the
American people of that day agreed that Reconstruction had been the most
"dreadful episode" in the country's history. In the dozen-plus years since
Reconstruction, however, the country—under divided Democratic and
Republican leadership—had "set aside" the "compulsory" racial experi-
ment and put "a voluntary reconstruction . . . on trial." The northern pub-
lic at large had given "virtual" (if not actual) "consent" to this change of
course.4 The nation as a whole had prospered economically as a result. But
now, the GOP had regained complete control of the federal government.
Perhaps it could now finish the work it had started in the 1860s; perhaps it
could now solve the southern race problem once and for all.
From the time of their election in 1888, many Republican leaders of
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the Fifty-first Congress had pledged to devote their attention to solving the
race problem. Included among them in the House of Representatives were
Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, Jonathan H. Rowell of Illinois, and
Thomas B. Reed of Maine—who would be elected the new Speaker of the
House. In the Senate, George Frisbie Hoar of Massachusetts and John Coit
Spooner of Wisconsin would lead the charge. Other influential Republi-
cans not in office at the time, including Chicago writer Albion Tourgee and
New York election supervisor John I. Davenport, also threw the weight of
their reputations and positions behind the reformers in Congress. They all
agreed that the solution to the problem lay in electoral reform. Enforce the
black voters' suffrage rights in accord with the Fifteenth Amendment, they
said, and blacks could control their own destiny and put an end to all other
forms of discrimination and mistreatment. Aside from the noble intention
inherent in such a plan, the reformers also had an ulterior motive in want-
ing to enforce black suffrage. The disfranchisement of blacks prevented the
establishment and perpetuation of overwhelming Republican majorities
in at least thirty southern congressional districts. The GOP had managed
to win control of Congress in 1888 without those districts, but, in order to
maintain control, the reformers believed they would need to pass a strong
federal election law authorizing supervision of congressional and presi-
dential elections in the South. Thus they set out to solve the southern race
problem with the stroke of a pen by passing a single law, which would come
to be known officially as the Federal Elections Bill. As one Republican news-
paper put it, the GOP had pledged itself to such a plan, and anyone who
dared "to block the wheels of the party chariot will be crushed beneath its
wheels."5
Yet there were numerous pebbles in the path of the oncoming "chariot"
that lay as serious obstacles on the road to reform. Majority numbers do
not necessarily equate to strength, and by no means was it a foregone con-
clusion that the crusade for southern electoral reform would succeed. Per-
haps the most important obstacle standing in the way of the Republican
reformers was resistance from white southerners, who rattled their sabers
with frenetic desperation at the thought of a return to Reconstruction, even
going so far as to threaten another Civil War to stop it. White southerners
felt both intense anger and great fear and loathing at the very thought.
They realized that the current practice of suppressing the black vote by
fraud, intimidation, violence, and outright violation of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment could not last much longer, but even so they opposed federal inter-
vention in their local affairs. When, in his first annual Message to Congress,
President Harrison hinted that the idea of state governments solving the
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The Republican Party 'Chariot' Another sort of presidential trip—not very agreeable,
but the coach will get there all the same. {Puck, 1889.) What appeared to some observ-
ers as the Republicans' unstoppable party "chariot" appeared to others as a rickety
stagecoach that could easily be thrown off course by Democratic obstruction.
problem themselves would be acceptable if only they would make some
noticeable good faith effort to do so, white southerners knew the time had
come to act. Harrison encouraged the South to be "at work upon" the prob-
lem and to suggest solutions, as if to say he would welcome the opportu-
nity to forget the idea of supervising federal elections if only southerners
would give him reason to. He warned that if southerners did not make
some visible progress quickly, he would support whatever plan the Repub-
lican Congress passed to deal with the problem.6
White southerners thus began developing their own solutions to their
region's race problem, which differed starkly, of course, from proposed
Republican solutions. Mississippi Democrats took the lead in contemplat-
ing ways to disfranchise black voters without overtly continuing to violate
the U. S. Constitution, options the reformers might at least tolerate if not
embrace. South Carolina Democrats, meanwhile, began pushing the idea
of helping fund a mass exodus of black emigrants out of the South to loca-
tions where they could enjoy the fruits of separation from whites.7
Besides resistance from white southerners, the reformers faced other
6 Introduction
obstacles as well. The same factors that had combined to put an abrupt end
to Reconstruction still existed: Democrats from all sections of the country—
not just the South—opposed any such attempt to resurrect the black vot-
ing rights issue, as did some influential Republican senators, including
Matthew Quay and Donald Cameron of Pennsylvania, William M. Stewart
and John P. Jones of Nevada, and Leland Stanford of California. Likewise,
some leading Mugwump Republican journalists and pundits, such as E. L.
Godkin and Carl Schurz, found the reformers' plan odious.8 In addition, a
very real possibility existed that in Benjamin Harrison the GOP would suf-
fer the same type of weak presidential leadership that it had endured under
Ulysses S. Grant, who lost the will to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. A
sizeable majority of the American public, as well as an influential contin-
gent of political leaders and journalists from both parties, stood against the
idea from the beginning, and that obstacle was compounded by the fear
that Harrison might become more of a liability than a leader. The effect of
this combination meant that in order to achieve their goal the reformers
would have to fight on three fronts simultaneously—against (1) Demo-
crats; (2) dissident Republicans; and (3) public opinion—and all quite
possibly without strong leadership in the White House.
These fronts require a brief explanation. First, the Democratic oppo-
sition: the Democratic Party still claimed to be the torchbearer of
Jeffersonianism in 1890; that is, the party that espoused state rights, local
sovereignty, and the mythology that rural agrarianism was somehow more
patriotically "American" than centralization, urbanization, and industri-
alization, all of which the GOP was more apt to espouse.9 But it had, in fact,
become little more in the minds of many observers than the party of white
supremacy, low tariffs, unionization, alcoholism, and Roman Catholicism.
Moreover, since the Civil War, it had been reduced in the estimation of
bloody-shirt-waving Republicans to the party that once proudly commit-
ted three of the most heinous sins that can be committed in a democracy—
slaveholding, secession, and treason. Therefore, it could not be entrusted
with the reins of the national government. The party's chief function in
national politics throughout Reconstruction and the Gilded Age seemed to
be to prevent Republican legislation when possible and to make it difficult
the rest of the time. As Massachusetts Senator George Frisbie Hoar put it,
the Democratic Party had only managed to stay alive since the inception of
the GOP by appealing to the basest elements of the American voting pub-
lic. Democrats, said Hoar, sought to convince uneducated and ignorant
voters that Republicans had the diabolical intention of increasing the power
of the federal government at the expense of state and local sovereignty.
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Hoar thus considered the Democrats the "against" party: against all of
Lincoln's policies during the war, against all aspects of Reconstruction af-
terward, against giving blacks a fair chance in life, against the protective
tariff, against national defense spending, against adding western states to
the Union, and against the Homestead Act. What did the Democrats stand
for7, asked Hoar. A curious assortment of ideas, issues, and items, including
unrestricted immigration, illiteracy, intemperance, and religious noncon-
formity. Moreover, they stood for allowing anyone to come to America and
practice any kind of strange religion (he named Mormonism, specifically),
practice any kind of deviant behavior—such as drunkenness, gambling,
and reveling—and then keep them uneducated and ignorant so that Demo-
cratic Party bosses like those operating out of Tammany Hall could easily
control them.10
Democrats denied all such charges. As former Democratic Speaker of
the House John G. Carlisle of Kentucky explained, "It is easier to scold than
to reason, and if epithets were as effective as arguments, the Democratic
party would have been overthrown [by the Republicans] long ago."11 He
considered Hoar's charges ludicrous. The Democrats could hurl epithets
equally well, however. They charged that the Republican Party represented
nothing more than a reformulated version of the old Federalist Party of a
hundred years prior with a new name. That is to say, both Federalists and
Republicans represented elite groups of self-interested sectionalists who
favored taxing the poor to their limit in order to continue building the
central government in size and scope until it would ultimately evolve into a
despotic leviathan under their own partisan control.12 And with that con-
trol, the "imperialists," as many Democrats liked to call Republicans, would
force their neo-Puritanical, neo-abolitionist views on the rest of the Ameri-
can people.13
Whether or not such charges were true, at least half of the American
public agreed with the Democrats' assessment of the GOP. This same half
of Americans also tended to accept the Democrats' pluralistic vision that
the United States should welcome a variety of types of people and reject
the self-righteous, exclusionary elitism of the GOP. After Reconstruction,
a clear majority of the American public had repudiated the social engi-
neering of the Republicans. They virtually demanded that the federal gov-
ernment, no matter which party controlled it, retreat toward a more
conservative and less proactive type of governance. The Democratic Party
definitely held the more conservative views among the two parties on vir-
tually all aspects of government but most noticeably so on racial issues.
They stuck much more firmly to the traditional American laissez-faire ap-
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proach to government than did the Republicans. The GOP had always been
more proactive legislatively, more prone to expand the scope of the federal
government, and more willing to experiment socially and economically than
the Democrats. By twenty-first-century standards this Republican activ-
ism does not look very progressive or liberal, but it looked radical enough
to scare many Americans at the time. To many contemporary political pun-
dits, the do-nothing attitude of Democrats came closer to fulfilling the in-
tentions of the Founding Fathers than the "do something even if it's the
wrong thing" attitude of the Republicans. Even so, these same pundits judged
that the Democrats would lose the fight over racial reform, not because
they were the minority party, but because the Republican Party had supe-
rior political leadership. The Republicans would prevail, they said, not
merely because they outnumbered their opponents but because they would
outwit them.14
The Democrats had grown accustomed to their role as the minority
party through many years of practice. They had, after all, been the minor-
ity party almost continuously since Reconstruction, rarely controlling more
than one house of Congress or the White House at any given time. The
GOP pushed legislation while the Democrats resisted. This pattern often
produced gridlock, but often it eventually led to compromise.15 The elec-
tion of the Republican majority in Congress and a Republican president in
1888 threatened to break this pattern of gridlock or this pattern of the op-
posing sides compromising and finding common ground where neither
really wanted to stand. The Democrats perceived the Harrison administra-
tion and the Fifty-first Congress as intent upon crushing all minority op-
position. They scrambled, accordingly, to find a foothold to brace themselves
against the coming onslaught. They had only three possible weapons with
which to stave off their political enemies: (1) public opinion, which they
believed to be on their side and hoped would continue to favor their views
on the southern race problem; (2) the filibuster, which could be used in
either the Senate, the House, or both (so they thought) as a last-ditch effort
if all attempts at compromise and reason failed; and (3) factionalism within
the GOP, which could work to their advantage, particularly if they could
convince a small number of Republicans to abdicate from the majority and
join their side.
The second front on which the Republican reformers would have to
fight loomed among dissidents within the ranks of the GOP. Democrats
realistically hoped that the Republicans of the Fifty-first Congress would
split. All political parties routinely experience factionalism, and the GOP
had been notorious for its internecine disputes. Since gaining power in 1860
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it had splintered into Radicals and Moderates, Stalwarts and Liberals (Half-
Breeds), Regulars, Independents, and Mugwumps, and a variety of small
fringe groups such as Prohibitionists and Greenbackers. Various factions
fought for control after 1888 as well, and these factions were organic and
ever-changing, with individual Republicans wafting in and out of alliance
with them constantly as issues came, evolved, and departed. Some of the
Republican migrants, such as Carl Schurz, at times seemed friendlier to the
Democrats than to their own party because of hurt feelings and wounded
pride engendered by years of infighting with the GOP leadership. And some
even bolted and became Democrats, such as former Union general and
leading Radical Republican during Reconstruction, Benjamin Butler of
Massachusetts.16
The organic nature of these nebulous factions makes it difficult to
prescribe clear definitions to them. But for simplicity's sake, two groups of
Republicans maybe identified. Those who favored helping black southerners
in some way can be called the "reformers." Those who did not favor special
legislation to help black southerners (because they did not wish to reopen
the sectional wounds of Reconstruction, or because they sought political
power for economic benefits and maintained power by graft for themselves,
their constituents, or both) might best be called "money men." These rival
and often conflicting factions made the challenge of racial/political reform
difficult, because at least half of the GOP leadership was beholden to the
machine and was thus just as concerned with economic issues as with solv-
ing the southern race problem.
Abraham Lincoln once remarked that the Republican Party stood for
both humanitarianism and economic growth, but when the two conflicted
with one another, Republican leaders would always choose the welfare of
the poor and downtrodden over financial gain for themselves and the
nation's business interests. But would the party of Lincoln remain true to
Honest Abe's creed in 1890? Whether the party of Lincoln or even Lincoln
himself had ever been true to the creed is in fact questionable. It seems
more reasonable to conclude that four types of Republicans had always
existed from the founding of the party in the 1850s up to the 1890s: (a)
those mainly interested in humanitarian concerns; (b) those primarily in-
terested in the almighty dollar; (c) those who felt torn between these com-
peting forces; and (d) those who wanted merely to use blacks as pawns in
their high stakes political game.17 The GOP in 1890 contained a sizeable
contingent of all four, and therein lay the seeds of a potential party schism
that threatened to prevent passage of legislation for solving the southern
race problem.
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Although this division of the GOP into factions could be seen at all
levels of government, nowhere did it appear more pronounced than in the
U. S. Senate. Some Republican senators were genuine in their humanitar-
ian concern for black southerners, and they could accurately be considered
political philanthropists who believed it their duty to practice noblesse oblige
toward the needy masses. They sincerely wanted to help the dispossessed
black denizens of the South. In this group were George Frisbie Hoar of
Massachusetts and Henry Blair of New Hampshire. Several others were not
so easy to categorize, such as John Sherman of Ohio, William M. Evarts of
New York, Preston B. Plumb of Kansas, Justin Morrill of Vermont, Leland
Stanford of California, and Henry L. Dawes of Massachusetts, all of whom
expressed interest in helping black southerners but rarely took noticeable
action toward that end. Those who seemed mainly intent upon using blacks
for partisan political gain included John J. Ingalls of Kansas, William E.
Chandler of New Hampshire, and Joseph N. Dolph of Oregon. Many of
those with longtime service in political office changed over time or vacil-
lated between the groups, depending upon the specific issue in question.
William E. Stewart of Nevada and Henry M. Teller of Colorado, for in-
stance, abandoned their humanitarianism of the Civil War—Reconstruc-
tion period in favor of economic concerns in the 1890s.18
The Republican money men in the Senate included Matthew Quay
and Donald Cameron of Pennsylvania, Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island,
William Boyd Allison of Iowa, and Philetus Sawyer of Wisconsin. Because
of senators like these and their vacillating cohorts, throughout the Gilded
Age and especially in the late 1880s, public opinion came to view the Senate
as an exclusive society comprised mainly of millionaires. Although that
belief exaggerated the wealth of the average senator, it contained more than
a grain of truth. Indeed, many senators had vested interests in railroads
and other corporations, having cashed in on the incredible wave of growth
and expansion that occurred during the Gilded Age. Several gained per-
sonal fortunes in excess of $1 million in the process.19 Iowa's senior senator
William Boyd Allison, for instance, who had viewed the Civil War, in his
biographer's words, "merely as a great opportunity for making some
money," built a personal fortune in western railroads during and after the
war. He had also entangled himself in the infamous Credit Mobilier scan-
dal of the Ulysses S. Grant administration but managed to escape "more
lightly than he deserved," for, despite what the rest of the nation thought of
him, the Iowa legislature repeatedly sent him back to Washington to repre-
sent the Hawkeye State.20
Some of these money men in the Senate loved to show off their wealth,
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with the intention of making a statement about money equaling power
and aristocracy. The public marveled at the lavish lifestyles and the gaudy
displays of opulence of such senators. Wisconsin's senior senator Philetus
Sawyer, for example, moved into a new custom-built Washington, D.C.,
mansion in 1890, where he regularly entertained guests, including constitu-
ents and political supporters and sometimes capitol city social elites and
international diplomats and dignitaries. Similarly, Nelson Aldrich of Rhode
Island held such wealth and power that some called his tiny state his per-
sonal "fiefdom,"21 and Matthew Quay of Pennsylvania was said to be (meta-
phorically) the richest man in the world because he "owned a president, a
Speaker of the House, and his own state"—the "Quaystone" state.22 Rail-
road tycoon Leland Stanford really was one of the richest men in the world—
a genuine self-made millionaire who in 1890 used part of his fortune to put
the finishing touches on the university in Palo Alto, California, which bears
his name.
Although the Senate affords a better view of the dichotomy of re-
formers and money men in the GOP than does the House, the same bifur-
cation of interests existed there. The preoccupation of half of the Republican
leadership in both chambers of Congress with money and financial issues
is clear, and the impact of this priority upon the overall party agenda can-
not be overstated. So adept would this Fifty-first Congress become at pass-
ing economic legislation, in fact, that it would soon earn the opprobrious
sobriquet of "the Billion Dollar Congress" from Democrats and indepen-
dent pundits. But at the convening of this Congress in December 1889, no
one yet knew just how much of a spending spree lay in store. As Congress
prepared to do its business going into the new year of 1890, some of the
most pressing items on the "Billion Dollar" economic agenda were the tar-
iff, which had been a political football that both parties kicked back and
forth throughout the 1880s and which most Republicans now wanted raised;
the coinage of silver, which had also recurred as a bone of contention year
after year and which now threatened to divide the party into factions; trusts,
which had only begun to command the attention of the nation but which
most Americans agreed needed regulating; and pensions for Union veter-
ans of the Civil War, which, like the southern race problem, could now be
addressed to the satisfaction of Republicans for the first time since Recon-
struction because of their simultaneous control of the Fifty-first Congress
and the White House.23
From the day the Republican majority won election in 1888, the re-
formers and the money men began fighting for control of the overall legis-
lative agenda for the Fifty-first Congress. The two most important items
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on the Republican agenda—raising the tariff and enforcing the voting
rights of southern blacks—alienated Democrats, but the black suffrage
issue also caused internal friction between the reformers and the money
men. These money Republicans did not oppose the idea of passing a new
federal election law—they simply did not want to do it at the expense of
their economic agenda. Most had few black constituents, so the suffrage
issue never hit close to home. Economic issues did. The GOP leadership
agreed that the tariff issue should thus be disposed of first.24 Although
the reformers wanted the Federal Elections Bill to be the party's flagship
issue, the money men prevailed. The GOP leadership chose tariff reform
over other economic issues, ostensibly because it affected the most voters
directly. Most Republicans, no matter which clique they belonged to, be-
lieved that raising the tariff would increase the wages and improve the
living standards of the nation's industrial workers, and by 1890, for the
first time in American history, industrial workers outnumbered farm-
ers.25 The tariff was seen, therefore, as the least problematic of a number
of unusually divisive issues.
The pension issue, however, had more staunch supporters than any
other single economic issue,because the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR)
had been lobbying for pension increases for a decade. The GAR originated
in 1868 as a fraternal brotherhood of Union Civil War veterans. By 1890 it
boasted 400,000 members, but because voting-age sons of the veterans also
supported the cause celebre of their fathers, the GAR actually controlled
about one million votes. No Republican politician, therefore, dared cross
the GAR, which gave the veterans' club power out of proportion to its num-
bers. Consequently, with the Republicans controlling both houses of Con-
gress and the White House, the pension issue seemed sure to be near the
front of the docket and sure to garner a great deal of attention.26
The reasons for the decision to raise the tariff before proceeding with
the Federal Elections Bill made perfect sense to the GOP leadership at the
time, but most African Americans bewailed the decision, the reformers soon
came to regret it, and many historians have criticized it ever since. The de-
cision was based upon the idea that there would be plenty of time to get the
entire Republican agenda passed, so the order they took the issues in did
not really matter. But since the agendas of individual Republican politi-
cians generally reflected the will of their constituencies, the GOP leader-
ship followed the dictates of public opinion as they perceived it, which leads
to the third front upon which the reformers would have to fight their
battle—public opinion. What the money men realized—and what the re-
formers could not yet see well or refused to acknowledge—was that be-
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tween the end of Reconstruction and 1890 a change had occurred in the
nation's collective thought processes about the race problem. Many white
northern humanitarian leaders had withdrawn not only their vocal sup-
port for the idea of forcing racial equality on the South but even their tacit
support. They had begun in earnest to seek some other solution to the race
problem. They never second-guessed the necessity of fighting the Civil War
to preserve the Union or to emancipate the slaves, but they had begun to
wonder whether bestowing equal civil and political rights upon the freed-
men had been a wise change and a prudent move. They had given the Repub-
lican leadership the benefit of the doubt on the issue initially, but now, with
the knowledge of how troublesome Reconstruction ultimately became weigh-
ing heavily in their minds, the idea of Republican reformers reenforcing black
suffrage on the white South certainly did not excite them.27
A prime example of this transformation can be seen in the First
Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question, which met in June 1890 at
Lake Mohonk in Ulster County, New York. Former Republican president
Rutherford B. Hayes chaired the conference. Many of the leading educa-
tors, ministers, journalists, and political figures in the nation spoke and
exchanged ideas, including the former Union general O. O. Howard; the
influential novelist and political pundit Albion Tourgee; the Reverends Dr.
Lyman Abbott and Dr. James Buckley of New York City; the president of
Swarthmore College in Pennsylvania, Edward H. McGill; the former presi-
dent of Cornell University in New York, Andrew White; the president of
Rutgers College in New Jersey, Dr. Merrill E. Gates; the corresponding sec-
retary of the American Missionary Association, the Reverend Dr. A. F. Beard;
the editor of the Independent newspaper of New York, Dr. William Hayes
Ward; and the U. S. commissioner of education, W. T. Harris. With the
exception of Albion Tourgee, none of these leaders advocated civil rights or
political or social equality as the answer to the "Negro Question." They
could not even agree on the nature of the question, much less its answer.
An exchange between Lyman Abbott and James Buckley reveals the extent
of the disagreement. Abbott asked, "How much longer must we go on talk-
ing about the Negro problem? There is no Negro problem,—only the prob-
lem of humanity." Buckley responded, "Dr. Abbott proposes to ignore the
Negro problem, and to make it one of the common problems of humanity.
If there be no such thing as a Negro problem . . . we should not be here. But
there is a Negro problem." Perhaps the most striking remark of the confer-
ence came from Abbott, who said, "So far as I can see, those that discuss the
Southern problem may be divided into two classes,—those who know the
facts and therefore have no theories, and those who have theories because
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they do not know the facts." Several speakers sought to refute that state-
ment, but with little success.28
The First Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question ended with no
answer, but it did end with some recommendations that a majority of the
participants approved. The most notable was that the nation's emphasis
should shift away from political solutions and toward educational solu-
tions and, particularly, vocational education for blacks. As Rutherford B.
Hayes put it, "the educational, the benevolent, and the religious side of the
[Negro] question" is "hardly less grave and influential" than the political
side.29 The only other meaningful fruit to come from the conference was a
Second Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question a year later, which
showed a continuation of the philosophy adopted earlier of stressing voca-
tional education as the best solution to the southern race problem. Both
conferences offer important glimpses of northern humanitarian sentiment
beyond the halls of Congress and outside the realm of politics at this criti-
cal, transitional period in American history. What they reveal is that, since
Reconstruction, northern concern for the welfare of black southerners had
increasingly begun to take the form of philanthropy, not political activism.
The philanthropy of this era came to be embodied in a philosophy known
as the Social Gospel—a combination of traditional Christian mission work
and a secular brand of enlightened humanitarianism. It could be seen mani-
fest in projects such as the establishment of Tuskegee Institute in Alabama
in 1881, which appeared to represent the model school for black southerners
and, to many observers, the wave of the future in helping uplift the African
American race. The Social Gospel, along with the American laissez-faire
political tradition, which frowned upon federal activism, caused the great
crusade of the former abolitionists-turned-postwar-humanitarians to im-
plode after Reconstruction. By 1890, the northern public had become al-
most completely silent, if not altogether unconcerned, about the federal
government helping black southerners. Hence, if the reformers in Con-
gress intended to address the South's race problem without incurring the
wrath of their constituents, they would have to do so upon the basis of
preserving and defending the Constitution rather than upon the basis of
providing federal humanitarian assistance to blacks, and they would have
to make a strong case for their action.30 Protecting the Constitution—Re-
construction Amendments and all—would therefore be their rationale. This
peculiar Republican sense of patriotic duty to uphold the new and im-
proved Constitution thus served as the justification for bringing the south-
ern race problem to the fore in 1890, more so than humanitarian concern
for the welfare of blacks. With exceptions made for the few true-blue re-
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formers, such as George Frisbie Hoar and Albion Tourgee, most Republi-
can leaders could accept this compromise. Most were not willing to sacri-
fice their personal political ambition for the principle of supporting an
unpopular measure. And many were not genuinely concerned about the
welfare of African Americans nearly so much as about the partisan politi-
cal advantage that could be gained from the black vote of the South, de-
spite claims to the contrary that they sometimes made.31
This charge can be proven based upon the total of the evidence. It is
clear, for instance, that this young administration and this new Congress
faced other related racial issues which they had no intention of handling
with any humanitarian concern. Trouble in the West with disgruntled and
rebellious Native Americans represented a race problem just as old and
irksome as the southern black-white problem, and the question of con-
tinuing the restriction or "exclusion" of Chinese immigration had likewise
lingered since 1882 without an answer pleasing to everyone. But since both
issues affected a comparatively small number of people—and it is impor-
tant to add that none of the affected people were either citizens or potential
voters—these race problems garnered little attention from Republican re-
formers. Since they could not hope to gain any political advantage for their
party from worrying about such minority groups, they simply chose not to
concern themselves with them. At the same time, something akin to a race
problem had begun to develop in the Northeast as well, where an increase
in immigration was rapidly changing the ethnic makeup of America's larg-
est cities. Unlike the Native Americans and the Chinese, the millions of
European immigrants landing on the shores of the great East coast cities
represented potential voters in the eyes of politicians, and both major par-
ties coveted their allegiance and raced to sign them up to vote. Frequent
problems resulted from the new immigrants' use of the ballot, however,
because, due to language and education barriers, they could generally be
manipulated by unscrupulous politicos more easily than could old-stock
Americans. Yet inasmuch as new immigrants tended to be white-skinned
Europeans who lived in northern cities, Republican reformers did not ex-
pend their energy calling for federal intervention to fix voting irregularities
associated with them like they did in regard to similar voting problems in
the South. When they mentioned reform at all regarding their immigrant
vote, it was in terms of correcting the problem at the state and local levels,
not through an act of Congress as they were now calling for to help black
southerners.32
Even if the reformers managed to succeed in the aforementioned
fronts, they still had to contend with the possibility that they would have
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weak leadership in the White House. Benjamin Harrison had won the
presidential sweepstakes only in the electoral college, not in the popular
vote. His credibility was thus in question from the beginning of his term.
In order to lead the nation effectively, he would have to win the confi-
dence of a resentful majority of American voters, who certainly had not
given him or the GOP a mandate for making changes as radical as the one
they envisioned regarding black voting rights. Political pundits questioned
Harrison's leadership skills and doubted that he would be prepared for
the challenges that his administration would face. They had good reason
for skepticism. Prior to his election as president, Harrison had enjoyed
something less than a sterling career in national politics. He lacked expe-
rience, having served only one term as a U. S. senator and otherwise hav-
ing held only a few minor positions in Indiana state politics. This record
inspired little confidence among the American people, even among those
who voted for the Hoosier statesman.33 In the campaign of 1888, Demo-
crats had openly expressed delight with the GOP's choice of Harrison as
its standard-bearer. They thought incumbent president Grover Cleveland
could easily defeat this second-rate, unexciting Republican candidate.
Democratic Senators James Berry of Arkansas and Alfred Colquitt of
Georgia agreed that they could not be more pleased with the GOP's choice
of Harrison as the Republican presidential nominee if they had picked
him themselves. Alabama Senator James L. Pugh commented that
Harrison must be undoubtedly the "weakest man in the Republican
party. . . . He has more ways to make people dislike him than any man I
ever met in Congress." South Carolina Senator Matthew Butler added,
"If we can't beat Harrison, we can't beat anybody."34
Harrison had received the nomination for four reasons, none of which
seemed very flattering to him. One, he hailed from the most important of
all the "doubtful" or "swing" states, a place that fellow Indianan and Demo-
cratic Senator Daniel Voorhees called "the Belgium of [American] politics,
the debatable land between great contending parties and opinions."35
Harrison, the GOP assumed, could deliver this pivotal state into the Re-
publican fold, which is ironic considering the fact that he could not win
reelection to the U. S. Senate there in 1887. Two, the party's real thorough-
bred, James G. Blaine, the "plumed knight" of Maine, who had lost the
presidential contest in 1884—one of the closest in American history—by
barely one thousand votes, chose not to run, citing lack of unanimous ap-
proval for his nomination within the party.36 Three, the two rival factions
of the party—the reformers and the money men—needed a candidate they
could both agree upon. Harrison was a candidate that neither felt particu-
18 Introduction
larly excited about, yet both could tolerate for the sake of compromise.
And four, he was the grandson of a president.37
The GOP's strategy to unseat the Democrat Cleveland with the
uninspiring Harrison looks brilliant in retrospect. Since 1889 marked the
one-hundredth anniversary of the U.S. Constitution and federal system of
government, which gave us the presidency and the modern Congress, the
Republican strategy relied on reminding voters that the next commander
in chief would be the "centennial president." In the best tradition of bloody-
shirt Republicanism, the GOP made sure voters understood that Harrison
was a Union veteran while Cleveland was not. Only Harrison, therefore,
was qualified to be the "new George Washington," the first president in the
second century of presidents, and only Harrison had the right to represent
the great United States at its centennial celebration. This plan of using the
centennial, with all its patriotic sentimentalism, worked well in conjunc-
tion with their concomitant strategy of harping upon Harrison's impres-
sive family tree. His grandfather, William Henry Harrison, had won the
presidency in 1840 and had briefly served in 1841, before succumbing to
pneumonia. His great grandfather, the first "Benjamin" Harrison, had signed
the Declaration of Independence. The current Benjamin formerly held the
rank of brigadier general in the Union army during the Civil War. His pedi-
gree was clearly superior to his experience in high office, and the GOP hoped
that it would be enough to lead the party to victory against the semi-popu-
lar incumbent president Grover Cleveland.38
Harrison stunned his detractors and pleasantly surprised his luke-
warm supporters by winning the election and becoming the nation's cen-
tennial president. Once elected, however, questions about his credibility
immediately surfaced. Besides not winning the popular vote, which was a
major issue in itself, he was also unable to overcome the stigma that he was
not the real standard bearer of the GOP, much less the leader of the whole
U. S. government. On the issue of losing the popular vote, Democratic lead-
ers and voters alike resolved to hold the Harrison administration in con-
tempt from day one, not merely because of his weak electoral college victory,
but because that victory resulted from some questionable, if not utterly
fraudulent, voting irregularities in at least two states—Indiana and New
York. The Hoosier and Empire states—the home states of the two candi-
dates—were the only two that the GOP carried in 1888 that it did not carry
in 1884, but they made all the difference in the outcome of both elections.
The Democrats thus set out to derail the new administration from the start,
to malign Harrison's leadership or lack thereof at every opportunity, and
to poke fun at him personally whenever possible.39 One southern Demo-
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crat achieved the latter two aims in one jibe, proclaiming before Congress:
"Lincoln, I believe, was a great man; but has a party that started with [such]
a great man and run to the present Executive not gone to seed? What better
evidence of degeneracy would you have?"40
On the second issue, two leaders in the Republican Party overshad-
owed the president in the popular perception. One was Thomas B. Reed,
who, as the Speaker of the House in the Fifty-first Congress, proved a stron-
ger presence in the national government than Harrison. Besides Reed,
Harrison's chief rival in the Republican hierarchy, the ever-controversial
James G. Blaine, held enough sway over the party that he could essentially
name himself to whatever position he chose in the Harrison administra-
tion, a fact that was not lost on the American public. He chose the office of
secretary of state. Although his position placed him in charge of foreign
policy and largely kept him out of the limelight during Harrison's term
(because no serious foreign policy issues arose from 1888 to 1892), some
Americans never ceased to consider him a more dominating presence in
the Harrison administration than the president himself.41 As one newspa-
per put it, compared to Blaine, President Harrison looked like a "Lilliputian."
Concerning the jockeying for power in the GOP, the paper added that "it is
dollars to doughnuts that when the smoke of battle clears away he [Blaine]
will make a hole in the earth with his forefinger, drop . . . 'Harrison the
small,' into it, and leave the country the pleasant task of shoveling the
earth."42
While Harrison actually stood considerably taller than a mythical
Lilliputian, he was still quite diminutive in stature, although not small in
girth. Besides his size, or lack thereof, he also seemed to wear a permanent
squint on his face, leading Theodore Roosevelt to comment once that he
always looked like "a pig blinking in a cold wind."43 Yet, this odd-looking
little man now had the job of trying to unite the Republican Party after the
election, to win the confidence of spiteful Democrats, and to guide the ship
of state through the turbulent political waters that lay ahead. Could he do
it? No one knew, but if so, his success would start with the wooing of the
American public through his outstanding oratorical ability. Yes, fortunately
for Harrison, he did have that one great redeeming quality. He was by all
accounts an exceptional public speaker. Many contemporaries—Republi-
can and Democrat alike—considered him to be among the best orators
they had ever heard. Early historians likewise thought him among the best
ever elected president. But even so, he quickly proved ineffective as the leader
of his party, much less the commander in chief of the nation, because his
executive actions rarely matched his eloquent rhetoric.44 As one contem-
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porary observed, Harrison "had a trick of turning a Republican into a
Democrat that was almost sleight-of-hand. . . . If people could have just
heard those splendid speeches, just heard Harrison, and then gone straight
home and remembered how fine it was and never, never tried to shake the
speaker's hand that was so like a wilted petunia—well, history might have
been different."45
But try they did, not only to shake his hand, but to capture his gaze, to
hold his attention, and to win his affection. Supporters, spoils seekers, and
congressmen in need of political favors immediately inundated the new
executive. The incredible volume and variety of citizens expecting presi-
dential action overwhelmed him. On one occasion, Republican Senator John
J. Ingalls of Kansas visited Harrison at the White House to seek a presiden-
tial appointment for a friend to a low-level post in the Sunflower State.
Harrison rejected Ingalls's candidate, however, and told him he would ap-
point a friend of his own from Indiana to the post. Ingalls responded by
declaring, "Mr. President, if you have any friends in Indiana or anywhere
else for God's sake nominate them."46
African Americans found themselves among the most expectant and
disappointed of Harrison's supporters.47 When a delegation of bishops from
the African Methodist Episcopal Church came pleading the case for civil
rights legislation, which Harrison had already promised to support in ev-
ery campaign speech as well as in his inaugural address, they left without
satisfaction. Harrison assured them only that something would be done,
but otherwise told them nothing to inspire faith and confidence in his ad-
ministration. He realized that he could not please everyone, and he did not
want to build hopes any more than he had already done. Onlookers imme-
diately interpreted his vagaries and silences as aloofness and apathy.48
Harrison's personal racial views could sometimes seem just as erratic
and puzzling as his presidential leadership, or lack of it, on racial issues.
While he rejected the idea of inherent black inferiority to whites—an idea
that had steadily grown in popularity throughout the 1880s—he did not
award any more civil service jobs to blacks than had any other post-Recon-
struction president. In fact, he appointed only ten blacks to office. African
Americans nationwide voiced their disappointment, but northern blacks
complained the loudest, because, whether intentional or not, Harrison ap-
pointed southerners almost exclusively when he appointed any blacks at
all. The northern Republican press charged him with a much more serious
discrepancy, however. The Boston Herald, the Buffalo Express, and the Pitts-
burgh Dispatch all reported that, shortly after moving into the White House,
Harrison had fired all of the blacks on staff and replaced them with white
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workers. There is no confirmation that such a thing ever happened, but the
fact that the northern Republican press reported it makes it at the very least
plausible. The modern authority on the racial views of the presidents, George
Sinkler, does not discount the possibility that such an incident occurred.49
If it did occur, Harrison's action would by no means have been unique.
Black-owned newspapers across the country constantly kept tabs on Re-
publican leaders, and they routinely reported similar cases where profess-
ing humanitarians practiced racial discrimination.50
Since Reconstruction, African Americans had become increasingly
aware of the duplicity of their supposed Republican friends. They had be-
gun to grow wary and weary of political rhetoric that had promised them
much and had given them little since the mid 1870s. Many had become
disillusioned with their dismal situation. It increasingly appeared that the
problem was not so much the Republicans' inability to do something about
black suffrage as it was their unwillingness to act. For instance, the GOP
had adopted the high protective tariff as its issue of choice during the first
Cleveland administration, scarcely mentioning civil rights for blacks. Where
were the party's priorities? asked African Americans. It should not be sur-
prising that, by 1890, several thousand black voters had already abandoned
the party that emancipated their race, and many others threatened to do
so. Some of the defectors joined the Democratic Party, others became in-
dependents who hoped to force both parties to compete for their allegiance,
and the rest stopped voting altogether out of disgust and despair. T. Tho-
mas Fortune, the mulatto editor of the New York Age, for instance, expressed
what many other blacks must have been thinking when he said, "I have
served the Republican party, the Prohibition party, and the Democratic
party, and . . . I declare that none of them cares a fig for the Afro-American
further than it can use him... .We [blacks] have served parties long enough
without benefit to the race. It is now time for parties to serve us some, if
they desire our support."51
African Methodist Episcopal Bishop Henry McNeal Turner of Atlanta
agreed, saying, "I have not deserted the Republican party, the Republican
party has deserted me and seven millions of my race."52 A few radicals in
the black press even contemplated the chimerical idea of forming their own
party. The majority within the black community, however, remained loyal
to the party of Lincoln. These loyalists tended to ostracize those who bailed
out of the sinking Republican ship, and some even committed acts of vio-
lence against the defectors. Although most blacks remained loyal to the
Republican Party, the growing lack of accord about how to deal with the
unfavorable circumstances only exacerbated their problems.53
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Southern Democrats used the friction between the GOP and African
Americans to justify their racist beliefs and actions. As Senator James K.
Jones of Arkansas put it, "Oppressed and outraged people seek their friends;
and the negro knows that, while the [white northern] Republican neighbor
is his friend for 'campaign purposes,' for sympathy and help he must look
to and rely upon the [white] people of the South."54 Such charges would
become one of the Democratic battle cries in the upcoming fight to solve
the southern race problem.
President Harrison and the Republican leaders of the Fifty-first Con-
gress faced serious challenges as they assumed control in 1889. Yet they
made their decision to tackle the southern race problem before they took
office, and they would stick to it, come what may. The only question was
how to accomplish their goal of reforming the South. To the average Re-
publican congressman or senator, the plan of implementing a massive new
program of federal supervision of elections looked like a good one. At least,
it seemed to be the best of the three possible solutions to the race problem
that had been thought of so far and that would consequently come up for
consideration. The other two—to uplift blacks through a federally funded
education program, or to relocate blacks from the South to other parts of
the nation or world through a federally funded colonization program—
inspired less passion than ballot reform. The former came to life in the
Blair Education Bill, the pet project of New Hampshire Senator Henry Blair,
which had appeared before Congress twice already by 1890 without pass-
ing but was scheduled for another hearing in the Fifty-first Congress. The
latter, an idea that many politicians and social leaders had advocated since
the first African slaves arrived in the Americas, now seemed to be a good
idea to almost every southern congressman, including its chief proponents
Senators Matthew Butler of South Carolina and John Tyler Morgan of Ala-
bama. It, too, would come to life, if only briefly, in the form of the Butler
Emigration Bill. It would, in fact, be the first of the potential solutions to
the race problem that Congress would debate.
Chapter 1
To EMPTY A RUNNING STREAM
The D. S. Senate Considers
the Butler Emigration Bill
The South would be a great deal better off if it could get rid of a large part
of its negro population.
—Savannah Morning News
The Negroes will never migrate. They are a race of strong local attachments.
They are parasitic in all their tendencies.... I have not the slightest confi-
dence in the idea of deportation.
—Senator George Vest of Missouri
Fully aware of Republican intentions to push a federal elections bill through
Congress, Democrats sought to forestall that plan and, if possible, elimi-
nate the need for it by introducing their own bill to deal with the southern
race problem. Realizing that the Republicans would need a few days to or-
ganize and prioritize their legislative agenda, the Democrats hoped to take
initial control of the business of the Senate and spark a debate that might
catch fire in the American public as well as in Congress. Their plan was to
introduce a bill that would make it possible for those black southerners
who wanted to leave the South to do so at taxpayers' expense. The idea was
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neither new nor unique. The belief that Congress should appropriate funds
for such a mass exodus of African Americans had a long history. Various
schemes for removing blacks from the South had been attempted from time
to time, as early as the colonial era and as late as 1879, with paltry results in
each case.1 Such attempts had failed each time because of the exorbitant
expense involved and a general lack of interest among blacks in emigrat-
ing.2 Although these early measures had most often been called "coloniza-
tion" plans, the Democrats of 1890 called theirs an "emigration" bill because
they wanted to stress the fact that they would not be forcing the removal of
blacks from the South but would merely be giving them the option and the
ways and means to leave voluntarily.
Since all previous attempts at colonization had failed, why did many
Democrats believe that their new plan would be any different? The answer
is complex, but it shows that the plan was not as foolish as it might appear
on the surface. First, there had always been a large contingent of black
southerners who wanted the option of leaving the South and were thus
intrigued by such proposals. As black educator William H. Crogman ex-
plained it, "For the first ten or twelve years after the [Civil] war.. . . Every
little politician, every crank, constituted himself a Moses to lead the Negro
somewhere; and various were their cries. One cried, 'On to Arkansas!' and
another 'On to Texas!' and another 'On to Africa!' and each had a following
more or less."3 Thus, many blacks expressed interest in leaving their cur-
rent homes throughout the 1880s, if only someone would lead them and if
somehow their move could be funded. By 1890, nothing had changed to
diminish this interest, but several important developments had occurred
to increase it. For one thing, the same economic hard times that caused the
white agrarian revolt in the late 1880s had hit the black farmer as well,
causing many, for the first time, to consider moving to greener pastures,
whether Africa or somewhere else. For another thing, the gains blacks had
made during Reconstruction had been almost totally lost in the 1880s be-
cause of various discriminatory practices in the South. Among these prac-
tices were: violence against blacks, which inexplicably escalated in 1889,
particularly in the form of lynchings; disfranchisement, which had already
robbed them of most of their political power in the South by 1890, even
before Mississippi's new constitution started a wave of state usurpations of
the Fifteenth Amendment; and forced segregation, which had become com-
monplace by this time. For a third thing, some blacks complained of taxa-
tion without representation, the old tried and true protest mantra of the
American Revolution generation. They argued that without enforcement
of the Fifteenth Amendment they could not be represented in proportion
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to their population in the federal and state governments, yet their tax dol-
lars helped pay the governments' bills. Moreover, the state governments
did not distribute government services, such as public education, equally
among the races. Why should they remain in a nation which did not give
them a fair return on their tax dollars? Finally, a sudden wave of propa-
ganda promoting the idea of emigration swept over the United States in
early 1890, convincing many blacks and whites alike that the best solution
to the race problem lay in total physical separation of the races.4
This wave of propaganda, more than any other factor, caused Con-
gress to take up the issue of federal aid to emigration in early 1890. The
story of how it happened begins in Liberia. This small American-made
nation on the malaria-infested coast of western Africa had suffered from
poverty and government instability since its founding in 1817. The Ameri-
can Colonization Society (ACS) and various other colonization organiza-
tions had settled only a few thousand black Americans in Liberia in all
those years. No one representing the ACS ever advertised Liberia as an in-
viting paradise. Most emigrants moving there could expect to trade one
type of hard life in the United States for a different type of hard life in
Liberia, which included fighting diseases without adequate medicines and
medical facilities; making friendships, alliances, and trade partnerships with
natives who did not always welcome new neighbors, suffering through pov-
erty that would likely be even more abject than the worst sharecropping
arrangement in the American South; and living under an unstable and some-
times oppressive government. Few black Americans wanted to make this
trade, and, from a purely financial perspective, even fewer could afford to.
The year 1889, however, brought a ray of hope to Liberia for the first time
in many years, when European companies began exploiting the nation's
lucrative, indigenous rubber plant. It seemed to Liberians and the ACS that
the upstart rubber industry would be the panacea bringing economic de-
velopment and the ways of civilization to the vast jungle hinterland. With
signs of life in the Liberian economy, therefore, the ACS could begin anew
its previously flagging efforts at recruiting potential emigrants.5
Leading this recruiting drive was Edward Blyden, a West Indies-born
Liberian who spent much of his time in London. He toured the United
States in late 1889 and early 1890, speaking and making acquaintances with
Americans of wealth and means. His visit would not have caused nearly as
much interest as it actually did without a connection that he established by
chance with some influential white South Carolinians who favored emi-
gration as the solution to the South's race problem. Blyden's visit to the
United States just happened to coincide with the publication of a book
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called An Appeal to Pharoah [sic], written by an anonymous author, later
revealed to be Carlyle McKinley, assistant editor of the Charleston News
and Courier. Although McKinley and Blyden had apparently never met or
corresponded before, they spoke essentially the same message—that the
solution to America's race problem lay in black emigration. In December
1889, James C. Hemphill, McKinley's boss and chief editor of the Charles-
ton News and Courier, invited Blyden to South Carolina for an interview.
Blyden accepted, the interview went to press, and papers all over the coun-
try soon began broadcasting his startling views on emigration to a fasci-
nated public. As a Liberian, Blyden's words seemed to validate the idea of
emigration expressed in An Appeal to Pharoah [sic], which probably would
not have generated much enthusiasm otherwise.6
As it turned out, its influence reached even to Africa itself, where British-
American adventurer Henry M. Stanley, who had long been employed in
mapping the Congo region, building roads and describing the natives of
inner Africa for King Leopold of Belgium, read it with great approval.
Stanley, who had caused quite a stir with the publication of his own books
about the previously isolated inner reaches of Africa,7 wrote the publishers
of the book in early 1890 to thank them for its message. He favored emigra-
tion as the solution to America's race problem. He believed that if An Ap-
peal to Pharoah [sic] could be widely distributed throughout the United
States, it would spark a mass emigration movement within five years. But
he predicted that it would never happen because "American capitalists . . .
are more engaged in decorating their wives with diamonds" than with con-
templating difficult racial issues.8
A few American capitalists, however, did prefer emigration for blacks
to diamonds for their wives. Among them were some southern members
of the U. S. Senate. Matthew Butler, the senior senator of South Carolina,
took the lead in drawing up the emigration proposal, which called for a
modest appropriation of $5 million per year to begin the enterprise. But-
ler, whose friends and family called him by his middle name, "Calbraith,"
had been a Confederate general who lost a leg in the Civil War. He be-
came a Redeemer thereafter, and the South Carolina legislature sent him
to the U.S. Senate in 1876. He was an archetypal Palmetto State hotspur
who seemed to carry a perpetual chip on his shoulder when speaking
about either the North, the Republicans, the war and Reconstruction, or
the race problem. In the Senate, he generally avoided making long, im-
passioned speeches, but he would never allow his state, his section, his party,
or his race to be disparaged without a fiery retort. Unlike some of his former
Confederate colleagues, he never rose to the highest level of leadership
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among southern Democrats in the Senate.9 Although he wrote the bill and
introduced it to the Senate, he did not begin the discussion of it, nor did he
ever advocate it as seriously and forcefully as another proponent of emi-
gration did. Those distinctions belong instead to John Tyler Morgan of
Alabama.
Morgan, a relative of former U. S. President John Tyler of Virginia,
had represented the Camellia State in the Senate since 1876, when, during
the "redemption" of Alabama, he won a close and contested race. Republi-
can colleague and senior Alabama Senator George F. Spencer, who believed
Morgan's election to have been fraudulent, accepted his seating only be-
grudgingly. In his younger days, Morgan had served as chief lieutenant of
one of the most ardent fire-eaters of the Civil War generation, William L.
Yancey. He had also risen to the rank of general in the Confederate army.
To say that he loved the South—particularly the Old South—and that he
believed in the old prewar state rights view would be understatements. While
most of his colleagues focused on current Gilded Age concerns or looked
ahead toward Progressive Era issues, Morgan favored retrenchment, regres-
sion, and restoration of the prewar status quo. Indeed, he must be counted
among the most conservative men on Capitol Hill in 1890, and he could be
arguably called the most outspoken racist ideologue of his generation. He
was widely acclaimed to possess, as his biographer put it, "a wider range of
information" on public issues than any other man of his generation. He
was certainly among the most talkative men in national politics and was
reputed to be the foremost "long-distance talker" or "jawsmith" in the U.S.
Senate. One Alabama newspaper remarked of Morgan that "his fervid elo-
quence" could be compared to a "mountain torrent... dashing against the
opposition," and that when he believed in something passionately, his be-
liefs were like "lightning . . . coursing through his veins."10
On January 7, 1890, Morgan called up the Butler bill for consider-
ation. Sensing that Republicans would likely consider the bill a divisive,
partisan, and sectional measure, Morgan tried from the start to prove oth-
erwise. The bill did not propagate a radical new idea, he said, but an idea
that had been around in various forms for more than a century. Summa-
rizing his argument, many of the most respected leaders in American gov-
ernment throughout the nation s history had believed that the solution to
the race problem lay in deporting or scattering the black population. Even
some of the staunchest and most revered Republicans and Whigs of earlier
generations favored this approach, including Abraham Lincoln, Henry Clay,
and Daniel Webster. The current Secretary of the Treasury in the Harrison
administration, William Windom of Minnesota, whose credentials as a
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partisan Republican and a genuine humanitarian no one questioned, also
advocated emigration. Why should the idea not be taken seriously then? If
the main source of the race problem came from the concentration of blacks
in one region, what could possibly be wrong with diffusing the population?
If the federal government simply shuffled blacks around in the United States,
it would spread their voting strength thin enough that there would be no
danger of them controlling any state government. The specter of black con-
trol of state and local governments was, after all, what white southerners
feared so much, causing them to disfranchise blacks and otherwise to try to
keep them down socially and economically. Eliminating that threat by scat-
tering blacks in America would be an improvement over existing condi-
tions, but removing them from the United States altogether would be even
better.11
Morgan believed that the technological advancements of the indus-
trial revolution in Gilded Age America had made the logistics of mass emi-
gration possible for the first time. He claimed that more blacks could now
be shipped abroad in one year than had been shipped in the first twenty
years of the American Colonization Society's existence. Even though the
population of blacks had reached almost eight million by 1890, through a
long-range, federally funded program, every one could conceivably be
helped to return to his or her ancestral homeland. Morgan then changed
the thrust of his argument, asking, if there never had been any Africans in
America and suddenly eight million of them wanted to immigrate to
America, would the federal government allow it? "No! Never!" he exclaimed.
Why, then, should they be allowed to stay now?12
Morgan next invoked the old pre-Civil War southern argument of
white paternalism toward blacks, claiming that he and his fellow support-
ers of the Butler bill all cared deeply for the welfare of their black friends
and neighbors, even to the point of considering many of them as family
members. And while it would be difficult to break their long-term bonds of
affection, these Americans of African ancestry would ultimately be better
off in the land of their forefathers than in the United States. They were
now, for the first time, psychologically and intellectually prepared for the
move en masse because they had gained education, political experience,
Christianity, and social civility from having enjoyed a generation of free-
dom in the United States. If anyone seriously thought that by moving to
Africa, black Americans would lose these attributes of civilization, white
southerners would never try to encourage them to leave. But the opposite
would surely happen—black Americans would help lift the whole African
continent out of barbarism and backwardness. If Africa could be so con-
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verted, it would only happen through the work of blacks themselves, be-
cause most native Africans had "a marked aversion to the white race." Cer-
tain parts of Africa were among the only places on earth where the white
Catholic church, which for centuries had built its reputation upon dogged
determination to proselytize reluctant peoples, had given up its missionary
efforts. Therefore, black Americans must become the missionaries, a privi-
leged elite in Africa who would do what white men could never do. But, to
be successful, they would have to learn to "be as kind and patient and gen-
erous towards their own kindred as we [white southerners] have been to
them." Morgan read from the publications of the British Zoological Soci-
ety and the journal of Henry M. Stanley to prove just how badly Africa
needed this civilizing influence and to prove that the interior of the dark
continent, particularly the Congo region, would make a suitable habitation
for the emigrants.13
Morgan reasoned that a mass expatriation to Africa would affect blacks
the same as the American Revolution had affected the patriots in the colo-
nies: it would give them "independence, liberty, and power," but, unlike
the founders of the United States, they would gain all of this "without a
sacrifice." If they remained in America, they would never enjoy these bless-
ings, but they would waste their lives trying to obtain them, for no matter
how intelligent, talented, and determined a black man may be, said Mor-
gan, "he cannot find a place suited to his worth in any part of the United
States. The more conspicuous his abilities may be, the less chance he will
have for a position where he can make them felt. All of us, in every part of
the Union, with one accord refuse to the negro the power and influence for
which we have endeavored to qualify him. How many blacks hold positions
of power and influence in the North? None! What northern state had ever
sent a black man to either house of Congress? None!"14
Considering the nature of the situation, it would be more humane,
Morgan continued, to stop building the hopes of black Americans through
the drawing of them into the vortex of party politics and making them the
spoils. Removing them from the political equation by encouraging and help-
ing them to emigrate would be in the best interest of everyone: it would
restore peace between the North and South, remove a stumbling block from
the path of both Democrats and Republicans, uplift the continent of Af-
rica, and give the emigrants opportunities for self-fulfillment that they
would otherwise never know. He concluded by asserting that "pride of race
will cause the African negro to rejoice in his coming as the redeemer and
regenerator of his fatherland. . . . Their light shall be as a city set upon a
hill."15
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Following Morgan's lengthy opening remarks, Matthew Butler spoke
briefly on behalf of his emigration bill. He began by explaining that the bill
did not call for involuntary deportation of blacks, but only voluntary emi-
gration. His argument thereafter quickly degenerated into a rant about his
perception of the race problem rather than an explanation for why the best
solution could only be found in emigration. Whereas Morgan had made a
strong case for how emigration would benefit everyone in America and
Africa, Butler mainly just attacked what he considered to be the hypocrisy
of northern Republicans and philanthropists who loved "the negro at a
distance" but wanted to keep blacks in the South for political purposes.16
Similarly, whereas Morgan truly thought emigration represented the best
solution to the race problem, Butler seemed insincere in advocating his
own bill. His true intention behind the bill appeared to be only to antago-
nize the Republicans with a measure that he knew would irritate most of
them. Indeed, according to one northern newspaper, Butler later admitted
that he did not really expect anyone to take his bill seriously and had only
introduced it as "a piece of sarcasm" to make the Republicans do some
soul-searching before they launched their Federal Elections Bill.17
If Butler hoped to antagonize the Republicans, his plan worked. If he
wanted to cause soul-searching among them, it failed. Three Republicans
briefly answered Butler's attack. George Frisbie Hoar of Massachusetts
pointed out that most blacks did not wish to abandon their belief in the
American dream, and they never would. Why would they possibly want to
leave this "paradise of labor?" he asked.18 Henry Blair of New Hampshire
contended that it would be much cheaper and easier to keep them here,
educate them, and help them gradually to assimilate into white society than
to ship them off to Africa. He also doubted that emigration could work
because, for every one black American who boarded a ship bound for Af-
rica, two native Africans would board the same ship for the return voyage
to America. In other words, most Africans, given a choice, would gladly
trade the hardships of life in their native land for the difficulties of life in
the United States.19
John J. Ingalls of Kansas next rose to answer Butler. Ingalls was al-
most as much a partisan, sectionalist, and hotspur as Butler, despite being
the current president pro tern of the Senate, and a three-term member. He
had a habit of launching into both bloody-shirt tirades and racist diatribes
that could leave listeners flabbergasted, which he did in his response to the
Butler bill—a speech he called the "Fiat Justitia."20 He also committed egre-
gious plagiarism in this well-prepared but rambling reaction to the Butler
bill. Opponents charged, and Ingalls's biographer has verified, that the main
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ideas and many of the words of this speech came from a book called Justice
and Jurisprudence by John Philpot Curran, although Ingalls never gave him
credit.21
The "Fiat Justitia" reads more like an incoherent, rambling racial ti-
rade than a well-conceptualized and scholarly case against emigration. For
the historian, it is in fact difficult in places to determine whether Ingalls
favored or opposed emigration. But oppose it he did, because he wanted
the black vote to remain in the South and be protected by the provisions of
the coming Federal Elections Bill. In essence, Ingalls argued that, if Butler,
Morgan, and other white southern emigration advocates really cared about
blacks, they would give them equal voting rights in the South rather than
try to deport them to Africa. As long as blacks stayed in the South and did
not venture northwestward to Kansas, Ingalls favored a large black popula-
tion remaining in the United States. He did not favor racial mixing, how-
ever. Indeed, he found the idea absolutely repulsive and wanted to make
perfectly lucid the fact that, while he favored political equality for blacks,
he drew the line at social equality. For an illustration of just how strongly
he felt about the issue, he recalled a recent conversation with Frederick
Douglass. The venerable old black civil rights leader had told Ingalls that
he believed the different races would eventually amalgamate in the United
States. Ingalls scolded Douglass for the assertion, proclaiming defiantly that
whites would never amalgamate with an "inferior" race. (Douglass later
responded to the Kansan's speech saying, "I have always entertained for
that gentleman the highest respect. When he is right he is very right and
when he is wrong he is very wrong. There is no halfhess in his character
and composition. He is either all or he is nothing. In this present instance
he happens to be not only wrong but very wrong."22) Ingalls thought his
own brand of racism somehow a great degree better than the brand his
southern Democratic colleagues espoused. He accused white southerners
of actually favoring "extermination" of blacks to either amalgamation or
emigration. He ended the "Fiat Justitia" with a barrage of bloody-shirt
South-bashing, which included, among other things, several uncomplimen-
tary descriptions of the recently deceased leader of the Confederacy, Jefferson
Davis, and a pronouncement of judgment against the state of Mississippi
for its backwardness.23
Thus closed the first round of verbal sparring over the Butler Emigra-
tion Bill. Even though it had accomplished nothing, advocates of the bill
continued to try to generate support for the plan. On January 30, Zebulon
Vance of North Carolina, one of the recognized southern Democratic lead-
ers in the Senate, spoke on its behalf.24 Vance gave a long and well-conceived
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response to Ingalls's charges. In it, he proved that he not only supported
the emigration idea, but also that he could articulate the southern position
on racial issues in general as well as anyone in Congress. While the "irides-
cent" Kansan had succeeded in shifting the focus of the debate to put the
Democratic sponsors of the bill on the defensive, Vance countermanded in
such a way that his side regained the initiative, forcing Ingalls and the Re-
publicans back into the role of spoiler. The North Carolinian began by cit-
ing the latest statistics of demographic change among the black population
in his home state, showing that in 1889 a huge migration of blacks to Mis-
sissippi had begun, which continued into early 1890. The migrants chose
to move to the cotton kingdom of the Yazoo Delta by the thousands, he
determined, because it was one of the few places in the United States where
the demand for agricultural labor currently outstripped supply. Vance saw
two interesting points to be made about this movement of blacks to Missis-
sippi. First, it proved that blacks in large numbers would indeed pack up
everything they owned and travel a long distance to find a better life, which
lent credibility to the emigration idea. Second, these migrants willingly chose
to take up residence in a state in the deep South which, according to Ingalls,
set the standard for committing racial injustices. If race relations were re-
ally so bad in Mississippi, he asked rhetorically, why would so many blacks
want to move there? Why did they not instead choose to migrate to Ingalls's
state, Kansas, or some other northern state? Could this perhaps be a com-
mentary on how badly white northerners treated blacks? Perhaps black
southerners had heard of the discrimination that greeted the Exodusters in
Kansas. Clearly, said Vance, either blacks did not see the North as a region
where they could find better economic opportunities than existed in the
South, or else they did not think they would be welcomed there socially.
Either way, it meant the North had problems and prejudices of its own and
should not be casting stones at the South.25
Vance used this preliminary argument to set up his main point: he
did not support Senator Morgan's opinion that Africa should be the desti-
nation of choice for black emigrants. Rather than emigration, Vance fa-
vored the dispersal of blacks throughout the United States. Particularly, he
hoped to spread them evenly throughout all of the northern and western
states. He complained that the South should not be allowed to hold a mo-
nopoly on blacks since white northerners claimed to love them so much. In
making such a sardonic comment, he tried to sting Ingalls and fellow Re-
publicans with a charge of racial hypocrisy and thus make them defend
their reason for wanting to keep blacks exclusively in the South, which he
believed was purely so that the GOP could exploit their votes. Republicans,





Exodusters and the Excluded Ethnics. {Harper's Weekly, 1879.) Thomas
Nast again showed a clarity of thought on the subject of racial migration
and immigration that most white Americans and their political leaders
could not grasp during the Gilded Age.
however, saw no benefit in arguing with Vance over a bill that they knew
would never pass, and they refused to be drawn into his snare.26 Wade Hamp-
ton, South Carolina's junior senator, delivered the next and final speech on
behalf of the Butler bill, which turned out to be an anticlimactic conclu-
sion to the debate.27 He made a defense of the Butler bill using the biblical
analogy of Abraham and Lot separating from one another for the good of
both (as recorded in Genesis, chapter 13)—an argument that made as much
sense as any other pro-emigration argument—but no one listened. Thus
ended the brief but suspenseful debate over the Butler bill. The Senate never
voted on the bill but simply laid it aside, which is, of course, the fate of the
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majority of bills that ever come before either house of Congress in any
session. Both the bill and the idea of emigration in general continued to
surface, however, in impromptu discussions in both the Senate and the
House periodically during the remainder of both sessions in 1890-1891.
Republican Senator Henry Moore Teller of Colorado even introduced a
bill in the second session that would have appropriated a $50 million fed-
eral loan to the Afro-American Colonization Society to buy land from
Mexico in Baja California, but the Senate never considered it.28
In the midst of the Federal Elections Bill debate, a year after the Sen-
ate had laid aside the Butler bill, several Republicans took pleasure in bring-
ing up the southerners' "negro-deportation-by-emigration scheme," as
Senator Shelby Cullom of Illinois called it. He found it odd that the same
southern Democrats who advocated a federally funded program of emi-
gration argued against the Federal Elections Bill on the basis that it would
increase the power of the federal government and cost too much.29
Senator William M. Evarts of New York found the same hypocrisy
evident in the southern Democrats' position on emigration, noting how
they demanded to be left alone to work out their own destiny on racial
issues such as black suffrage and segregation, yet they conveniently changed
their tune now to ask for federal money to help them get rid of blacks
through an "expatriation" project. John Tyler Morgan answered Evarts by
pointing out that the only senator who ever advocated a "forced removal"
of blacks was William Windom, a northern Republican currently serving
as Secretary of the Treasury in the Harrison administration. Windom, like
Zebulon Vance, favored dispersion of blacks throughout the United States
over deportation abroad, but thought that the federal government should
not give blacks a choice in the matter. Morgan admitted that the idea would
be an acceptable alternative to voluntary emigration, bellowing, "I want
them scattered. I want the senator from New York to have thousands and
hundreds of thousands of them if he would like to have them."30
Democratic senators from the deep South favored the Butler bill al-
most unanimously, with the lone dissenting voice coming from Alfred
Colquitt of Georgia. Colquitt did not oppose the bill in principle. He sim-
ply thought it an unrealistic option considering that all previous coloniza-
tion programs and schemes had failed. As he put it, "All forms of
colonization to any part of this country, to Africa, or anywhere else must be
absolutely and finally discarded. Such a thing is out of the question. It is a
chimera. It is not possible."31 No Democrat outside of the deep South ex-
pressed opposition to the Butler bill except George Vest of Missouri. Vest, a
diminutive Democrat with neo-Confederate views, would go on to enjoy a
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long, distinguished career in American government (yet somehow is re-
membered in history only for eulogizing dogs as man's best friend). Dur-
ing the Democrats' filibuster of the Federal Elections Bill in January 1891,
he and John Tyler Morgan killed a fair amount of time disagreeing over the
feasibility of emigration as a solution to the southern race problem. Vest
argued that blacks were not a pioneering people, as were whites. They would
never voluntarily venture into the great unknown but would rather choose
a degraded status in the United States because they had a childlike depen-
dency on whites. If that were true, asked Morgan (reading from the Wash-
ington Post), why would two thousand blacks from Texas and Mississippi
be converging upon Savannah to await transportation to Africa from the
Congo National Emigration Steamship Company? Vest responded that they
would only sit there in Georgia waiting to be told what to do because they
would not have the capacity to figure it out for themselves.32
Vest then recalled an incident that he claimed to have personally wit-
nessed and participated in involving would-be Kansas Exodusters in 1879.
He said that a large group of blacks had been "seduced" into moving to
Kansas by fictitious portrayals of the Plains state as a land flowing with
milk and honey. He went down to the railroad depot in his hometown of
Kansas City, Missouri, on a cold autumn day, when the bone-chilling prai-
rie wind turned the landscape into a virtual frozen tundra, to witness the
arrival of these migrants from the deep South. "There were one hundred
and fifty of those poor, deluded creatures" who waited to "be taken where
they could live without work, and where, under cloudless skies, there would
be perpetual flowers and sunshine." These Exodusters told him they were
scared to be in Missouri because they had heard stories about the Border
Ruffians of old. They wondered when they could cross over into Kansas.
Vest complained that the "scoundrels" who had lured them there never
showed up to lead them on into Kansas, whereupon he and other compas-
sionate white Missourians had no choice but to take them in and feed them
lest they starve and freeze to death.33
The emigration debate also spread from the Senate to the House of
Representatives. In the House debate over the Federal Elections Bill in July
1890, Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts declared that talk of emigra-
tion among white southerners "is a confession of failure and a cry of de-
spair" in trying to solve the race problem without federal help.34 Other House
Republicans found comic relief in presenting a resolution passed by the
Afro-American Congress, an organization that had coincidentally assembled
in Chicago at the same time that the Senate took up the Butler bill. It asked
Congress to appropriate $100 million for the relocation of every "unhappy"
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white citizen of the South to the North. It added that Senators Morgan,
Hampton, and Randall L. Gibson (of Louisiana) should be jointly appointed
"the Moses [es] to direct the unhappy people out of the States of their mis-
fortunes."35 Although the Afro-American Congress poked fun at those it
perceived as the leaders among southern racists, it did, in fact, favor what it
called "emigration" (by which it meant only "migration") "to more law
abiding sections" of the United States.36
Most House references to emigration, however, contained no such
humor. Representative Charles E. Hooker of Mississippi contended, very
seriously, as did many other Americans, that God had ordained African
slavery in the United States because He wanted to civilize and Christianize
a portion of the race in order to send them back to Africa someday to evan-
gelize the gigantic, pagan continent. Hooker thus favored emigration and
believed fully that there would come a time in the not-too-distant future
when God would lead his chosen people out of the land of their captivity
back to their ancestral homeland. In the meantime, he thought it para-
mount that whites instill them with education and morality to prepare them
for the work ahead. He named Bishop Henry McNeal Turner, who had
only lately become recognized as a leader of the black race in America, as
the probable "Moses" of the emigrants. Hooker's ideas, to some extent,
proved prophetic. Indeed, Turner did become the most vociferous and vis-
ible leader of the emigration movement throughout the 1890s.37
Turner was born in South Carolina in 1834 to a free family. He claimed
that his maternal grandfather had been an African prince before becoming
a slave, but there is no evidence to support that claim. What is certain is
that his maternal grandmother was white, which gave Henry an unusually
light complexion and Caucasian facial features. Self-educated, articulate,
and ambitious, Turner rose through the ranks of the African Methodist
Episcopal Church, serving as a chaplain to black Union troops in 1863 and
gaining ordination as a bishop in 1880. He came to national prominence as
a spokesman for emigration in 1890, despite the fact that he did not per-
sonally make a pilgrimage to Africa until the latter part of 1891. During the
debate on the Butler bill, Turner wrote an open letter to former U. S. Sena-
tor Blanche K. Bruce of Mississippi, published in the Washington Post,
strongly supporting the bill. Turner wrote with complete sincerity and con-
viction that, if the bill passed, blacks would be fulfilling their destiny in the
service of Christ, for which generations of bondage and hardship had pre-
pared them.38 This letter catapulted him into the role of leading spokesman
for the cause of black emigration. Consequently, his stature grew over the
next few years, and he became the heir apparent of Frederick Douglass as
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the most visible, respected spokesman for African Americans. A much
younger man, however, one Booker Talifero Washington, who did not fa-
vor emigration, eventually achieved that distinction after delivering his fa-
mous "Atlanta Compromise" speech in 1895.39
Even after the Butler bill had been laid aside, Turner continued to
press for its reconsideration. He wrote a long letter to Butler thanking him
for his interest in helping black Americans and calling him the "Providen-
tial instrument" for carrying out God's plan. He realized that Butler wanted
to rid the South of its high black population rather than to help blacks
fulfill their divine destiny, but Turner praised him anyway, saying, "Some
may hiss and condemn your course for the present, but unborn genera-
tions will commend your courage and honor your memory." Turner found
only one fault with the bill, that the proposed appropriation of $5 million
"would be but a drop in the bucket" compared to the need. He urged But-
ler to reintroduce the bill with the appropriation increased at least "ten
times," because "hundreds of thousands" of black Americans desired to
emigrate.40
Such religious interpretations of the history and destiny of African
Americans did not originate with Turner. Alexander Crummell, also a
black religious leader of national stature, preceded Turner by many years
in preaching that God's divine plan for black Americans included send-
ing them back to Africa. In fact, he had been preaching this message even
before emancipation, which means he had been competing against the
egalitarian ideology of abolitionists and neo-abolitionists, with little suc-
cess, for most of his lifetime. Crummell considered the years since 1865
to be, for African Americans, analogous to the biblical story of the He-
brews wandering in the wilderness for forty years, when all along the prom-
ised land lay within their reach. The ancient Hebrews needed only to cast
fear aside and simply go forth in faith and claim their prize. He also be-
lieved that the Liberian experiment had failed thus far because 90 percent
of the settlers there had no education and thus little understanding of
how to conduct a civil government or society. He also pointed out (incor-
rectly) that not a single scholar or statesman had emerged from Liberia
in the nation's existence.41 Evidently, he did not think Edward Blyden quali-
fied as a scholar or statesman. Or perhaps Crummell refused to recognize
Blyden's accomplishments because he believed him to be a Moslem, as
did many other contemporaries, a notion that the renowned Liberian
emigrationist neither admitted nor denied.42
Some white religious leaders noted the propensity of black American
Christians for evangelizing and proselytizing in the United States while
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making little effort to spread the Gospel abroad. They complained, too,
that these black clergy tended to focus more upon gaining equality for their
people in America than upon saving their souls. They thought it hypocriti-
cal that black Christians would favor spreading the ideology of egalitarian-
ism in the United States over heeding the real call of God's people—mission
work. They thus spread a message that black Americans had an obligation
to become missionaries to one of the largest non-Christian populations in
the world: Africans. One commented that the "development of Africa ex-
cites in the Christian world to-day a more common and widespread inter-
est than any other subject," but, sadly, the "educated and well-to-do American
negro alone seems to be apathetic and indifferent" about it. Meanwhile, "tens
of hundreds of white men" have died in the "forests and swamps" of Africa
fulfilling their Christian duty. He added that black Christians could not claim
that lack of funds kept them from the mission field, because white mission
societies would gladly support them with generous contributions.43 At the
time this criticism arose, the African Methodist Episcopal Church had only
just begun to launch a serious evangelistic effort in Africa, and Turner, in
fact, made his impact felt in Africa immediately thereafter.44
Besides stirring the Christian community, the Butler bill also sparked
a tremendous discussion of the emigration idea in the forum of secular
public opinion. Although no public consensus on the subject ever emerged,
the amount of white support for it was unusual. Unlike earlier and later
waves of emigration fervor, the one that the Butler bill sparked did not
produce a great outcry from white southern employers, who usually feared
a labor shortage resulting from a  mass exodus of black workers from the
fields. Whereas the 1879 exodus to Kansas created quite a disturbance among
employers throughout the South, the threat of an even larger loss of work-
ers in 1890 elicited no comparable response.45 There are two obvious rea-
sons for this change. First, the black population had been in a constant
state of migration from the hill and Piedmont sections of the South to the
cotton belt throughout the late 1880s in search of better economic oppor-
tunities, and many white employers had already adjusted to the loss and
prepared for the eventuality of even greater losses. Second, the agricultural
economy of the South had become so depressed by 1890-1891 that a su-
perabundant labor supply existed, allowing white employers to absorb
the losses more easily than ever before.46 By contrast, in the next large black
movement out of the South after 1890—the great northern migration of
the World War I years—the traditional pattern of white opposition resumed,
indicating that the years surrounding the time of the Butler bill's consider-
ation were the ideal time, and perhaps the only time, in American history
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when a majority of white southerners would have accepted black emigra-
tion as a serious possible solution to the race problem.47
Many northern newspapers—including the Leavenworth Advocate, the
New York Independent, and four Philadelphia papers (the Inquirer, the Ex-
aminer, the Star, and the Transcript)—expressed their customary oppo-
sition to all emigration and colonization plans, lambasting the Butler bill
as a foolish and racist proposition. Open-mindedness and ambiguity of
opinion, however, characterized the views of other traditional opponents
of emigration, such as the Detroit Tribune. At the same time, other major
northern newspapers uncharacteristically supported the emigration idea,
including the New York Times, the Philadelphia Telegraph, the Pittsburgh Post,
and the Chicago Tribune. Most major southern newspapers—including the
Atlanta Constitution, the Charleston News and Courier, the Savannah Morn-
ing News, the Jackson Clarion Ledger, and the Arkansas Democrat—favored
black emigration in 1890. Although a few southern papers, such as the
Memphis Appeal-Avalanche, remained neutral on the issue, virtually none
opposed the Butler bill.48
One of the largest and most influential periodicals to support emi-
gration was the Nation, published in New York by Republican editor E. L.
Godkin. This leading Mugwump Republican organ proclaimed a similar
message to that of the religious leaders, that black Americans had an obli-
gation to go back to Africa. Its message differed, however, in that it empha-
sized infusing the dark continent with "civilization" (meaning, ostensibly,
education and technology) rather than the Gospel. Moreover, it deduced
that if blacks refused to go back to Africa, it proved that they lacked cour-
age, as well as confidence in their ability to apply the knowledge in Africa
that they had learned from white Americans without the help of white
Americans. If that were the case, said the Nation, there could be no other
explanation than that they realized their inferiority to and dependency upon
the white man. Thus, logically, if they would not leave, they deserved their
second-class American citizenship.49
Many of these supporters of emigration harped upon a common
theme: the need for a Moses figure to arise and lead the blacks to their
promised land, whether that be in Africa or somewhere else. One supporter,
who had traveled extensively in the interior of Africa, believed that the Congo
basin would be the promised land, calling it "another Canaan for our mod-
ern Israelites." He asked, "When is the new colored Moses to arise for this
exodus and lead his people home?"50 Another favored the migration of blacks
to the American West, stating matter-of-factly that the migrants needed
only two things that they did not yet have: a "Negro Moses" whom other
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blacks would respect and follow as a spiritual leader, and "Emigrant Aid"
companies to help them with more earthly problems, such as dealing with
land speculators, railroads, and unscrupulous traders.51
Others thought that neither Africa nor the western United States could
be a promised land for the black sojourners because both places had been
tried already without favorable results. Cuba, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, or
some Central American nation, they thought, would make the best prom-
ised land. The problem with such areas, however, was that, unlike Liberia,
which had always existed essentially as a protectorate of the United States,
the Latin American nations all possessed sovereignty. Black Americans could
only settle in them by permission of the various governments, and in some
countries protest against such settlement would be fierce.52 This fact did
not deter advocates of the plan, however, but merely prompted them to say
that black emigrants did not need a "Moses" so much as they needed a
"Cromwell" to take charge of the situation and force the issue upon the
government, regardless of the protest of the people.53
Talks had in fact already begun in late 1889 between blacks in San
Antonio, Texas, and the Mexican government for establishing a colony in
Mexico.54 Many blacks and whites alike hoped that the project would come
to fruition, but most did not really expect that it would. One southern news-
paper commented that, even if the Mexican government did pass the bill
allowing the colony, few blacks would accept the invitation to move there,
because: "The Negro knows when he has a good thing. He knows he is
better treated and respected right here in the cotton region of the South
than he ever has been or ever will be anywhere else in the world.. . . The
Negro is well satisfied, prosperous, and as happy as a woodchuck."55
This assessment of the contentment of blacks made sense to many
white Americans at the time because of the huge influx of black sharecrop-
pers into the cotton states around 1890. Indeed, as Zebulon Vance had
pointed out in his speech on the Butler bill, far more blacks had recently
moved into the cotton region and the American Southwest for economic
reasons than had contemplated moving out because of racial discrimina-
tion.56 This fact forced some observers to view the emigration idea as tanta-
mount to trying "to empty a running stream with a ladle."57 Indeed, large
numbers of blacks began migrating into the Yazoo Delta of Mississippi,
into western Arkansas, and especially into Oklahoma in 1890. The Okla-
homa Immigration Society was created especially to recruit blacks to the
former Indian territory. In the case of both Oklahoma and Arkansas, how-
ever, black newcomers immediately discovered that their new white neigh-
bors did not appreciate their presence. In Oklahoma, which had only been
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open to non-Indian settlement for one year, even the Choctaws refused to
live alongside black settlers. Many Native Americans, despite their own de-
graded status in American society, looked down upon blacks as inferior be-
cause some leaders of their tribes had once held black slaves just as white
Americans did. They thus tried, with temporary and limited success, to drive
the black settlers out of Oklahoma. Consequently, as a last resort, many of
the black migrants who had only recently moved from the eastern states to
the inhospitable West now found themselves appealing in desperation to the
American Colonization Society (ACS) for passage to Liberia.58
Most of these desperate souls took the obvious first step of writing
letters to the ACS, notifying the organization of their interest in emigration
and inquiring about the cost and logistics of a move to Africa. Few took the
next step, however, of actually filling out official applications with the ACS
in hope of being chosen for colonization in Liberia. The ACS, a privately
funded New York City agency founded in 1817, could not afford to accept
many applicants and thus weeded out the weak from those it considered
most likely to survive and prosper in Africa. From its inception until 1890,
the ACS had succeeded in helping only a few thousand blacks move to Af-
rica, because it had always required that the emigrants contribute some
portion of their own fare. In most years since emancipation, the ACS had
received only a few dozen applications, or a couple hundred at most.59 It
frequently rejected applicants because they lacked the financial resources
and often, by the organization's judgment, the know-how to start from
scratch in the wilderness of Liberia and earn a living there.60 In 1890—1891,
the ACS received a record number of letters expressing interest in emigra-
tion, applications for passage, and money forwarded by hopeful emigrants
as down payments on their moving expenses. It claimed that twice as many
people as ever before currently wanted to emigrate—based upon letters of
inquiry written mainly by male heads of household. It conservatively esti-
mated the number at one million, a figure that included all family mem-
bers of the heads of household.61 While this interest caused great excitement
in the ACS organization, most of these would-be emigrants lacked the ways
and means to procure the necessary $100 to $200 per person to make the
move. Moreover, in the judgment of ACS officials, many more did not pos-
sess the self-starting pioneer mentality required to carve a livelihood out of
the African wilderness. Most of the blacks expressing interest, therefore,
never even got past the initial inquiry stage to make it to the next and more
important stage of completing the actual applications for passage. Thus,
for all of the hype about emigration in 1890-1891, the ACS helped no more
blacks relocate to Africa in those years than in any average year.62
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Although interest in emigration arose among blacks throughout the
United States in 1890-1891, in some areas of the country, the emigration
fervor swept across the landscape like a brush fire or a religious revival.
Conway County, Arkansas, was one such place. More than two thousand
applications to the ACS came from this location alone in 1890-1891. The
ACS chose only a small group of these Arkansans for passage, however—
picking those it considered the most likely to succeed as African trans-
plants. The Reverend James Dargan led in organizing this group and
accompanying them on their overseas voyage. Both Dargan and his band
of emigrants actually turned out to be quite ill-prepared for the move.
The reverend embarked upon his journey abroad intending to stay in
Liberia himself, but after arriving and surveying the deplorable living
conditions there, he immediately decided to come back to the United
States. He decried that the place was "not fitting for a horse to live much
less a person." He left the other eighty-five emigrants there, however. As
he departed, so he claimed, those he left behind began "holering and cring
[sic] wanting to come back." Dargan's disturbing report captured the at-
tention of many other blacks who hoped to emigrate, giving them serious
second thoughts about leaving behind their American homes. Letters from
the new Liberian transplants soon arrived, however, which reported that,
after the initial shock of the move wore off, life was better in Liberia than
in the United States, and they were glad they had made the decision to
emigrate. One of the newly settled Africans even boasted that he would
not move back to Arkansas if the state offered to give him free land and
stock. The Arkansas emigration craze then resumed, with more people
interested than before, although the number of qualified applicants did
not increase.63
Propaganda inviting blacks to emigrate did increase, however, largely
as a result of Bishop Henry McNeal Turner's work. After finally visiting
Liberia himself in 1891, he wrote with assuredness that "anybody, white or
colored, from America is welcomed out here in Africa, either on the coast
or back in the interior, while Englishmen, French, and Germans are mostly
hated. . . . Americans are looked upon as the guardians of Liberia and the
friends of her blacks, and it modifies the prejudice somehow. I do not un-
derstand it yet." He added that the African people wanted black Americans
to move there. A particular tribal king, he said, expressed a deep and sin-
cere concern "about the colored people in America. He wanted to know
when we were coming home He will give his kingdom to his children in
the United States." Turner also cautioned, however, that "This is no place
for fools or paupers. . . . Persons should not come here and expect to be
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hirelings; for the native African stands ready to do all kinds of work much
cheaper and better than we can, except [for] skilled labor."64
Many black Americans criticized both Turner and the emigration
movement in general. Bishop Benjamin F. Lee said that Turner "speaks of
the United States as Hades and of Africa as Eden; yet even he still holds his
residence in Hades, only paying Eden a brief visit once a year."65 The most
outspoken black leader to oppose Turner and emigration, however, was C.
H. J. Taylor, an Atlanta lawyer who had served briefly as U. S. Minister to
Liberia during Grover Cleveland's first administration and later became a
Kansas City newspaper editor. Taylor thought of the little coastal nation in
the same way that the Reverend Dargan of Arkansas had described it, say-
ing all the hype about Liberia painted a misleading portrait of the true
conditions there. He accused Turner of having an ulterior motive in solic-
iting for Liberia. Turner had a vested interest in the economic development
of the African nation because he currently served as the Liberian consul to
the United States.66
Other black leaders, such as the Reverend E. K. Love of Georgia and
Virginia Congressman John Mercer Langston, a former U. S. Ambassador
to Haiti, opposed emigration not because of Turner's leadership but be-
cause of either their principles or their pragmatism. They believed that,
after centuries of slavery in America, during which they helped carve a civi-
lization out of the wilderness for the benefit of whites, blacks now deserved
the opportunity to fulfill the American dream, too. They should accept noth-
ing less, they said, but should keep the pressure on the federal government
until it finally capitulated and enforced the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments.67 Robert Smalls, a Republican politician from South Caro-
lina, explained that African Americans had contributed 186,000 soldiers in
250 battles for the defense and interests of the United States in various wars,
and, therefore, they "do not intend to go anywhere."68 Frederick Douglass
complained that most blacks could not leave even if they wanted to be-
cause their debts incurred from years of sharecropping locked them to the
land and to their creditors. He noted that whites in North Carolina had
tried to prevent blacks in their state from migrating to Mississippi recently
because they wanted the migrants to stay and work off their debts.69
W. E. B. DuBois, an idealistic young graduate of Harvard University
in 1890 who would later renounce his American citizenship and take up
permanent residence in Africa, opposed emigration because he, too, had
succeeded in America, thanks to his ivy-league education and natural abil-
ity. If only more blacks could become as educated as he, surely they would
earn the respect of white America, he thought.70 Booker T. Washington tac-
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itly opposed emigration on the grounds that blacks, despite the best efforts
of racist whites to keep them down, had made extraordinary progress be-
tween emancipation and 1890, and since the long-term economic pros-
pects of the race appeared to be improving, African Americans should be
patient and should not abandon their American homes.71 T. Thomas For-
tune, founder of the Afro-American League and editor of the influential
black newspaper the New York Age, held a mixed view on emigration. He
preferred protest, and even revolution, to leaving the United States, but he
did propose in 1890 that African Americans leave the South. He urged that
they "scatter . . . more generally throughout the republic" and thereby no
longer constitute a "race problem" for any particular section of the coun-
try.72 Clearly, black public opinion managed no consensus over the emigra-
tion issue.
Although the controversial Butler bill never became law, the interest
in emigration it helped reignite blazed for more than a year before dissipat-
ing. Not only Butler, but at least one northern Republican senator, William
E. Chandler of New Hampshire, a leading member of the Senate's commit-
tee on naval appropriations, continued to receive letters long after the Fifty-
first Congress had adjourned from interested citizens offering their support
for some amended version of the Butler bill.73 Bishop Henry McNeal Turner
thought it would eventually pass in a later Congress and that the bill's au-
thor, Senator Matthew Butler, would "go down in history as the pioneer of
the grandest measure in the closing days of the nineteenth century."74 Con-
sidering that (1) perhaps as many as one million (but certainly many thou-
sands of) African Americans seriously entertained the notion of leaving
the United States permanently in 1890-1891; and that (2) the Billion Dol-
lar Congress had the money at its disposal and therefore could have af-
forded to fund such a mass exodus of blacks; as well as that (3) millions
of white Americans would have either approved of or at least allowed
their departure, the Butler Emigration Bill was not necessarily a quixotic
pipe dream.75
From our post-civil rights movement vantage point, it is difficult to
understand how the emigration idea could have ever been taken seriously
as a potential solution to the South's race problem. Most African Ameri-
cans in 1890, however, found it even more difficult to muster optimism
about their future in the United States. What did they have to look forward
to in this country? Thus, the emigration idea certainly seemed to be a le-
gitimate alternative to their staying in the United States and watching their
civil rights erode until they finally disappeared into oblivion.
Why, then, if so many African Americans took the Butler bill seri-
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ously, did Congress not give it the consideration it deserved? Some south-
ern Democrats believed that most Republicans could never support such a
solution, "because it would imply a confession" of failure on the part of
those who had emancipated the slaves and begun the Reconstruction.76
Although that explanation may contain a grain of truth, the real answer is
probably that most Republicans could not bring themselves to contem-
plate sending away a race of people to whom the United States owed such a
debt of gratitude. As Republican leader James G. Blaine once said, and many
white Americans agreed, the nation "owes something to the negro."77 Afri-
can Americans had helped build the United States. Surely, the U. S. govern-
ment owed them more than mere passage back to Africa. Emigration, in
fact, must have seemed to many Republicans like a cruel end for a group of
people who deserved so much better. Why should white Americans add to
the injustices already committed against this unfortunate race and thereby
saddle their consciences with an even greater degree of guilt than they al-
ready felt? Thus, even though money was available and interest among blacks
abounded, the majority of the GOP—the party which represented humani-
tarianism, enlightenment, and progress—was not, nor would it ever be,
prepared to support emigration. Such a potential solution to the race prob-
lem seemed to be just too extreme. Northern Republicans, and indeed the
nation as a whole, therefore, accepted by default the unbridled growth of
racial segregation—a milder form of physical race separation that had be-
gun years before—as the best social arrangement for the racially bifurcated
South. Segregation thus became, as one historian has put it, "the maxi-
mum oppression to be tolerated from racist Americans" by ambivalent and
non-racist Americans.78
The adoption of full-scale segregation, however, was merely a social
measure—it did not directly touch the issue of political rights for blacks.
The American people and government still had to deal with the issue of the
black man's place in the American polity. The Federal Elections Bill would
soon address it, and many fair-minded Americans were ready. As the Inde-
pendent, a New York periodical, put it, forget the emigration bill—bring on
the Federal Elections Bill.79 Bring it on the Republicans would, but not be-
fore they first considered another potential solution to the race problem,
the Blair Education Bill. The issue of education for African Americans thus
becomes the focus of the next chapter of this study.
Chapter 2
To DRAIN THE INFINITE OCEANS
The Swan Song of the Once-Great Blair Education Bill
When education is universal, the question of race distinction will be oblit-
erated, justice will prevail, and people of different color will live beside one
another in all parts of our country with mutual respect.
—Senator Leland Stanford of California
It cannot be said that Congress has the power to tax the people for the
purpose of handing the money back to them as a gift.
—Senator Richard Coke of Texas
Once the Senate brushed aside the idea of emptying a running stream with
a ladle, it next sought to alleviate the race problem by draining the "oceans
of illiteracy," as Senator Henry Blair of New Hampshire put it, with the
Blair Education Bill.1 Black southerners, more than any other group of
Americans, faced the danger of drowning in a sea of ignorance, and the
Blair bill was intended to be the life buoy for rescuing the victims and tow-
ing them to safety upon the shoreline of American society. The idea was
that blacks could catch up with whites in education and that their ability to
function and compete in the white-dominated society would soon eradi-
cate the prejudice that created the race problem.
Like the colonization scheme, the idea of educating black southerners
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did not originate in 1890, nor did Blair pioneer it. From the outreaches of
the Freedmen's Bureau and the American Missionary Association to the
writings of Albion Tourgee and to the philanthropic efforts of George
Peabody and Andrew Carnegie, black southerners had been the recipients
of educational attention ever since their emancipation in 1865. Yet, com-
pared to the need, all educational efforts before 1890 had amounted to little
more than a drop in the bucket. Episcopal Bishop Thomas U. Dudley of
Kentucky explained the problem in 1885 by saying, "in spite of all their
boasted progress, the Negro possesses an ignorance which is simply abys-
mal."2 Something more needed to be done. Blair's proposal differed from
all of the previous education bills in that it called for the creation of a per-
manent, uniform, national, public school system in America supported with
federal funds. The public schools would thus necessarily operate under fed-
eral supervision. This plan, first introduced in the Senate in 1881, produced
some of the most highly charged debates in the history of Congress and in
the history of public education in the United States.3
Actually, various congressmen introduced ten separate bills for fed-
eral aid to education in the decade of the 1880s, but the Blair bill alone
received serious consideration. It was superior to all of the others, the re-
sult of Blair's extraordinary degree of research concerning the needs of
public schools. It identified and explained the nation's educational prob-
lems using statistics that critics could not easily refute, and it proposed
what seemed to be a sensible, though constitutionally questionable, solu-
tion to those problems. The Blair bill passed the Senate in 1884 by a vote of
33 to 11, again in 1886 by a vote of 36 to 11, and a third time in 1888 by a
vote of 39 to 29. Unfortunately, it never came before the House for consid-
eration because Democratic Speaker John G. Carlisle of Kentucky intensely
opposed it and refused to squander the House's precious time on it.4
In each case, bipartisan and trisectional coalitions both supported
and opposed it, and in each case a significant number of senators did not
vote, although most made their opinions known. No clear pattern emerges
regarding how northern, southern, western, Democratic, or Republican
senators voted. Each voted his conscience or voted according to the dictate
of his state legislature, and no consensus existed even among neighboring
states in any given region. For instance, in the South—the region where the
Blair bill would have had the greatest impact—North Carolina and Vir-
ginia supported it, South Carolina and West Virginia opposed it; likewise,
Georgia and Mississippi supported it, while the state sandwiched between
them, Alabama, opposed it.5 By 1890, with the incipient Farmers' Alliance
set against the bill, Democratic senators who favored the bill did so at the
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peril of losing their seats. James L. Pugh of Alabama came closer to that
ignominious end than any other U.S. senator, but his extremely rabid op-
position to the Federal Elections Bill throughout 1890, an election year,
pleased enough constituents and members of the state legislature that he
managed to keep his seat.6
Because the Blair bill had already been debated in three previous con-
gresses, the arguments for and against it had already been made thoroughly
manifest by the time the Fifty-first Congress considered it. Many senators
who spoke on the bill in earlier debates thus chose not to speak in 1890.
They simply awaited the end of the debate, so they could move on to other
business. In this group were John Tyler Morgan of Alabama, William B.
Bate of Tennessee, and James B. Beck of Kentucky (all of whom had consis-
tently and outspokenly opposed the bill), William M. Evarts of New York
(who had just as consistently and earnestly supported it), and John Sherman
of Ohio (who had made a total reversal from initial opposition to strong
support). Others, however, such as Richard Coke of Texas, never seemed to
tire of finding new reasons to dislike the Blair bill. As one colleague re-
marked, Coke "finds so much vitality in this bill that he has to kill it every
session by [making] a long speech."7
The final debate on the bill, which occurred in early 1890, would have
been anticlimactic if not for three factors. First, the scheduling of debate
on the bill fell, by chance, between the debates on the Butler Emigration
Bill and the Federal Elections Bill. This fact made it a vital component in
the larger discussion of the race problem at the beginning of the Jim Crow
era. Understanding it now from the historical perspective is, therefore, es-
sential for a clear comprehension of the greater issue. Second, Henry Blair's
passion for his education bill did not abate in eight years of relentless work.
Blair nurtured his bill, constantly updating his data and otherwise perfect-
ing it, and he presented his case for the fourth time as though it were the
first. The energy he spent and the time he consumed advocating this previ-
ously doomed measure commanded the public's attention, though some-
times it was only negative attention. This public fascination compels the
historian to give Blair the consideration he craved for himself and his be-
loved education bill. Finally, this last debate on the Blair bill in 1890 repre-
sented the only real chance in four tries that Blair had to get the measure
approved. He had presidential support and a Republican House that would
certainly deliberate upon the bill should the Senate pass it again. It seemed
to be a foregone conclusion, therefore, that it would finally become law
under the auspices of the Billion Dollar Congress.
Blair was a native of New Hampshire, born into a poor and undistin-
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guished family, but he became a self-made man, working his way through
law school. He served as a colonel in the Union army during the Civil War,
which helped him develop his leadership skills. The people of New Hamp-
shire elected him to the House in 1875, and the legislature sent him to the
Senate in 1879. Once in the Senate, Blair formulated his education bill,
which consumed virtually his entire twelve-year career in that august body.
His poverty and the difficult circumstances that he faced in his youth no
doubt caused his great desire to see the disadvantaged receive adequate
educational opportunities. Yet, despite such idealism, he understood that
most congressional bills, no matter how noble or necessary, would never
pass. Had his bill not passed the Senate, therefore, upon its first or second
introduction, Blair probably would have accepted that fate and moved on
to other issues. As it happened, however, the bill did pass the Republican-
controlled Senate three times only to be subsequently tabled in the Demo-
cratic House, leading Blair to believe that the Republican majority elected
in 1888 would break that pattern without the slightest hesitation. He had
already secured President Harrison's endorsement of his plan, so the road
toward passage of the bill seemed smooth.8
Impediments quickly arose, however, that Blair never foresaw. First,
talk of the impending Federal Elections Bill threatened to destroy whatever
goodwill existed between Democrats and Republicans, including the bi-
partisan coalition that had previously supported the Blair bill.9 Second, the
New South's post-Reconstruction industrial thrust had made the 1880s the
most prosperous decade for the region since before the Civil War, as the
Manufacturer's Record of Baltimore and similar journals revealed. Such eco-
nomic recovery seemed to show that the southern states no longer needed
federal money to rejuvenate their public school systems. The 1890s por-
tended great growth and development for the region of the country that
lagged the furthest behind in education and, at the same time, remained
the most entrenched in the dogma of local government sovereignty. Third,
by 1890, a turning point had been reached in the way many American edu-
cation leaders viewed the educational needs of black southerners. The First
Mohonk Conference showed that the standard type of education that the
Blair bill espoused was not as suitable for African Americans as was voca-
tional education, a fact that the bill did not particularly address.10
Finally, free-thinking northern news media, particularly E. L. Godkin's
highly influential Nation news magazine, opposed the bill and increasingly
waged war in print against it after 1886, calling it "A Bill to Promote Men-
dicancy." This phrase implied that federal funding and congressional su-
pervision of education were steps in the direction of socialism, which would
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ultimately make all children educated under such a system wards of the
state, thus destroying the initiative of the intellectually gifted. As the Na-
tion explained it, placing education under federal control would take
America's social structure, which had been "specially created for the ben-
efit of valor, foresight, industry, and intelligence," and make it fit "the spe-
cial needs of the ignorant, the weak, the lazy, and the incompetent. It is
somewhat like a proposal to make such alterations in the house of a decent
and prosperous mechanic so that tramps may feel at home in it." By 1890,
newspapers all over the country (and especially in the South) had picked up
this argument, including James C. Hemphill's Charleston News and Courier,
Hannis Taylor's Mobile Register, and Henry Watterson's Louisville Courier-
Journal, each of which could hardly contain its contempt for the Blair bill.
Likewise, congressmen who opposed the bill but lacked original reasons to
explain why, also embraced this argument. Between the press and the poli-
ticians, this mendicancy argument had made a tremendous impact on public
opinion by 1890.11
Not surprisingly, the black press, including T. Thomas Fortune's New
York Age and H. C. Smith's Cleveland Gazette, lined up in solid support of
the bill, as did an overwhelming majority of their readers.12 African Ameri-
cans stood in no position to reject any offer the federal government might
make for their welfare, especially one promoting educational advancement.
Venerable statesman Frederick Douglass assessed the value of the Blair bill
by declaring that "It will be at least a recognition of a great national duty
towards a people to whom an immeasurable debt is due."13 All black lead-
ers, however, did not agree on every specific measure within the Blair bill.
Fortune, along with Pan-Africanist Alexander Crummell and leading edu-
cators J. C. Price of Livingstone College in North Carolina and Booker T.
Washington of Tuskegee Institute in Alabama, believed that an education
equal in every respect to that which white students typically received would
not benefit blacks as much as a special type of education of their own—
namely vocational education. With the ideological support of esteemed
white humanitarian leaders—such as the Reverend A. D. Mayo of Massa-
chusetts, the Reverend R. H. Allen of Pittsburgh, and Samuel Armstrong of
the Hampton Institute in Virginia—and with the financial backing of white
philanthropists—such as Andrew Carnegie—many black leaders trumpeted
vocational education as the salvation of the race.14
The first mention of the Blair bill in the Fifty-first Congress came in
January 1890 as a response to the Butler Emigration Bill. In an impromptu
remark that showed his disdain for Butler and the emigration idea, Blair
complained that the race problem in America existed only in the "imagina-
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tions and ineradicable prejudices of a few white men." Education, not emi-
gration, would be the solution, he said, adding that reeducating some white
southerners to think like northerners would go a long way toward solving
the race problem.15 Blair's off-the-cuff remarks did not further his cause,
but he, like so many of his Senate colleagues, could not help himself. When-
ever he saw an easy opportunity to criticize the men across the aisle, he
took it, with no apparent regard for the consequences.
When, on February 6, Blair began formal deliberations on his bill in
the Fifty-first Congress, he exhibited much more caution about his choice
of words. He recognized that many of his Republican cohorts wanted to
dispense with his bill quickly, or forgo it altogether, in order to move on to
economic legislation—the tariff being at the head of the list. He hoped to
give them something to think about in the meantime by pointing out that
if the South as a whole was as educated as the North, southerners would
understand the logic of a high protective tariff, which would turn many
southern Democrats into Republicans. An educated South would be good
for the GOP, the national economy, and, ultimately, race relations in America.
Blair proceeded then to give a lesson showing the inextricable link between
education and economic prosperity. The North was wealthier than the
South, he explained, because it enjoyed the two complimentary traditions
of free labor and an educated working class. Educated workers, he opined,
would not work cheaply. Their demand for high wages would create high
consumer prices and thus keep the economy under constant stimulation.
The South possessed neither of these traditions. Slavery, he said, had re-
tarded the South in both economics and education. Since the 1860s, south-
ern labor had remained cheap because the workers were uneducated and
thus unable to understand the economic forces that kept them in poverty,
which, in turn, kept them from organizing or demanding higher wages.
This fact kept agricultural commodity prices low, which depressed the over-
all economy of the South. This retarded economic system caused a self-
perpetuating cycle in which the southern states could not afford to fund
their own educational institutions adequately. The only way to break the
cycle, asserted Blair, would be to infuse the South with federal funds. The
resulting economic stimulation would redound to the benefit of blacks and
whites alike.16
Since his argument rested upon ten years of research and three rounds
of practice prior to 1890, the only issue for this Congress to address, in
Blair's opinion, was that of appropriating the money. The question that
begged to be asked, therefore, was "Have we the money?" Blair answered,
of course, with a resounding "yes." The surplus stood at a record level, just
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waiting to be spent on various projects both great and small. Would it be
spent on such amenities as river and harbor improvements valued at $10
million per year, when there were "oceans . . . of illiteracy flowing over our
land?" Or perhaps a new navy, valued at $350 million? "Educate the world,"
said Blair, "and there will be no need of a navy." The military analogy served
him in another way when he compared the need for a national education
system to the need for a national army, saying that, in war, if one part of the
army is defeated, the whole nation may lose. In the war against illiteracy,
likewise, the northern part of the army could not afford to let the southern
part surrender in defeat, or the whole nation would lose. The price, mea-
sured in dollars, for a war against illiteracy would not be great compared to
the cost, measured in the long-term interests of American society, of not
waging the war. Consider, he said, the fact that the value of penal institution
property in many states exceeded the value of property set aside for educa-
tion. Perhaps "with the proper number of schools jails would disappear."17
Blair then read the keynote address from the annual meeting of the
State Agricultural Society of Georgia. The address emphasized education
as the greatest need among the poor people of Georgia, blacks and whites
alike. To illustrate this point, Blair read an interview, conducted by an At-
lanta institution of higher learning, of an unnamed, illiterate, thirty two-
year-old black man. The interviewer asked the man if he had voted in the
last presidential election. He replied that he had voted, but he did not know
for whom he had voted. When asked if he had ever heard of James A.
Garfield, Chester A. Arthur, or Grover Cleveland, he said Garfield sounded
vaguely familiar, but he did not know the others. He could not identify
Benjamin Harrison as the current president. He also did not know that
England and France were not located within the United States.18
Blair also showed that white southerners needed better educations
just as badly. He read a long statement from a missionary named Frank E.
Jenkins who had lived and worked among the white population in Appala-
chia. Jenkins lamented the condition of these "poor white trash" who lived
"almost untouched by the currents of modern life." These people resided
in a seven-state region, a land area so vast—twice the size of New England—
that state funds and resources never reached them. A national system of
education, said Blair, represented their only chance to enter the mainstream
of American society. Hoping to capitalize simultaneously upon the Senate's
penchant for humanitarianism and its love for democratic principles, he
complained that Appalachia whites could read neither the Bible nor the
ballot.19
Opponents could not accuse Blair of focusing on the South to the
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Ignorance Exposed. "What ye readin in the newspaper, Uncle Poke?"
"Dis heah article 'bout dat man walkin' on de ceilin." "Turn the paper
'round an'let me see't. Why, you've got it upside down!" {Harper's Weekly,
1889.) By the time the Billion Dollar Congress convened in 1889,
cartoons such as this one in the New York periodical Harper's Weekly,
which made fun of the supposed ignorance of African Americans,
had become all too common.
exclusion of all other regions of the country, because he also showed that
there was much room for improvement in his native New England. He
looked at fellow Senator Orville Platt of Connecticut, who opposed his bill,
and commented, "it would be wise if we could get over this self-righteous
notion that we are much better off than our neighbors in the Southern
States." He pointed out that Charleston, South Carolina, currently spent
more money per capita on education than did Boston, Massachusetts.
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Moreover, even his own state of New Hampshire, he argued, could benefit
from a national education system because, even in good school systems, there
was room for improvement. Blair added that virtually all state Superinten-
dents of Education supported his bill. He made the most of their support,
reading aloud many of their letters addressed to him that emphatically en-
dorsed his plan. He also read newspaper articles from all over the country to
prove that illiteracy still pervaded every region of the United States in 1890.20
Although one senator or another interrupted him from time to time
disputing his facts, Blair continually pounded away with charts and tables
full of statistics. He also read even more letters of support, many of which
came from various well-known and respected leaders in society, such as
Frances Willard, president of the Women's Christian Temperance Union,
and J. L. M. Curry, agent of the Peabody Fund. Curry was as respected as
any educator in the nation, and his support of the Blair bill was thus quite
important. At the time of the bill's initial introduction in 1882, he had writ-
ten: "Here we stand face to face with necessity. All over this State the taxes
of the white people cannot be made to suffice for the education of both
white and colored; with the utmost goodwill, the resources are deficient.
Nothing but national aid can solve the problem."21 In 1890, Curry still pub-
licly favored such a remedy to the country's education ills, but privately he
favored emigration as the best solution to the southern race problem. As
the administrator of the Peabody Fund, however, he continued to make an-
nual public pronouncements on the woeful condition of education among
blacks in the South, which provided Blair with much fuel for argument.22
After two weeks of tying up the business of the Senate, Blair ended his
speaking marathon. He concluded with the two arguments he considered
the most likely to produce an emotional reaction in his colleagues. He com-
pared the literacy rates of the United States as a whole to various European
nations that led the world in industry, technology, and military power, show-
ing how severely the United States lagged behind. Should this not strike
fear in the hearts of Americans, asked Blair? In his final argument, he turned
to the Bible and made his case for a national education system based upon
one of the parables of Jesus. He compared those educated people who op-
posed his bill to "Pharisees" who "go to church on Sundays and worship
the Nazarene carpenter" but "stand erect before Almighty God and thank
Him for one thing only: that He made them (as they are simple enough to
imagine) better than other people." He aimed his remark particularly at
southern Democratic leaders who he believed represented an aristocracy
that capriciously doled out education to some and withheld it from others.
He named randomly Senators James L. Pugh of Alabama, J. Z. George of
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Mississippi, Randall L. Gibson of Louisiana, and the U. S. Supreme Court
Justice from Mississippi, Lucius Q. C. Lamar, as typical of the southern
aristocracy. Appealing to the Protestant religious faith of most fellow sena-
tors, Blair also compared these southern Democrats to the Jesuit leader-
ship in the Catholic Church in America. Both elite groups held the education
of millions of common people in their hands, and both opposed his bill.
Contrary to the delusional thinking of the Jesuits, said Blair, in an obvious
play on words, "The Catholic masses are for free schools," and, he con-
cluded, so were the poor people of the South.23
Actually, the Catholic church in general, not merely Jesuits, opposed
the Blair bill and took an official position to that effect. The Church feared
that one of the underlying goals of a national education system was to de-
stroy its autonomy and to indoctrinate Catholic youth with Protestant ideas
and values. That fear is understandable from a historical perspective, con-
sidering that, in 1890, the Protestant majority in the United States still ex-
pressed an aversion to Catholicism almost as vigorously as they had done
in colonial and antebellum times. Although it is ridiculous to say that a
conspiracy to reeducate Catholic children existed among Protestant law-
makers, the idea that a national system of public education might under-
mine religious education certainly seems, on the one hand, to have been a
rational fear. On the other hand, Protestant American society as a whole
had not yet agreed upon a single, uniform purpose for educating the work-
ing classes. Preparing young people for the job market, for college, or for
voting had not yet displaced religious training as the primary reason for
emphasizing education as a social necessity. Thus, most Americans—re-
gardless of their religious affiliation—saw education as a family concern
or, at most, a local government concern. Blair ran ahead, therefore, even of
Protestant public opinion, which makes the Catholic phobia of Protestant
indoctrination seem irrational in the final analysis. To underscore just how
disjointed the American public education system was at this time, not until
1889 did some Midwestern states, which were heavily populated with Ger-
mans, make English a compulsory subject in the public schools. At the same
time, some southern states had only begun to adopt standardized text-
books.24 Blair's idea of creating a national education system thus appears to
have been far ahead of its time.
Blair reached out to Catholics by trying to convince them that the
Protestant majority of the North would be more apt to accept them as so-
cial equals if only they would support his bill. Their support would osten-
sibly show their loyalty to the United States and thus discredit the idea that
the Catholic people could not think for themselves because the Pope and
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the church hierarchy told them what to think. Blair's effort was not suc-
cessful. Neither the Church nor a majority of American Catholics came to
support the Blair bill, but they did praise the senator from New Hampshire
for being a pioneering humanitarian in the field of education for the com-
mon man.25
Blair's odd way of reaching out to detractors by criticizing their reli-
gious, political, and socioeconomic views may or may not have been a wise
strategy, but his choice of individual southerners to compare to the Jesuits
definitely was not propitious. Both of the Mississippians mentioned, as well
as the Magnolia State's other senator, Edmund Cary Walthall, actually fa-
vored the bill.26 J. Z. George even spoke on its behalf a few days later, calling
it (with all apparent sincerity) "a generous offer made by the Northern
States to the Southern States."27 Blair needed George on his team and very
easily could have alienated the Mississippian by his ill-timed remarks about
southern Democratic opposition.28
Once Blair had completed his speaking marathon, Charles Faulkner,
a first-term junior senator of West Virginia, rose to initiate the verbal op-
position. His state occupied the foremost position among those that Blair
had mentioned as being heavily populated by uneducated "poor white
trash." Unquestionably, West Virginia needed federal aid to improve its
education system as much as any other state, yet Faulkner had shown no
interest in fixing the state's pedagogical woes since joining the Senate. He
had focused instead upon obtaining national regulation of the food and
drug industries, a personal—and successful—crusade that foreshadowed
the coming Progressive Movement of the early twentieth century. Regard-
ing the Blair bill, he merely reflected the will of his constituency, arguing
that it was unconstitutional. He declared that the only correct interpreta-
tion of the Constitution was the strict interpretation, which disallowed the
growth of federal power through the "general welfare" clause. In taking
this position on the establishment of a national system of education,
Faulkner showed a double standard with regard to increasing the federal
government's scope, for only by interpreting the general welfare clause
broadly could he say that the federal government had the constitutional
authority to regulate the food and drug industries. He believed that educa-
tion was a different matter, however, not comparable to other issues, be-
cause the Founding Fathers had specifically forbidden federal interference
with it. For emphasis, he invoked the names and writings of early national
leaders James Madison, John Marshall, and Alexander Hamilton, who had
all discussed education and had determined that it lay outside of federal
jurisdiction. Moreover, he complained that the bill stemmed from socialis-
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tic roots. He noted accurately that a plan for redistributing the wealth of
rich Americans to their poor neighbors lay at the heart of the Blair bill.
Moving on to the next generation of venerable Americans of the past,
Faulkner then quoted Andrew Jackson, Henry Clay, and Daniel Webster,
who all agreed that the national government had power to collect taxes for
national or interstate projects, but not to redistribute the money to the
states or to the people. Most early American leaders had, therefore, forbade
socialism or such socialistic schemes as this bill represented.29
Faulkner also complained that the Blair bill contained no provision
for an equal distribution of funds to the races. Rather, it gave preeminence
to black schools because they generally had the greatest need. He argued
that such a policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment by showing favorit-
ism based on race. He opposed what essentially is called today affirmative
action. Not only was this policy wrong, said Faulkner, but if actual num-
bers of illiterates throughout the United States were taken into consider-
ation rather than percentages of illiterates within each racial group, whites
would be the main beneficiaries, for white illiteracy dwarfed black illit-
eracy in sheer numbers. Faulkner then concluded his speech with a glaring
contradiction, proclaiming the Caucasian race the "superior and more in-
telligent race," adding that the black population represented nothing more
than a "mass of ignorance" concentrated in the South.30
Senator Joseph Hawley of Connecticut, one of several curt but courtly
New England Republicans in the Senate, answered Faulkner briefly. As a
senator, Hawley focused mainly upon economic issues and thus never en-
tered the ranks of the humanitarians within the GOP. He agreed with
Faulkner's history lesson and conservative interpretation of the Constitu-
tion. He noted that many of his fellow Republicans, including Henry Blair,
routinely misquoted Alexander Hamilton, the foremost broad construc-
tionist among the Founding Fathers, using his interpretation of the "gen-
eral welfare" clause to grow the power of the federal government in ways
that neither Hamilton nor any of the other Founders ever envisioned.
Hawley contended that Hamilton "never dreamed that the Federal Gov-
ernment should control the common schools."31
Richard Coke, the former Redeemer governor of Texas and current
three-term U.S. senator, next declared his opposition to the bill. Coke, speak-
ing with a distinctive lisp that made him pronounce the letter "s" as "th,"
mirrored Faulkner and Hawley's constitutionality argument, saying, "The
powers delegated to Congress and those reserved to the States are abso-
lutely fixed by the Constitution.... The States can not consent to a usurpa-
tion of their jurisdiction and powers by Congress." The lisp made it difficult
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for other senators to understand Coke and perhaps to listen intently enough
to give any serious contemplation to his argument. Yet, Coke was more
serious about conservative government than most of his peers. As gover-
nor of Texas he had dismantled the state-supported public school system
that the Republicans built during Reconstruction, putting the schools back
under county supervision. If he could have, he would have done the same
for every state in the Union. There was no chance, therefore, of his accept-
ing the Blair bill. He quoted Thomas Jefferson, who, like the other Found-
ing Fathers, also excluded education from the powers granted to the national
government. Coke noted that, as founder of the University of Virginia,
Jefferson showed a more zealous passion for universal education than any
other American who ever lived. If he did not support a national education
system, what more needed to be said? What more was there to debate? How
could any good American possibly support this bill? Could it be because
some senators favored the United States imitating the European powers
that provided national education systems? Indeed, thought Coke, because
they favored the United States adopting the European model of "imperial
centralization" and monarchical "paternalism" rather than living within
the federalized framework of the Constitution.32
Leland Stanford of California, who was nothing if not the exact op-
posite of Coke in oratorical ability and leadership skills (one contempo-
rary even called him the "greatest man in the world today"33), answered the
Texan's charges. He countered that the people of northern Europe currently
represented the vanguard of educated civilization. Criticizing the leading
European education systems thus did not make sense. Perhaps the United
States could learn from the European example in one way: during the time
of the Roman Empire, the Latin leaders of Rome considered the Germanic
tribes to be "so low down in the scale of humanity that it was almost im-
possible to think of civilizing them." Yet, once given the opportunity, they
rose to a greater degree of civilization than the Romans ever imagined. Could
history now be repeating itself, as white Americans pronounced judgment
upon black Americans for being so far behind in the steps of human progress
that they could never catch up? Stanford believed that with equal opportu-
nities, any group of people could rise above its present condition. He not
only favored the Blair bill, which would redistribute the wealth of his own
class to the lower classes, but he also advocated that individuals take the
initiative to make the world a better place by setting examples of personal
sacrifice for the public good. Stanford, a multimillionaire railroad tycoon
stood in a good position to lead by example and take such an initiative in
education. He was putting the finishing touches on his own institution in
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Palo Alto, California, even as he spoke. Stanford University would open in
1891. Yet, had he not been a rich man, he likely would have still favored
education for the working man so that all could come to recognize and
appreciate, as he put it, "the beneficence of God."34
Not everyone in the Senate could appreciate Stanford's lofty humani-
tarian rhetoric. Democrat John R. Reagan of Texas followed the Califor-
nian and rejected his comments as sentimental nonsense. He had spent
his Senate career focusing on such economic issues to the exclusion of
everything else, trying to lay the groundwork for the industrial develop-
ment of Texas and the rest of the postwar South. He considered race ques-
tions to be an impediment to taking care of the more important economic
business of the country.35 His opinion of the Blair bill, therefore, was not
generous. He charged that Blair portrayed the United States as being so
illiterate and ignorant that it stood "in danger of going back into a state
of barbarism" unless his bill passed. But who created this great republic,
Reagan asked? Was it men who had attended a compulsory national school
system, or was it men who had gained the free and liberal educations
afforded by the family, the churches, and by self-help?36 "What right has
Congress to tax the people of Pennsylvania to educate the children of
South Carolina, or the people of Ohio to educate the children of Missis-
sippi, or the people of Iowa to educate the people of Texas?" Reagan con-
cluded by cleverly criticizing the millionaire railroad tycoon Stanford
without stepping beyond the confines of gentlemanly parliamentarianism
and calling him by name. He instead used another railroad magnate, the
notorious "robber baron" Jay Gould, as an example of someone who,
although one of the richest men in the country, would pay the same
amount of taxes to support public education under the Blair bill as the
men who shoveled coal on his locomotives.37
Ephraim K. Wilson, a one-term senator from Maryland, who had an
otherwise undistinguished career both before and after his six years in the
Senate, followed Reagan in denouncing the bill. In his brief discourse, he
quoted perhaps the most venerable educator in American history to that
time, Horace Mann of Massachusetts, generally considered the father of
the public school system in the United States. Mann believed that the Found-
ing Fathers' exclusion of education from the Constitution left progressive-
minded educators such as himself with no recourse but to work through
the states, for only an amendment to the Constitution could change the
situation. Wilson agreed, asking, if Congress succeeds in this attempt to
defy the Constitution and tamper with education, what will be next? Such
a small step might start a process that would ultimately lead to the evolu-
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tion of a federal leviathan that forces its will upon the masses. He also asked,
would American children eventually be indoctrinated with only that type
of education which Congress authorizes? Could this seemingly small, in-
nocuous step lead to other usurpations of the Constitution as well? What if
Congress later came to disregard the constitutional prohibition on estab-
lishing a national public religion? Why should it be so unbelievable that
such a thing could happen? Congressmen could argue that the nation would
be better off if all Americans practiced the same religion. It would bring
peace and stability to a chaotic system that currently sees some religious
groups prosper while others struggle. Is not this analogy valid, the com-
parison appropriate, and the logic rational?38
John Coit Spooner, a second-term senator from Wisconsin, followed
Wilson in declaring his opposition to the bill. The first Republican to de-
nounce the bill, Spooner seemed an unlikely antagonist of federal aid to
education because he identified with the reformers on most other issues, as
the Federal Elections Bill debate would soon prove. A corporate attorney
by vocation, he could wage a stiff battle in debate, and he certainly did so in
opposing the Blair bill. He based his main objection upon the fact that his
own state and several others provided quite adequately for education al-
ready. He saw no reason to change the present system—a system that worked
well in states that stressed the value of education. In addition, the South
was beginning to prosper materially to the point that it would soon need
no outside help to catch up. Almost one million blacks attended the public
schools in the South in 1890, which showed tremendous progress in south-
ern education. Spooner agreed with Reagan, therefore, that taking money
from his state of Wisconsin to educate the children of the South seemed
neither fair nor necessary.39
Spooner habitually spoke kind words in Senate speeches and in the
press about helping African Americans, but now that he had a genuine op-
portunity to help them get a better education, he balked. He justified his
opposition by pointing out that public disapproval of the Blair bill had
grown every year since the measure's initial introduction. He read from
several leading newspapers to illustrate his point and commented that it
would be foolish "to contend that the newspapers have entered into a con-
spiracy in favor of ignorance." Interestingly, one of his main sources was
the Charleston News and Courier, which made a strange bedfellow for the
Wisconsin Republican. It was the primary Democratic organ pushing the
Butler Emigration Bill, which Spooner vehemently opposed. The South
Carolina paper loathed the Blair bill with almost as much fervor as it sup-
ported the Butler bill. Throughout Blair's speaking marathon, it daily urged
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the New Hampshire senator to stop talking, for no one cared to hear what
he had to say.40
Following Spooner, John S. Barbour of Virginia took the floor and
gave his undivided approbation to the Blair bill, expressing incredulity that
any sane southern senator would not do the same. He said that the argu-
ment over the strict versus broad construction of the Constitution was much
ado about nothing. He pointed out how Thomas Jefferson, whom Demo-
crats considered the father of their party, transgressed against his own po-
litical creed with the purchase of Louisiana, and how a southern Democratic
Congress and president annexed Texas with equal disregard to strict con-
struction of the Constitution. The fact is, Barbour propounded, southern
Democrats had always abandoned the strict construction argument when-
ever it seemed in their best interest to do so.41
Midway through his talk, the old Virginia statesman turned and ad-
dressed the fiery young Charles Faulkner of West Virginia, no doubt giving
him an icy stare. He pronounced with utter disdain his resentment of a
West Virginian claiming to speak on behalf of the South. How could any-
one from that state, which had sold out its fellow Virginians to the east in
the Civil War, possibly claim to represent the southern point of view on any
issue? Barbour then turned in the direction of John Coit Spooner on the
Republican side and stated grimly, "This talk about the great wealth of the
South is a delusion and an exaggeration. Where is it and in what does it
consist?" He could not see it. All he saw was poverty, illiteracy, tenant farm-
ing, soil erosion, and a one-dimensional economy in the South. He pointed
out how his own state of Virginia needed all the help it could get, federal or
otherwise. He explained that when the Old Dominion gave up its claim to
the Northwest Territory under the Articles of Confederation, it did so out
of patriotic duty alone—it got nothing in return. Now that his state was
inundated with a "mass of ignorance," caused, he said, by the emancipa-
tion of the slaves (the action of a president from one of the states created
from that old Northwest Territory), it must be the patriotic duty of the
emancipators to help educate the liberated blacks. It is nothing less than
sickening, he added, that the state that gave the country George Washing-
ton, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and John Marshall had been re-
duced to the status of "a beggar."42
After Barbour, a few senators rose in short order to express either
their support for or opposition to the bill, but none added any substan-
tively new remarks. Closing the debate was the "iridescent" Republican
John J. Ingalls of Kansas, who came out in opposition, saying that educa-
tion would do southern blacks no good if they did not first have simple
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Eulogy for the Blair Bill. Their only utility. . . . Good figures as Puck ever drew, He
hates to bid farewell to you—And yet he stoutly must maintain That Puck's loss is the
country's gain! (Puck, 1890.) The failure of the Blair Education Bill in the Fifty-
first Congress marked a victory for the conservative approach to American educa-
tion and arguably a defeat of social justice for African Americans.
justice. Therefore, forget the Blair bill, he said—bring on the Federal Elec-
tions Bill.43
The Federal Elections Bill was indeed on its way, but it would not be
ready for the Senate's consideration for another nine months. In the mean-
time, the Senate voted to table the Blair bill, and the last hope for creating a
national education system to benefit black southerners, not to mention
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poor whites in rural areas of the South, vanished for the next three decades.
Blair, at every opportunity, perfunctorily reminded his opponents in the
Senate of their coming eternal damnation for not passing his bill. When, in
July 1890, the Senate debated a large appropriation for educating Native
Americans in the West, Blair poignantly commented that "one cannot in
listening to this debate fail to be struck with the fact that it is very much
better to be an Indian [in terms of education] than to be . . . a citizen of the
United States."44
Besides a few state Superintendents of Education, scattered educa-
tors, and Blair himself, African Americans were the primary mourners at
the Blair bill's passing. T. Thomas Fortune urged his people not to grieve,
however, but to consider the defeat of the bill as a wake-up call for self-
help. He wisely urged his race not to wait for the federal government to
endow them with education, but to educate themselves the best way they
could. Booker T. Washington, among others, had already set this policy in
motion and could now continue, undisturbed by competing ideas, educat-
ing black southerners. Three months after the Blair bill debate ended, the
First Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question convened in New York
state, and vocational education became the main topic of conversation there.
The defeat of the Blair bill had basically served as a point of departure for
the conference, as most participants seemed to know instinctively that there
was no point in hoping for a renewal of interest in the type of plan that the
Blair bill espoused. Most accepted the inevitable shift in the nation's focus on
education toward vocational and moral instruction for blacks. As the Rever-
end R. H. Allen of Pittsburgh put it, "We speak of the Negro problem;... the
solution of this problem is in the education of the hands and heads and
hearts of this people. This will solve the problem of any race on the face of
God's earth." To him, academic education was one of only three forms of
instruction, and not more important than the other two, vocational and
moral.45
In retrospect, T. Thomas Fortune's advice seems prophetic, Booker T.
Washington's action appears appropriate, and the Mohonk Conference's fo-
cus looks right on target, because not until 1919 did a similar bill for federal
aid to the public schools come up again in Congress. Other education bills
did come up in the meantime, however. Justin Morrill, the elder statesman of
Vermont, who had paved the way for subsequent congressional education
legislation with his Land Grant Act of 1862, continued to advocate federal
funding of colleges, even in 1890. The money would be divided between white
and black colleges, but Morrill designed the bill mainly to support the latter.
The debate over the Morrill bill was brief. The Senate did not want another
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long education debate in the same session. It passed the measure with haste.
This Second Morrill Act, as it is now known, provided little consolation for
supporters of the Blair bill, but it represented an important step in the for-
ward march of America's educational development.46
Despite the failure of the Blair bill, Henry Blair's efforts to improve the
nation's public education system forced a normally apathetic society to see
the embarrassingly deplorable educational conditions that existed in many
parts of the country. His work at the end of the Gilded Age thus ultimately
provoked an overhauling of the education systems of the United States at the
state and local levels during the coming Progressive Age of the early twenti-
eth century. History has vindicated this senator from New Hampshire, there-
fore, as a visionary—a leader whose idea was ahead of its time.47
The defeat of the Blair bill marked a tragic turning point in both Af-
rican American history and the history of education in America. Educa-
tion simply did not garner the interest of the American public in 1890 that
other issues did. More important, the idea of educating black southern chil-
dren did not provoke the same level of public discussion and controversy
as did other racial issues—namely emigration and enforcement of black
voting rights. Specialists in the history of African-American education gen-
erally admit that the average black citizen at that time did not even care as
much about education as they did about suffrage.48 Only professional edu-
cators seemed to get excited about the issue. Black educator J. C. Price of
Livingstone College, speaking at the National Education Association's An-
nual Convention in Minneapolis in July 1890, did not take a stance on
whether vocational, religious, or academic education was the best solution
for his people, but he took a strong stand on the belief that some kind of
education was absolutely essential. "I do not argue," he said, "that increased
intelligence, or multiplied facilities for education, will, by some magic spell,
transform the negro into the symmetry, grace, and beauty of a Grecian
embodiment of excellence. It is certainly not my humble task to attempt to
prove that education will, in a day, or a decade, or a century rid the black
man of all the physical peculiarities and deformities, moral perversions,
and intellectual distortions which are the debasing and logical heritage of
more than two and a half centuries of enslavement." But education would
still be the solution to the race problem, he believed, because in it "an an-
swer is to be found to all the leading objections against the negro which
enter into the make-up of the so-called race problem." He continued:
The great work of education among negroes consists in leading
them out of the errors which centuries of debasing servitude
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fastened upon them; but even when this is done, the negro will
not be an embodiment of every moral excellence, but he will at
least stand on the same plane of morals with the other represen-
tatives of our common and fallen humanity, and whatever is the
possibility of one will be the possibility of the other, so far as
education is concerned; for under it, we believe that the negro
can be and do what any other race can be and do.49
For the Republican leadership of the Fifty-first Congress, both the
education and emigration issues were merely unwanted distractions taking
attention away from the most pressing item on their racial agenda, the Fed-
eral Elections Bill. Thus, in a matter of barely three months, the Fifty-first
Congress had jettisoned two of the three potential solutions to the south-
ern race problem. Federal supervision of elections, not education, said most
GOP leaders, would be the salvation of black America. Both houses of Con-
gress and the American public bid adieu to the education issue and girded
up for the coming battle over the most controversial bill of its kind up to
that time in the nation's history—the Federal Elections Bill.
Chapter 3
CHARTING NEW WATERS
The Race Problem and the "Reed Rules" in
the House of Representatives
The "rights of the minority" have been so well protected that the rights of
the majority have disappeared. . . . The contest over the rules is the first
thing with which the Fifty-First Congress will be called on to deal.
—Henry Cabot Lodge, Republican representative of Massachusetts
The demand for the removal of the limitations in the rules means that the
party in power is fatally bent on mischief.
—Roger Q. Mills, Democratic representative of Texas
While the Senate debated the emigration and education issues, House
Republicans, led by new Speaker Thomas B. Reed of Maine, prepared to
chart new waters in parliamentary procedure, changing hundred-year-
old rules of debate. Although Reed did not design his new rules solely to
ease passage of the humanitarians' racial agenda, the "Reed Rules," as
they were known, had an immediate and dramatic impact on the House's
attempts to solve the race problem. Understanding Reed's preliminary
winter and spring cleaning of the House, which washed away the dusty
old traditions, is thus central to establishing the context for the fight over
66
Charting New Waters 67
the capstone of the humanitarian legislative agenda, the Federal Elections
Bill.
Simply stated, the Reed Rules eliminated filibustering and other tac-
tics of obstruction, such as disappearing quorums and endless roll calling,
in the House. They allowed the majority party to secure passage of partisan
bills, unimpeded by minority opposition.1 The tradition of minority ob-
struction against partisan legislation was as old as Congress itself. Rarely
did it impede legislation to the extent that it jeopardized the democratic
process, although a notable exception occurred in the Fiftieth Congress.
James B. Weaver of Iowa, who later became the first presidential candidate
of the People's Party, blocked "the wheels of legislation for two weeks at a
time," said one newspaper, in "an absurd recognition of the rights of a
minority of one." Weaver's extremism in filibustering prompted much pub-
lic discussion about changing the rules.2
The Republicans knew well that the minority could derail a majority's
legislative agenda, because they had been the minority in the House almost
constantly since Reconstruction, during which time they had become quite
adept at filibustering on tariff issues. Before the convening of the Fifty-first
Congress, therefore, a group of leading Republicans, which included Reed,
future president of the United States William McKinley of Ohio, and fu-
ture Speaker of the House Joseph Cannon of Illinois, agreed behind the
scenes that their agenda was so important to the welfare of the country that
they could not risk a Democratic filibuster. Moreover, they realized that the
Democrats—particularly those from the South—would consider any bill
for providing federal supervision of congressional elections to be highly
partisan, sectional, and racially divisive and that such a bill would probably
provoke a filibuster unlike any seen in the history of Congress. By passing
the Reed Rules immediately upon convening, the House leadership could
eliminate that threat before it could materialize. In so doing, however, they
also created a storm of protest even before they introduced their highly
controversial Federal Elections Bill, which made their racial agenda even
more inflammatory than it would have otherwise been.3
Looking at Thomas B. Reed's background and record before 1890,
the new Speaker seemed an unlikely candidate to lead the revolutionary
reorganization of House rules. He grew up in a middle-class family in Maine.
He had no distinguished record of military or political service before his
election to the House in 1876. More important, during his twelve years of
congressional service prior to his selection as Speaker, Reed had filibus-
tered Democratic bills on several occasions, as had many other Republi-
cans. He never expressed any compunction about his actions, however,
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despite the fact that his new rules now withheld the same tool from the
opposition party that he and the GOP had often used when they were in
the minority. How did he explain this double standard and apparent rever-
sal of opinion on filibustering? He rationalized that, technically, each Con-
gress had always established its own rules for conducting business. Just
because previous congressional leaders had chosen to adopt the same rules
as their forebears did not mean they were bound by the Constitution to do
so. Likewise, each Congress voted on the rules it would adopt, and, there-
fore, the majority party in the House always chose the rules by which it
would govern. If the Fifty-first Congress now chose to govern under new
rules that would streamline the legislative process and bring greater effi-
ciency to the operation of the federal government, why should anyone com-
plain? Such an action lay completely within the constitutional authority of
Congress.4
Moreover, each newly elected Congress established its own rules
through a vote taken upon its first convening, which meant that the Speaker
had no power to force rules arbitrarily upon the House. The Reed Rules,
too, would be adopted only if a majority of representatives agreed to them.
The power of the Speaker was thus limited. Each successive Speaker had,
however, always been in a position to fine-tune the legislative process, and
many had done so in one way or another. From 1811 to 1825, Henry Clay
of Kentucky transformed the Speaker's role from that of a mere moderator
of debate to that of a manipulator of partisan legislation, although he never
abrogated the rights of the minority to hold the floor, as Reed now pro-
posed. In 1836, Speaker James K. Polk, a Democrat from Tennessee, pre-
sided over his party's adoption of a controversial Gag Resolution that
forbade the introduction of abolitionist legislation in the House. Both the
Speaker's role and House rules remained fairly static thereafter until 1877,
when, at the behest of Democrat John Reagan of Texas, who later became a
senator, the House suspended the rules temporarily in order to pass a single
railroad appropriation bill. In 1880, Democratic Speaker Samuel J. Randall
instituted a series of special rules to regulate debate only on certain speci-
fied bills.5 Precedents thus existed for the action that Reed planned to take
as Speaker of the House.
More recently, Democrat John G. Carlisle of Kentucky, who served as
Speaker from 1883 to 1889, increased the power of his position by refusing
to hear debate on bills he opposed, such as the Blair Education Bill. Carlisle
also believed adamantly in allowing the minority party to filibuster any bill
at any time until compromise could be reached. This practice, which Re-
publicans employed every time Democrats sought to lower the tariff, pro-
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duced gridlock in the House. Indeed, the House passed few bills under
Carlisle's watch except uncontroversial bipartisan measures.6
Carlisle, unlike Reed, never incurred the wrath of the minority party
or the American public. His stoic demeanor, his ability to choose his words
wisely, and his generally even-handed rulings from the chair contrasted
sharply with Reed's personality and style of leadership. Whereas Carlisle
had followed the custom of genteel parliamentarianism, "under which it is
thought everything that is courteous is due to your adversary," Reed fre-
quently found himself defending both his poor choices of words and the
arrogance with which he expressed his opinion. Southerners, particularly,
thought Reed guilty of what they perceived to be stereotypical northern
"rudeness" in the Speaker's chair.7
Personalities aside, Reed believed that Carlisle took an overly conser-
vative approach to the speakership, which perverted what the Founding
Fathers had intended for the position. The Democrats had taken the old
"tyranny of the majority" argument too far, he thought. As an avid student
of history, Reed looked at the actions of the English Parliament at the time
of the American Revolution to frame his opinion of what constituted tyr-
anny. In his opinion, absolute rule by the majority did not automatically
equate to tyranny. Rather, majority rule was the very essence of democracy.
He also looked with equal interest at the contemporary procedures of the
English democratic system in contrast to the American. Reed in fact used
the English House of Commons, which did not allow obstructionist tac-
tics, as a model for his future reformation of the American House of Rep-
resentatives. He observed that the English custom required the minority
party to sit in silence as the majority party legislated. This practice proved
much more efficient than the American tradition of unlimited debate. "If
time were eternity, or men were angels," said Reed, "there should be no
limit to debate." But since neither was the case, limits should be set, and
legislation should proceed with all due speed.8
English writers typically minced no words in berating American par-
liamentary procedures, and their opinion strongly influenced Reed as
Speaker. Reed realized that, to Englishmen, the American House of Repre-
sentatives had become something of a laughing stock. The Clerk of the
English House of Commons, Reginald F. D. Palgrave, considered the mi-
nority party in America to be little more than a group of "jesters" who
toyed with the majority party to the detriment of the nation. If such a thing
occurred in Parliament, said Palgrave, "the national force which created
the House of Commons would not for a moment tolerate such conduct."9
Another English observer commented that "Legislation is government,"
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and that the American minority should allow it to proceed. The minority
party would simply have to console itself with the creed that "We are chas-
tised with whips now, but when we become the majority, we will chastise
them with scorpions."10
The day would surely come when the Democrats would be able to
find solace in that motto, but at the moment, they refused to be consoled.
Instead, they favored "twisting the lion's tail" and expressing their intense
resentment of the British influence that Reed invited and welcomed into
American politics. Some paranoid Democrats saw a nexus between the
political philosophy of New England Republicans such as Reed and the
Federalist Party of old, which called the infamous Hartford Convention
during the War of 1812. The fact that many of Reed's New England con-
temporaries, including Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts—whose great-
grandfather, George Cabot, presided over the Hartford Convention—rushed
to the new Speaker's support, exacerbated the Democrats' suspicion that
the Republicans wanted to inch America back into the British Empire.11 As
did the musings of Massachusetts Congressman Benjamin F. Butler, who
actually made a public speech in 1889 arguing that all English-speaking
peoples of the earth should unite into one nation (whereby they would
find it easier, essentially, to rule the world).12
Although Lodge, as the primary author of the House version of the
Federal Elections Bill, would become the main beneficiary of the Reed Rules,
midwesterners such as William McKinley of Ohio, author of the McKinley
Tariff of 1890, and Jonathan H. Rowell of Illinois, a coauthor of the Federal
Elections Bill, held just as much responsibility for pressing and sustaining
the Reed Rules as any New Englander. McKinley, who would become presi-
dent of the United States in 1896, made himself an easy target by support-
ing the new rules while simultaneously admitting that he had filibustered
silently in his House seat for the past twenty years. He claimed in 1890 to
have suddenly seen the error of his ways, declaring, "I cannot now recall
that I ever did it for a high or noble or worthy purpose." Democratic repre-
sentative "Private" John Allen of Mississippi, ever ready to turn a phrase
for entertainment and dramatic effect, answered spontaneously, "Then he
must have done it for a low, ignoble, or unworthy purpose I want to say
to the gentleman that when I have filibustered it has always been for a high
and worthy purpose."13
Public opinion was divided over the wisdom of Reed's new House
rules, but the critics vocalized their opposition far more than the support-
ers proclaimed their views. To most observers, the whole idea of the major-
ity forcing its will upon the minority seemed somehow un-American. The
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fact that such a numerical parity existed between the two parties, both in
Congress and in the electorate, made the Reed Rules look especially unfair.
In fact, the Democratic minority in the House actually represented 100,000
more voters than the Republican majority.14 Many Americans, therefore,
incredulous of the nerve of Reed and the rest of the GOP leadership in the
House, complained, as did one New England newspaper, that "To all in-
tents and purposes, a half-dozen men are making laws for sixty millions of
people."15
That statement contained a grain of truth, but it exaggerated the ra-
tio. The number of men making the laws was closer to a dozen than a half-
dozen, because the Reed House could affect national policy only by working
in conjunction with the Harrison administration and leading Republicans
of the Senate. Yet, the sheer volume of business that the House conducted
in 1890 gave the appearance that Reed and his lower chamber cronies pos-
sessed more power than the president and the Senate combined. Indeed,
the House passed so many bills, thanks to the Reed Rules, that the docket in
the Senate quickly became backlogged beyond all hope of being emptied
before the Fifty-first Congress adjourned. The Reed House proved to be,
without a doubt, the most active legislative body in United States history to
that point.16
The Reed Rules directly and instantaneously affected the course of
legislation regarding the southern race problem. The House applied the
new rules, with dramatic results, to settle seventeen contested elections, ten
of which involved African American candidates or ballots. One of these
cases, in fact, provided the first opportunity for Reed to implement his new
rules, because it arose on the first day of business in the first session. In
each of the cases, a Republican candidate had lost a congressional race in
1888 and had challenged the results based on corruption or intimidation
of Republican voters by Democrats, Independents, or Farmers' Alliance
candidates (whose party allegiance was unascertainable). In three cases,
the defrauded Republican was black, but in at least ten of the cases, the
victor had won by disfranchising blacks or discounting their ballots. The
rest of the cases originated in northern or border states where race made
little difference in the outcome. In all cases, however, the Republicans stood
to gain an even greater majority by unseating the victorious Democrat.
Reed, therefore, set strict time limits for debating each case, and in most
instances, the evidence seemed clear enough on the surface that Reed al-
lowed only one day for testimony and the vote. The House resolved the first
case, Smith v. Jackson, which involved two white West Virginians, in one
day. Much to the dismay of the Democrats, Reed called for a vote and
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Czar Reed. Her new champion—another case of elective affinity.' (Puck, 1890.) The
man chosen Speaker of the House for the Fifty-first Congress, Thomas B. "Czar"
Reed (R-Maine), is shown here as the new "plumed knight of Maine," having out-
jousted James G. Blaine for the honor. Indeed, Reed became a much more power-
ful Speaker than Blaine had ever been.
counted Democrats present but not voting. This ruling caused pandemo-
nium on the Democratic side of the chamber, as various representatives
wailed and gnashed their teeth in protest, but the minority had no power
to stop the vote.17
Reed justified the decision to implement his new rules in the Smith v.
Jackson case by commenting quite insouciantly that it would be impossible
to "conceive anything more dreary" than hearing protracted election cases
in the House. Moreover, no one listened to the testimony anyway, he ex-
plained, because contested election cases represented the only truly and
absolutely partisan issues that the House ever voted upon, and members
almost invariably voted along party lines. Besides, he added, there had been
about seventy-five such contested elections since Reconstruction, costing
taxpayers a total of $318,000 and a full six months of wasted time. In Reed's
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opinion, only those cases that involved something more than the usual de-
gree of corruption or intimidation, such as criminal misconduct on the
part of one of the candidates or the death of one of the candidates, de-
served that kind of time and expense.18
Two such cases came out of Arkansas, and both involved murder. In
the case of Featherston v. Cate, the winner William H. Cate, a regular Demo-
crat, had, through alleged misconduct, defeated the incumbent L. P.
Featherston, an Arkansas Wheel Democrat backed by the Farmers' Alliance
and the Republicans. This case also involved the murder of three of
Featherston's supporters. After three days of testimony, Reed called for a
vote, whereupon the House unseated Cate and seated Featherston in his
place.19 In the case of Clayton v. Breckinridge, the Republican John Clayton
had been mysteriously murdered after the election while gathering evidence
to prove that his opponent, Clifton R. Breckinridge, had won by fraud.
Breckinridge took his seat in the House, after which he spoke and voted
freely for nearly the entire first session while his case dragged on. The House
took up his case and laid it aside several times for lack of conclusive evi-
dence. In the end, however, the Republicans finally unseated Breckinridge,
although they never proved that he had any direct involvement in Clayton's
murder.20
One of the most spectacular of the contested election cases, Langston
v. Venable, came, as did the vote on Clayton v. Breckinridge, after the Federal
Elections Bill had already passed the House. It thus had no impact on the
outcome of that bill, but the humanitarians hailed it as a great triumph
nonetheless because it replaced a white Democrat with a black Republican.
The House unseated the Democrat Edward C. Venable and awarded the
contested seat to black Republican John Mercer Langston of Virginia. In a
show of protest against this verdict (which was based upon sketchy evi-
dence of Democratic vote fraud), the Democrats completely vacated the
House on the day Langston was sworn in.21
The Reed Rules in general, but particularly the use of them in unseat-
ing Democrats in the early contested election cases, made the acrimony
between the parties much more pronounced than it would otherwise have
been going into the Federal Elections Bill fight. Reed and company cared
not what the minority party thought, however. They knew they had a unique
opportunity to rectify problems with black voting rights that had gone
unaddressed for fifteen years and that could not be addressed successfully
in any other way than by the use of political force. Experience proved as
much. Voting fraud and political corruption had been rampant in the United
States throughout Reconstruction and the Gilded Age. The Fifteenth
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Amendment had been violated and practically rendered impotent in the
parts of the South where it was most sorely needed. Although it was uni-
versally understood that the Republicans had passed the Fifteenth Amend-
ment especially to benefit southern blacks, the South did not possess a
monopoly on hatred of the new law. Court cases had also arisen in Kansas
and Oregon to test the Amendment within weeks of its ratification in 1870.22
Although discrimination against black voters in the South was com-
mon knowledge, the Republicans lost the ability to do anything about it
after losing their hegemony in the federal government in 1874. The federal
courts, meanwhile, continued to rule upon cases that clarified and, in ef-
fect, limited the applications of the Fifteenth Amendment. The Radical
Republicans still tried, however, to enforce the voting rights of blacks in the
South. They managed to pass Charles Sumner's Civil Rights Bill postmor-
tem in 1875 and at the same time passed a Federal Elections Bill in the
House, which did not pass the Senate as a result of a Democratic filibuster.
Thereafter, with Democrats in charge of one or more branches of the fed-
eral government, nothing substantial had been done to protect black vot-
ing rights.23
Sensing a golden opportunity to end a dozen years of Democratic
resistance to Republican prerogatives, Reed and the GOP leadership in
Washington, D.C., decided that they could solve the race problem with a
Federal Elections Bill and push their economic agenda through in the same
Congress. Using the Reed Rules, such a course of action would certainly be
possible, and seemed likely to prove successful. Yet, serious complications
immediately surfaced that GOP leaders evidently neither foresaw nor con-
sidered very carefully thereafter. The main one was that public opinion
overwhelmingly favored leaving the issue of black voting rights alone. This
sentiment had begun toward the end of Reconstruction and had continued
to grow. In fact, by 1890, the pendulum of public opinion had swung so far
away from protecting black voting rights that many newspaper editors and
pundits began seriously discussing repealing the Fifteenth Amendment.
While such a measure seemed too radical for most Americans' taste, lack of
federal action to fix the nation's ailing political system between 1875 and
1890 nonetheless enjoyed a tacit popularity within white America on the
eve of the Federal Elections Bill debate.24
There are at least seven reasons for white America's popular, albeit
silent, approval of the so-called let alone policy. The first reason—and most
commonly cited at the time—is that the vast majority of the American
people, regardless of party affiliation, were weary of Reconstruction and
ready to move on to other issues, particularly those involving the economic
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growth and development of the nation. In powerful, poetic language, one
disgruntled Democrat summed up the feeling of a majority of Americans
about the tired, worn-out issues of Reconstruction, reminiscing that "the
years unfolded reconstruction to the astonished gaze of civilization. It came
grinding across the face of the earth for seven dreary winters, for seven
desolate summers, for seven blighted springs, and seven barren autumns,
before it pulled its slimy length away."25 Democratic voters in neither the
North nor the South had ever wanted the type of Reconstruction that the
Radical Republicans seemed determined to bring about, which granted citi-
zenship and voting rights to blacks. Likewise, only about half of the Repub-
licans ever truly committed themselves to Reconstruction for genuine
humanitarian reasons. The other half of the party had merely found it ex-
pedient to protect blacks temporarily in order to prevent the freedmen's
reenslavement, and they were more than glad to abandon blacks once they
thought that danger had passed. By 1890, only a small, frustrated group of
humanitarians remained to continue advocating racial equality, and even
the most dedicated of them had begun to second-guess the wisdom of their
egalitarian policy. Virtually every Republican, no matter which wing of the
party he belonged to, could agree on economic growth, however, as the
issue to bring sectional reconciliation to the bitterly divided nation. The
American public concurred.26
Because of the widespread public disdain for the memory of Recon-
struction, a major part of the Democrats' strategy to combat the humani-
tarians' racial agenda rested upon a plan to bewail the evils of that odious
twelve-year span of American history at every opportunity. Some southern
Democrats feared that an entire generation of northerners had come of age
since Reconstruction who had no knowledge of that dreadful period and
were otherwise completely ignorant about the issues of recent American
history. A campaign of education (propaganda) was thus in order. As one
Georgian explained to John Tyler Morgan, "I never met a northerner who
had any conception of the doings of the carpetbagger. What we need is for
you to tell 'the story over again' to unfamiliar ears. It needs to be a revela-
tion."27 Morgan happily obliged, as did many other Democrats, during the
Federal Elections Bill debate, rambling for untold hours about the horrors
of black and Republican rule in the 1860s and 1870s in the deep South.
Another reason for the general public's acquiescence to their nation's
broken political system was that, oddly, many Americans of this generation
viewed politics as some type of high stakes game. As such, campaigns and
elections were supposed to be fun. Politicians, especially in the House, cer-
tainly seemed to enjoy making light of serious national problems on occa-
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sion. For example, when Democratic Congressman Roswell P. Flower of
New York declared nonchalantly in a routine speech that the Democrats
favored a "free ballot and a fair count," the Republicans chuckled in uni-
son, amused that the Tammany Hall New Yorker had the gumption to make
such an absurd statement while keeping a straight face. Flustered by the
irreverent response, Flower reiterated the same statement more earnestly
and forcefully. The chuckles grew to loud laughter. Becoming utterly em-
barrassed and trying to stave off complete public ridicule, Flower attempted
a third time to prove his sincerity, adding volume and histrionics for dra-
matic effect. The laughter on the Republican side turned into a deafening
roar. As Flower struggled to salvage his dignity, the Republicans goaded
him on. They loved watching a member of the other party wither under the
pressure of national humiliation. Finally, after Flower had apparently be-
come visibly shaken and seemed to have reached his lowest ebb, a voice
from the crowded chamber exclaimed, "I ask unanimous consent that his
picture be taken." The Republicans erupted with side-splitting laughter.
This game of politics was clearly good entertainment. The fact that the
nation's leaders could laugh and joke at one another's expense about the
corruption in the political system as it stood must have only increased the
ambivalence that most Americans felt about changing it.28
Some people, however, did not see politics so much as a game of en-
tertainment as a game of war. If, occasionally, someone got injured or killed
in a war game, such misfortune was to be expected. It seemed to be a natu-
ral, unavoidable by-product of the system that some people would cheat at
the game and others would be hurt in it. This cynical rationalization led
many otherwise honest and upright citizens to conclude that there was
nothing criminal or even unethical about guile and treachery within the
realm of politics. Winning elections involved matching wits with the oppo-
nent and outfoxing him, not only in debates on issues, but also in under-
handed electioneering when necessary. The party that could lie, cheat, bribe,
or steal the most efficiently without getting caught would win, and it de-
served to win. In essence, therefore, the Social Darwinist philosophy that
pervaded this age was applicable to politics as well as to society. The smart-
est (most conniving) candidate would—and rightfully should—prevail, and
the strongest (most impervious to criticism and investigation) would—
and rightfully should—dominate.29
Although only a small percentage of Americans consciously believed
that this natural order should not be disturbed, more expressed uncertainty
about whether it should be, and most did not care one way or another.
Apathy was thus a third reason for toleration of the decrepit political sys-
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tem. Most Americans simply did not feel directly threatened by crimes
against the ballot because such problems always seemed to appear in other
people's districts, not in their own. They saw that the main region suffering
from this political infection was the South, which made it distant and, in a
sense, foreign to most non-southerners. Only in the rare cases where a large
number of white people in a given district in the Northeast or Midwest felt
betrayed or defrauded in an election would there be a public outcry to
change the system. Indeed, electoral depravity was not ubiquitous nation-
ally, although all states suffered from it occasionally. It arose only in certain
pockets and boroughs in some states, and different states experienced it
from one election to the next. Between 1888 and 1890, Indiana, Michigan,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, and Ohio, as well as more than half
of all southern and border states, caught the contagion of ballot corrup-
tion. More often than not, the voting fraud virus in the northern states was
quarantined within the cities and rarely infected the rural areas. As a rule,
the abuses in the South were confined to particular congressional districts
that may have been either rural or urban, but usually those districts con-
tained large black populations. Later in the 1890s and early 1900s, most of
these heavily black districts would see their African American voters dis-
franchised across the board.30
A fourth reason for the tacit approbation was that not all of the ma-
nipulation of the system came in the obvious forms of buying and selling
votes, miscounting and discounting ballots, driving voters away from the
polls, or other such egregious abuses. More subtle methods of changing
the outcome of elections could be just as effective. For example, gerryman-
dering, a milder and less offensive form of political decadence, ran ram-
pant in both the North and the South, and both major political parties
practiced it equally. This partisan maneuver of state legislatures drawing or
redrawing congressional districts to give advantage to the party already in
power did not emerge as a post-Reconstruction development, of course.
Founding Father Elbridge Gerry gave the practice its name by promoting
such redistricting in Massachusetts in 1812 to favor the Jeffersonian Re-
publicans. In 1888, Massachusetts was still gerrymandered, only now in
favor of the GOP.31 One Democrat went so far as to make the distorted
claim that, "No such Congressional and legislative gerrymandering has been
continued or enforced elsewhere in the world as that existing in New En-
gland for Republican benefit Republicans have all of the twelve senators
from New England and twenty-three out of twenty-six representatives,"
despite the fact that two-fifths of the electorate voted Democrat. How could
that be so, charged Democrats, without gerrymandering?32 Indeed, in Mas-
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sachusetts in 1888, 178,000 Republicans elected ten congressmen while
151,000 Democrats elected just two. Actually, the reasons for this oddity
are much more complicated than merely deliberate redistricting to favor
the GOP. The fact that the vast majority of those Democrats were concen-
trated in Boston while the rural parts of the state contained more Republi-
cans mainly accounts for the lopsidedness in Massachusetts.
Many other states and regions showed even more seriously skewed
districts in favor of one party or the other. In Kansas, for instance, 182,000
Republicans elected seven congressmen, while 105,000 Democrats elected
none. Pennsylvania and Illinois both appeared similarly skewed in favor of
the GOP, while Indiana, Ohio, Mississippi, and South Carolina seemed just
as unfairly twisted in favor of the Democrats. Tennessee and Maryland
looked partially disfigured, while Iowa had extremely and egregiously ir-
regular districts. Because the practice of carving up states in such ways had
become so widespread, federal lawmakers began to discuss the possibility
of taking redistricting power away from the states and giving it to Con-
gress. But as one contemporary authority noted, doing so "would only ex-
change State gerrymandering for national gerrymandering" at the hands
of whichever party happened to be in power in Washington at the time.
Since there seemed to be no solution to this problem and since both parties
were equally culpable, many Americans must have rationalized that they
might just as well remain indifferent to the problem and let the parties
battle it out in elections.33
The fifth reason for public reticence about changing the system was
that the Republicans, who were the ones calling for reform, lacked credibil-
ity as reformers in the eyes of more than half of the American electorate. To
most Americans it was clear that Republicans had been guilty of dema-
goguery on racial issues in the past. Democrats preferred, of course, to call
it hypocrisy. At the same time that the GOP busied itself with forcing black
suffrage on the South during Reconstruction, several Union states engaged
in internal struggles that resulted in their rejection of black voting rights.
Moreover, California, Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Oregon, all found it more difficult to ratify the
Fifteenth Amendment than did any former Confederate state. Even after
ratification, many white northerners and westerners continued to resent
black suffrage. Some abolitionists-turned-humanitarians even came out
publicly in second-guessing the wisdom of passing the amendment.34 More-
over, after one Republican Congress gave the right of suffrage to blacks in
Washington, D.C., a subsequent Republican Congress rescinded that right.
Democratic Congressman William McAdoo of New Jersey marveled at this
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action-counteraction, which appeared to him to be a brazen example of
Republican duplicity, declaring:
If the colored citizen has the virtue which his friends claim for
him and which I trust he possesses, then there is no better the-
ater in the world for him to vindicate his right to rule and to
wisely administer government and to show his power, wisdom,
and self-restraint than to give him the ballot, surrounded, as he
is, by the best environments, in this city. There is no claim that
the negro is bulldozed in the District of Columbia. He is given
every facility for education. He is surrounded with colleges for
his special benefit; the most intelligent of his race are here.35
In addition to Republican duplicity on racial matters, the Democrats
could criticize with equal truth and effect the many financial scandals that
occurred under Republican auspices at the national, state, and local levels
during Reconstruction. Southern Democrats could also rail against
northerners of both parties for numerous instances of horrible political
corruption in the big cities above the Ohio River and the Mason-Dixon
Line.36
Moreover, the would-be reform party reeked from the stench of cor-
ruption at the ballot box after the 1888 elections. Besides the gerrymander-
ing that, in part, helped produce the Republican majority in the House,
Benjamin Harrison had won his electoral college victory (as Democrats
saw it) only because of frauds perpetrated in Indiana and New York, the
same two states that, incidentally, had propelled Grover Cleveland into the
White House in 1884 through Democratic fraud. If the GOP indeed won
in 1888 only because of fraud, as Democrats charged, this retaliatory strike
was certainly the choreographed workings of the chairman of the Republi-
can National Committee (RNC), Senator Matthew Quay of Pennsylvania.
His only job as RNC chairman was to place as many states in the GOP
column as possible, one way or another. Quay expected the Democrats to
perpetrate their usual frauds in the election, so he must have rationalized
that the Republicans should do the same, but do it more efficiently.37 In
fact, that seems to have been the case.
In the most shocking incident of apparent fraud in 1888, Democrats
accused RNC treasurer William W. Dudley of Indiana, a close, personal friend
of Benjamin Harrison, of buying the votes of "floaters" (uncommitted vot-
ers who sold their votes to whichever party bid the highest for them) with
money donated by wealthy Pennsylvania businessman John Wanamaker.
80 Legislating Racism
Upon his election as president, Harrison immediately rewarded Wanamaker
with the office of postmaster general of the United States. Dudley was tried
in federal court, but the judge resigned amid the trial, allegedly under pres-
sure from Quay and Harrison, and his replacement, a Harrison friend and
appointee, dismissed the case on a technicality.38
In two other cases resulting from the 1888 elections, Mississippi Demo-
crats caught local Republicans allegedly tampering with ballot boxes, but
rather than being reprimanded by the RNC, the Republican Congress, or
the Harrison administration, they were rewarded with government jobs. In
one, Democrats accused a Republican operative named J. M. Little of rig-
ging a ballot box to favor his party's candidate. Upon Harrisons victory,
Little quickly moved to Washington, D.C., where the new president ap-
pointed him to an undisclosed, low-level civil service job, which he held
throughout the remainder of the Harrison administration. In the other
case, a newspaper editor identified only by his surname Sansby allegedly
stole confidential documents from the Democratic executive committee in
Mississippi, took them to Washington, and handed them over to Matthew
Quay in exchange for an appointment as consul to Equador.39
Quay's political tactics were, therefore, if not altogether illegal, at least
highly questionable. They appeared so detestable that even some fellow
Republicans, such as Carl Schurz, a Missourian who had served as Presi-
dent Rutherford B. Hayes's secretary of interior, caustically criticized them.
Schurz accused Quay of borrowing $200,000 from the Pennsylvania state
treasury in order to speculate in the stock market for his own personal
gain. The money evaporated in the market, leaving Quay unable to repay
the treasury. He would have gone to jail except that wealthy friends came to
his rescue, replenishing the depleted treasury. To Schurz, Quay had acted
shamefully and had disgraced the GOP. Indeed, he lamented the fact that
Quay represented his party, "the party of great ideas . . . the party of Lin-
coln and Sumner."40
Throughout 1889 and 1890, the press, needless to say, made fodder of
Quay's dirty deals, but the Republican boss refused to answer his critics
publicly. "The charges were made months ago . . . by entirely responsible
parties," said the New York World, a Democratic organ, but Quay "remained
silent in face of the fact that a distinguished man of his own party declared
in Congress that his silence was confession. After all these months he offers
the Senate and the country only his unsupported word that he is innocent,
and his declaration that the crimes alleged were committed by his partner,
who is now dead and therefore unable to answer."
A Republican organ, the Philadelphia Inquirer, answered on behalf of
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the Keystone State senator, however, saying, "The attacks were begun in the
New York World, a newspaper that lives on sensations and cares nothing for
their truth or falsity." An Independent paper, the New York Herald, not sur-
prisingly, took the most objective view of Quay's personality, politics, and
possible perjury, saying, "Quay is no better and no worse than others of his
class, Democratic and Republican. He is a professional trickster and wire-
puller, chosen to lead because he is untroubled by scruples and undisturbed
by conscience."41
Of the three editorial opinions, the latter seems most likely the cor-
rect one. Quay merely exemplified and personified the corruption that ran
roughshod throughout the American political scene during the Gilded Age.
Yet, he tarnished the Republican Party more than it could bear at a time
when its purity was most necessary. His actions on behalf of the GOP left
pundits asking, rightly, could a party guilty of such crimes against democ-
racy possibly clean up American politics? Could a party so notorious for its
money scandals reasonably pass judgment upon the party of civil rights
violators? This party had, after all, been racked by scandals and imbroglios
of one type or another off and on since Abraham Lincoln's death. Now,
under the backstage leadership of Matthew Quay, the corruption appeared
to have reached an all-time high. Many, if not most, fair-minded observers
did not deem this party qualified to sit in judgment of the Democrats. As
one northern newspaper put it, the Republican Party talking about purify-
ing the ballot was like "the devil quoting scripture."42
The sixth reason for the national public acceptance of the status quo
can be identified, in a name, as Henry Woodfin Grady. If any one person
influenced northerners to accept the southern racial point of view it was
this unlikely young newspaper editor from Atlanta. Like a shooting star,
Grady appeared on the scene of history only briefly before burning out in a
tragic blaze of glory. Before 1886, he had been known only regionally, and
then simply as a typical southern Democratic newspaperman. He became
an instant national celebrity in December 1886, however, when he gave his
first major after-dinner speech outside of the South. That speech, delivered
at the New England Society meeting in New York City, he entitled "The
New South." It contained a twofold message: first, that northern investors
should continue to help promote the rapid industrialization of the South,
which had begun in earnest after Reconstruction; and second, that the South
should be left alone to deal with its race problem in its own way. Neither
message was new, and neither originated in the mind of this young Atlantan,
but Grady had an uncanny way with words and audiences. He wooed the
wealthy, elite, Republican crowd with praise for all of their virtues of thrift,
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enterprise, intelligence, and humanitarianism, and with a call for sectional
reconciliation and brotherly love between northerners and southerners. He
convinced listeners with his calm, tactful, and often humorous style that
the race problem would solve itself once the South attained its economic
goals.43
Although a few northern skeptics challenged Grady's racial assump-
tions, none questioned the correctness of his economic agenda. Among the
skeptics were William Tecumseh Sherman, who also spoke that night in
New York, and the "iridescent" Republican bloody-shirt-waver Senator John
J. Ingalls of Kansas, who later lambasted excerpts of Grady's speech on the
floor of the Senate. Some prominent southerners, including the South's
most famous editor, Henry Watterson of the Louisville Courier-Journal, also
criticized Grady, accusing him of selling out his people by inviting more
"carpetbagger" industrialists to move to the South. Despite these few no-
table exceptions, the general public immediately accepted Grady's message
as gospel and quickly hoisted him above his peers to become the "Spokes-
man of the New South." He was only thirty-six years old.44
Active in Georgia politics, Grady could have easily won office at some
high level in the state had he chosen to run. He reasoned, however, that he
could have more impact on public opinion as a writer and orator than as a
lawmaker. He was probably correct. He declined the opportunity to be con-
sidered by the national Democratic Party as a potential running mate for
Grover Cleveland in 1888. Yet, had he lived until 1892, he might very well
have become the vice president of the United States. But Grady died unex-
pectedly in December 1889 at the age of thirty-nine, shortly after deliver-
ing his finest public address. He spoke at the Boston Merchants' Association
annual banquet to an audience that included Grover Cleveland and An-
drew Carnegie, among other national celebrities. Despite suffering from a
severe case of pneumonia, Grady made the trip from Atlanta to Boston in
the dead of the New England winter. As contemporary writer Joel Chan-
dler Harris observed, "he stood beneath the shadow of Bunker Hill," where
resided the nation's strongest bulwark of civil rights sentiment, and made a
final passionate plea for the North to leave the South's race problem alone.
In anticipation of the coming Federal Elections Bill, and in what amounted
to his dying breath, he justified the suppression of the black vote as a neces-
sity rather than a choice. In essence, Grady explained that the South must
first make some major economic progress, even catch up with New En-
gland in industrial development and diversification, before it could worry
about elevating the condition of its black population. The overwhelmingly
Republican audience, whether out of agreement with his message or out of
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appreciation for his courage and determination to deliver it in spite of his
illness, cheered and applauded the Georgian. Some even wept.45
Grady's last speech, like his first, invited immediate protest from true
humanitarians, yet when this southern star died on his trip home to At-
lanta, even his most adamant critics mourned. As is so often the case with
controversial public figures, his reputation in death became greater than
his accomplishments in life. The money-minded Republicans of the Bil-
lion Dollar Congress, some of whom had been among those who first in-
stituted the "let alone" policy in the South that ended Reconstruction,
embraced Grady's memory by letting his message be the final word on the
Soufh's race problem. Many northerners quietly acquiesced, while many
others expressed their outright and emphatic approval.46
The seventh reason for the tacit acceptance of the ailing American
political system in 1890 was that, despite all of the problems associated
with the use of the ballot, the United States still enjoyed by far the most
democratically representative government in the world. In the national elec-
torate as a whole, only 14 percent of the total male voting age population
was denied the right of suffrage. While blacks comprised the largest single
group counted in this 14 percent, Native Americans, Chinese and other
new immigrants, criminals, and the mentally ill comprised the rest. Fur-
thermore, black disfranchisement was not nearly as pronounced at the be-
ginning of the decade of the 1890s as it later became. In fact, four southern
states—Georgia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia—had actually ex-
perienced growth in the number of black voters between 1876 and 1890.
More curiously, the number of Republican congressmen representing
former Confederate states had grown from three in 1880 to thirteen in 1890.
Such trends did not go unnoticed by the American public. Who could have
known in 1890 that these trends would suddenly be reversed in the coming
decade? Considering such patterns and taking all other factors into consid-
eration, no other nation came close to accomplishing what the United States
had done in building a representative democracy. The next closest nation,
England, by comparison, still disallowed some 40 percent of voting age
males the right to vote in 1890. When viewed in this respect, it becomes
more understandable why the American people did not give their repre-
sentatives in Washington a mandate to change the system.47
Without a popular mandate, Czar Reed and the Republican House
had no hope of creating a bipartisan coalition to pass a Federal Elections
Bill that everyone could tolerate. If change was to be made, therefore, it
would have to be accomplished by Reed and the GOP acting unilaterally
and forcing the issue, not by following public opinion. Urged on by Presi-
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dent Harrison and a small contingent of humanitarian politicians and writ-
ers, Reed and company in the House thus determined to mount a crusade
to clean up the system, particularly to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment in
the South. Enforcing black voting rights would salvage the dignity of the
party that had passed the amendment, and it would instill in the American
public a renewed respect for the U.S. Constitution, which had been rapidly
waning as a result of violations of the amendment. More important, said
the humanitarians, it would simply be the right thing to do ethically. It
would finish what the Republican Party had started some three decades
before. Most important of all, however, black southerners represented by
far the largest bloc of potential Republican voters in the nation, and with
the full power of their vote behind the party's white vote of the North, the
GOP's majority would be perpetuated for the foreseeable future. This, of
course, was a fact that the reformers did not usually want to admit, but
which was indubitably true.48 Thus came one of the most remarkable show-
downs between opposing parties and ideologies in America's political his-
tory, the epic fight over the Federal Elections Bill, and the House of
Representatives would be the first theater of war in this great clashing of
minds.
Chapter 4
THE VERY INSANITY OF DEMOCRACY
The Federal Elections Bill and the Return to
Reconstruction in the House of Representatives
They say it is a force bi l l . . . . If things are crooked, a little force possibly will
not be hurtful.
—Edmund Waddill Jr., Republican representative of Virginia.
It should be entitled "An act to stir up strife and cause bloodshed in the
South."
—Samuel W. Peel, Democratic representative of Arkansas.
The formulation of the Federal Elections Bill did not originate with the
convening of the Fifty-first Congress. Since the election of Grover Cleve-
land to the presidency in 1884, Republicans had considered sundry plans
by which Congress might best protect the voting rights of black southerners.
Leading the effort was William E. Chandler, a first-term senator from New
Hampshire who had previously worked closely with the Hayes, Garfield,
and Arthur administrations to find a remedy for suffrage abuses in the South.
The solution that GOP leaders agreed upon during that eight-year period
was to keep a watchful eye on the South but not to intervene. It would
essentially be a time to test the South to see how much, or how little, white
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southerners could be trusted to play fair in elections. Chandler, like many
of his northern Republican colleagues, greatly doubted that such a gesture
of goodwill toward the South would produce the desired outcome. The
Cleveland victory in 1884, which resulted at least partly from black dis-
franchisement and ballot box fraud in the South, convinced Chandler that
this soft approach would not work. He, in turn, helped convince many of
his fellow Republicans who were vacillating between humanitarianism and
economic concerns that controlling southern elections was an absolute
necessity. Chandler took the moral high road and told his colleagues that
no one could rightly consider himself a Republican if he did not support
enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment. He also convinced many of his col-
leagues, including presidential candidate Benjamin Harrison, to campaign
on the issue in 1888. By the beginning of the Harrison administration, the
New Hampshire firebrand had already begun applying pressure to south-
ern Democrats to clean up their act. He documented the abuses of the black
vote in the South with a massive amount of evidence, which he dutifully
presented to the Senate.1 Republicans from all over the South eagerly helped
Chandler in his quest to document the abuses. Dozens wrote to him, sup-
plying him with eyewitness accounts and local newspaper reports of racial
atrocities. African Americans appreciated Chandler's efforts immensely. One
even went so far as to call him "the greatest man in the United States" be-
cause of his incessant labor on behalf of the downtrodden black race.2
In addition to the efforts of Chandler, writer Albion "Judge" Tourgee,
a former carpetbagger justice of the Superior Court in North Carolina dur-
ing Reconstruction, also worked behind the scenes to stir the humanitar-
ian element of the party to action in 1888. Tourgee stood among the few
Republicans who remained unshakeably radical in their racial views
throughout their lives. He had never allowed the bloody shirt to be put
away and had never accepted the "let alone" policy after Reconstruction.
After the election of the Republican majority in 1888, however, he made an
even stronger stand against southern ballot injustices. He wrote widely read
articles in newspapers and magazines and met frequently with President
Harrison, Speaker Reed, and other Republican leaders to help them for-
mulate a uniform policy on the race problem.3 He felt great anticipation
about the work to be done by the Republican Congress, saying with all
confidence, "For the Negro in the United States, the year 1890 is destined to
be the most important... since the black man first touched . . . the ballot."4
Joining the crusade with Chandler and Tourgee were Murat Halstead,
a Cincinnati newspaper editor, and southern writer George Washington
Cable, both of whom hoped to rekindle the dying embers of humanitari-
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anism in the Republican Party. Together, this small group of activists sold
the idea of electoral reform to the inner sanctum of the Republican Party
and publicized it in the news media at a time when most Americans had
deliberately chosen to ignore the problem. They succeeded in stirring the
righteous indignation of the GOP and public opinion in the North to such
an extent that 1889 to 1891 became the high-water mark of interest in the
race problem in post-Reconstruction America (excluding, of course, the
civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s). Even Frederick Douglass,
who had lived through the slave era, the Civil War, and Reconstruction,
recognized that at no other time in his life had the race issue been more
acute than during and immediately after the election of 1888.5
Once Chandler and his fellow crusaders succeeded in restoring pub-
lic interest in the race problem, others quickly joined their cause. In his
inaugural address, President Harrison came forward and urged, with char-
acteristic ambiguity, that Congress write a bill of some kind for reforming
the franchise in the South and thereafter remained silent on the issue for
more than a year, allowing Congress to do the work.6 Several congressmen
from each side of Capitol Hill then raced to the table to draft competing
proposals for a Federal Elections Bill. Each proposal disagreed with the oth-
ers over the nature and severity of the measures to be adopted. Among the
initial drafts that Congress considered, second-term Wisconsin Senator John
Coit Spooner's came to predominate. Spooner had been among the first
would-be reformers to follow Chandler's lead in the recent Fiftieth Con-
gress. When Chandler fell seriously ill before the beginning of the Fifty-
first Congress, Spooner became the recognized leader of his crusade in the
upper chamber. In the House, the proposal of Jonathan H. Rowell of Illi-
nois, a Union veteran who had been wounded in the Civil War and who
had a gift for abrasive language when discussing the southern race prob-
lem, initially predominated. Although the Spooner and Rowell proposals
were only rough drafts of what would evolve into the Federal Elections Bill,
the ideas of both men remained deeply embedded in the bill even after
their respective committees refined and reworded their proposals. In the
end, however, George Frisbie Hoar and Henry Cabot Lodge, a tandem from
the Bay State, emerged as the leaders in their respective chambers, writing
the final drafts of the Senate and House versions of the bill and initiating
the debate on each.7
Hoar, with his small glasses, his nearly bald head, and his seemingly
constant frown, appeared physically like a caricature of the average Puritan-
abolitionist-humanitarian from Boston. Democratic editor Henry Watterson
of the Louisville Courier-Journal liked to call him "Grandma Hoar . . . a man
88 Legislating Racism
of the most equal temper, for he is mad all the time. If he should chance to
catch himself smiling, he would go off somewhere and kick himself."8 Hoar
completed his Senate version of the Federal Elections Bill before Lodge fin-
ished his House version and introduced it, quite prematurely, in the upper
chamber in April, without the prior knowledge or approval of House Re-
publicans. Lodge and Rowell expressed their dismay at Hoar's action, cit-
ing the fact that a bill for controlling congressional elections should originate
in the body whose membership it was to affect directly (state legislatures,
rather than the people, elected U. S. senators, of course, so the bill would
not affect membership in the Senate directly). Hoar could not resist that
logic, and he thus acquiesced, tabling his own bill in lieu of Lodge's forth-
coming bill. Even so, Senate Democrats blasted the Hoar bill immediately,
as if practicing for the showdown coming later in the year. Alabama Sena-
tor James L. Pugh, who had been a rabid secessionist before the Civil War
and afterward became one of the most adamant white supremacists in the
nation, took the lead, denouncing the bill as "revolutionary" and "sub-
versive." Moreover, he predicted that it would "insure the shedding of
blood" in the South. Senate Republicans, who would have plenty of
chances for rebuttal later, could only listen to Pugh, bite their tongues,
and bide their time, for Hoar remained determined to honor his com-
mitment and let the House schedule debate on its own version of the
Federal Elections Bill first.9
Hoar's commitment did not, however, prevent Republicans from voic-
ing disapproval of Pugh's speech outside of Congress. William E. Chandler
appealed to public opinion, writing in the widely circulated periodical Fo-
rum, "Giving the South before the war representation for three-fifths of its
slaves was degradation enough for the North," but giving it full representa-
tion now that blacks were citizens but were not allowed to vote was the
ultimate humiliation. He matched Pugh's saber-rattling by reminding fel-
low northerners that the North had whipped the South once already, and
that it could do so again.10 Chandler's acidic article elicited a response from
Pugh's fellow Alabamian John Tyler Morgan, who called Chandler a self-
appointed judge, jury, and "public executioner" of white southerners. He
informed Republicans that their plan to control southern elections "has
been more bitterly condemned" by the American people than any other
partisan bill in the history of Congress.11
Morgan's statement about the unpopularity of resurrecting the black
voting rights issue was certainly true. Indeed, by the time Henry Cabot
Lodge introduced HR11045, the Federal Elections Bill, in June 1890, a rather
acrimonious discussion of the idea of nationalizing control of congres-
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Fanning the Flames of Sectional Strife. "Base and Unpatriotic. . . . It will fan into
life the smouldering embers of the race question, which time and education are gradu-
ally extinguishing"—Protest of New York Business-Men against the Lodge Force Bill.
{Puck, 1890.) Democrats repeatedly accused the Republicans of fanning the flames
of sectional strife through their determination to pass the Federal Elections Bill.
sional elections had been going on for several months in Congress, in the
press, and in American society at large. Following party lines as well as the
Mason-Dixon Line, people began to form their opinions about the Federal
Elections Bill before the Republicans had even written it. To Democrats
and most white southerners, it would be a "force bill" no matter what it
actually said, for by their preconceptions it would be written strictly to
force black government and Republican rule upon the South—a region
that still suffered from the aftereffects of the Civil War and Reconstruction
all these years later. Any Federal Elections Bill would thus be by definition
partisan and sectional. That belief seemed quite rational considering the
conduct of the Republican majority in the Billion Dollar Congress to that
point. The Reed House had already sent the Democrats reeling from the
dizzying speed with which it had passed the McKinley Tariff and ruled upon
more than a dozen contested elections. Now, for good measure, the Demo-
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crats would be forced to try to defend themselves against a bill they felt
certain would destroy the balance of power between the two parties in na-
tional politics. Even worse, they would have no weapon with which to fight
their battle except the voice of protest. The Democrats could only hope
that by making a strong case against the idea of federal supervision of elec-
tions, public opinion—which already leaned toward the Democratic side
on this issue—would turn against the Republicans to such an extent that
they would be forced to abandon their plan.12
The first step in implementing this strategy to win the support of the
American public was for southern Democrats to plead with northern Re-
publican voters openly for empathy, and to beg them to try to imagine
themselves in the unenviable position of white southerners. If the roles
were reversed, they asked rhetorically, would northerners want to be robbed
of the right of local self-government for which their forefathers had fought
and died in the American Revolution, in order that an inferior, servile race
(as they saw it) might control their region of the country? No, of course
not. And if New England, rather than the South, were populated by an "ig-
norant race wanting to vote," said one southerner, "rivers of blood" would
run there.13 Given the fact that the North did not have a race problem like
the South's, and never would, southerners did not realistically expect em-
pathy from northern politicians, but they did hope that their appeals would
bother the collective conscience of the northern public. The southern Demo-
cratic strategy of trying to make northerners feel sorry for the South had
merit, but by itself, it would not be enough. If the majority of white Ameri-
cans were to rise in condemnation of the "force bill," they would need other
reasons besides mere empathy. To the white South's delight, the free-think-
ing northern press supplied several of these reasons.
To independent-minded northerners, a Federal Elections Bill, no
matter how noble the intentions of the authors, would be the wrong idea
for America at the time. Since it would appear to be strictly a northern
measure passed against the South, it would rekindle the flames of sectional
hatred that seemed to have largely burned out in the 1880s. As E. L. Godkin
explained, "in resisting a repetition of the experiment [of unrestricted black
suffrage] the southerners are resisting with full knowledge the probable
consequences of failure." That is, it would return the South to the unstable
situation that prevailed during Reconstruction. Echoing the southern ap-
peals for northern empathy, Godkin added, "There is no reason to suppose
that any State at the North would be willing, for the sake of the southern
Negro, to commit the election of its State legislature to the charge of fed-
eral officers."14
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Moreover, some independent-minded northerners reasoned that the
supervisory law already in effect had never worked efficiently. There had
always been a problem of finding good men to serve as supervisors, espe-
cially in the large cities, and that would no doubt continue to be the case
under any new supervisory law. Supervising elections was a thankless job
that required thick-skinned, highly principled individuals willing and able
to accept temporary employment. Although the job paid well, most gain-
fully employed people would not want it. Some critics likened becoming
an election supervisor in the 1890s to becoming a British tax collector in
the American colonies on the eve of the Revolutionary War. Who wanted
to be tarred, feathered, and rode out of town on a rail or worse? Honest
civilians willing to serve as supervisors were thus always difficult to find,
leaving many polling stations under the watchful eye of unscrupulous, and
often criminal, caretakers. Consequently, the idea of using the U. S. Army
to supervise elections invariably emerged. But, as the Nation explained, the
Army, numbering only twenty-eight thousand in 1890, could not handle
the job—and would not want the job, either. It already had its hands full
patrolling the vast western territories and trying to bring thousands of re-
calcitrant Native Americans under the subjection of the U. S. government.15
Besides the pragmatic reasons already named, other, more philosophic,
reasons for opposing the Federal Elections Bill emerged, which, to the de-
light of southern Democrats, sprang from the minds of some unlikely al-
lies: northern humanitarians. The Reverend Henry Field, a former
missionary to the freedmen during Reconstruction, was one northerner
and professing humanitarian who helped legitimize opposition to the bill.
Field proclaimed that the idea of reenforcing the Fifteenth Amendment in
1890 could only be considered "the very insanity of democracy." He based
his opinion upon the concept of natural and inalienable rights, which the
Founding Fathers had written into the Declaration of Independence more
than a century earlier. Believing that each American state possessed an "in-
alienable right" to have "good government," Field favored disfranchise-
ment of blacks in the South by both a literacy test and a property
requirement. He explained that "Personal liberty may be a natural right,
but the privilege of voting certainly is not Americans are wont to hail as
movements in the direction of liberty" all laws extending the right of suf-
frage to those previously deemed unqualified to vote. "But whether they
are in the direction of good government is another question." If those given
the right to vote are not "fit to use it," he argued, it "is a step toward barbar-
ism . . . a crime against civilization," for "self-preservation is the first law of
nature."16
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Other northern humanitarians, such as Charles H. Levermore, a his-
tory professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and an avowed
neo-Puritan, agreed. After recently visiting the South for the first time, he
sighed that he could now "appreciate more fully and more kindly the ter-
rible burdens" under which white southerners "stagger." He argued that
they should be commended for the progress they had made in race rela-
tions since the war rather than condemned for their failure to catch up
with the North. Enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment, Levermore insisted,
would not help them catch up; rather it would drive them further behind.17
Moorfield Story of Boston, who would later become the first president of
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, also
agreed. He philosophized that Reconstruction turned out to be nothing
more than a failed experiment in American race relations and that "the
strain proved too great"—both upon blacks, who, as a race, were not pre-
pared for the responsibility, and upon the American democratic system,
which was too fragile to support suffrage for minorities.18 Former carpet-
bagger governor of South Carolina, Daniel Chamberlain, likewise agreed.
After having presided over a state with a majority black population during
Reconstruction, he now had a change of heart about the wisdom of black
suffrage because, he said, it had taken Anglo-Saxons "at least eight centu-
ries" to develop their political rights. Why should American "negroes" have
rights suddenly thrust upon them with no preparation?19
Lending moral, if not vocal, support to the southern Democrats' cause
was the fact that even some leaders of the black community opposed the
Federal Elections Bill. Most prominent among them was Booker T. Wash-
ington. In his usual, cautious way, he carefully avoided making any contro-
versial public pronouncements on the subject, but privately he hoped the
bill would not come to fruition. He believed it would merely give white
southerners more excuses to commit atrocities against blacks than they
already had and would thus do more harm than good.20
Despite the fact that the idea of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment
had little public support, Rowell introduced HR 10958 for federal supervi-
sion of elections on June 14, 1890, anyway. It went to the Committee on
Election of the President, Vice President, and Representatives in Congress,
where various committee members promptly dissected and revised it. Five
days later, it emerged as Lodge's HR 11045. On June 21, the Government
Printing Office published it and distributed it to every member of the House.
Allowing only five days for congressmen to study the mammoth bill, Speaker
Reed scheduled the House debate to begin on Thursday, June 26.21
Reed recused himself during the debate, placing a four-term repre-
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sentative from Kansas named Samuel R. Peters in charge as Speaker Pro
Tempore, ostensibly to remove some of the partisan appearance of the bill.
Peters had lived in Memphis where he had earned his livelihood as a news-
paper editor from 1868 to 1873 and, compared to other former carpetbag-
gers, had since enjoyed an above-average amount of respect among
southerners in Congress. Although Reed showed prudence in appointing
Peters as his stand-in, the move hardly put the Democrats any more at ease
in the debate than they would otherwise have been. Under the floor man-
agement of former Senator Charles Buckelew of Pennsylvania, one of the
eldest and most venerable members of the House, the Democrats tried, not
surprisingly, to prevent consideration of the bill. But Reed's schedule al-
lowed no flexibility. The new Speaker would utilize his radical rules to their
fullest potential, initially allowing only forty minutes per speech. Midway
through the debate, to expedite the impending vote, he cut the allotted time
to five minutes per speech.22
Lodge, the Republican manager of the debate, introduced the bill over
the objections of the minority. Since his Republican colleagues would sup-
port it without an extensive explanation of the contents of its seventy-plus
pages, he did not need to go into the minute details of the bill in order to
secure its passage. Instead, he touched on its basic features and explained
why he thought it necessary for the improvement of the national polity. He
noted that, fundamentally, the bill called for election supervisors to be cho-
sen by the local circuit court judge in congressional districts only where a
complaint of vote fraud was filed by at least one hundred citizens in an
entire district, or by at least one hundred in a city with a population of
twenty thousand or more, or by petition of at least fifty citizens in a county.
In cases where a local judge suspected corruption throughout the entire
district, the court would appoint canvassers to collect the ballot boxes
from the various supervisors at each polling station. Lodge cited Article
I, Section 4, of the U. S. Constitution, James Madison's constitutional con-
vention notes, George Tickner Curtis's Constitutional History of the United
States, and Supreme Court cases Ex Parte Yarbrough and Ex Parte Siebold
to prove that Congress has power to regulate federal elections in such a
manner.23
Had Lodge stopped there or stuck to the legal aspects of the issue, he
would have done well. He could have perhaps made the debate over his bill
more congenial, even if he couldn't make the bill itself more palatable to
the opposition. Instead, he could not resist taking the opportunity to wave
the bloody shirt and to express his neo-abolitionist racial views. Contem-
poraries knew to expect such inflammatory rhetoric from "Cabot," as
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friends and family called him. It should not be considered strange, there-
fore, that historians have tended to point out his notable character flaws as
well. Lodge's biographers and other scholars who have looked closely at the
man agree that he had an uncanny ability to rub people the wrong way. His
abrasiveness stemmed from the fact that, while he possessed a brilliant in-
tellect, he could not seem to bridle his tongue, making him seem unusually
arrogant, even amid the ego-center of the nation that was Capitol Hill.
Considering his background, Lodge had a right, however, if any congress-
man had a right, to consider himself an authority on certain subjects and
thus to speak his mind without fearing the consequences. He was a forty-
year-old Boston "blue blood" with a doctorate degree in history from
Harvard. He had previously been employed as an editor of one of the most
popular monthly news magazines in the country, the North American Re-
view, and, in 1890, he served on the board of Overseers of Harvard. Brought
up in the New England traditions of both Puritanism and abolitionism
and surrounded all his life by educated, liberal politicians and literary gi-
ants, Lodge appeared to many observers to be a self-righteous humanitar-
ian who was determined to live up to the expectations of Boston's social
elites on the issue of civil rights for black southerners. He liked to think of
himself as having inherited the mantle of radical progenitor Charles Sumner,
and he certainly did in the sense that he became the undisputed leader of
Massachusetts politics during and after the 1890s.24
In other ways, however, Lodge's words, actions, and demeanor typi-
fied what unabashed racists of the day saw as the hypocrisy of the Republi-
can Party in 1890, making him an easy target for Democratic lampoons. In
personality, he was a snobbish, serious-minded scholar who did not accept
criticism well, who always had to be right and win every argument, and
who seemed to possess no sense of humor. More educated than any other
member of Congress and wealthier than most, he did not fit in among the
boisterous, often uncultured, commoners who comprised the bulk of the
House membership. Unlike most of his colleagues, he was unable to play
politics as a game or to consider debate as an academic exercise. At the end
of the day or the end of a session of Congress, he could not simply walk
away from the antagonisms that had gone before, as most of his colleagues
did. Instead, he carried grudges with him permanently and seemed to col-
lect them as battle scars or trophies of war. On racial issues, he talked the
rhetoric of a humanitarian, at least toward black southerners, yet he abso-
lutely opposed allowing the flood of new immigrants arriving daily on the
shores of Boston and New York to continue, calling everyone who did not
descend from northwestern European stock "obnoxious." Not surprisingly,
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in the second session of the Fifty-first Congress, he would introduce the
first of many bills for restricting this wave of new immigration. Lodge
brought much grief upon himself by this complex combination of per-
sonal quirks and seemingly contradictory racial views.25
Continuing his introductory speech on the bill that would, for better
or worse, come to bear his name, Lodge declared that "freedom was na-
tional and slavery sectional. So it may be said with equal truth that honest
elections are national and dishonest elections are sectional." He compared
Mississippi and New Jersey, both Democratic states with roughly 1,131,000
people, but contrasted the number of votes cast in each during the 1880s.
The former had cast, on average, 116,000 votes per federal election; the
latter 275,000. Their number of congressmen was the same, of course, mean-
ing Mississippi had one representative for every sixteen thousand votes cast
while New Jersey had one for every forty-three thousand. Furthermore, the
representatives from Mississippi held more power in chairing and serving
on committees than did those from New Jersey. He cited other similar dis-
crepancies between northern and southern states to support his conten-
tion that southern politics was out of phase with the rest of the nation's
politics.26
Next, Lodge turned his attention to the race problem, opining that
the only solution lay in black southerners gaining freedom of the ballot.
His argument can be summed up thus:
The wrong of slavery was expiated by the North, which con-
doned it, as much as by the South, which upheld it. . . . The
negroes in the United States did not come here by any will or
action of their own. They did not seek to force themselves upon
us as the Chinese, whom we excluded, tried to do It is idle to
say that they [blacks] are better off than they would have been if
they had staid [sic] in their native wilderness. Better an eternity
of savage freedom than the civilization which came to them with
the hammer of the auctioneer in one hand and the slave-driver's
whip in the other.27
Lodge concluded his racial sermon with a series of curiosities and
contradictions, which would only fuel the opposition's arguments against
his bill. He proclaimed the praises of loyal and faithful "negro-Americans"
who had helped save the Union in the late war, then noted that they should
not be seen as objects of sentimentality by humanitarians. He added that
the practice of using "qualifying adjectives" that "denote race distinctions"
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as prefixes to "American" should stop. He then questioned the wisdom of
his progenitors passing the Fifteenth Amendment twenty years earlier, but
decreed that "now that the deed has been done, it is federal responsibility
to protect it." He ended his speech with the most important statement (and
the one most often overlooked by historians) made during the course of
the three debates on the race problem in the Fifty-first Congress: "If any
State thinks that any class of citizens is unfit to vote through ignorance, it
can disqualify them. . . . It has but to put an educational qualification into
its constitution."28
Lodge's speech received great, prolonged applause on the Republican
side and in the galleries. Little did the partisan admirers, or Lodge himself,
realize, however, that the last point in the speech would help open the door
for constitutional disfranchisement of blacks in the South for the next sev-
enty-five years. That development, which came first in the form of the Mis-
sissippi Constitution, is of such paramount importance that it will be dealt
with in-depth in a later chapter.
Meanwhile, as Lodge took his seat after his opening remarks, James
C. Hemphill, a four-term representative of South Carolina, began deliver-
ing the rebuttal for the Democrats. Having the burden of framing an argu-
ment that would discredit a bill which was foreordained to pass, Hemphill
first attacked Lodge's bill on constitutional grounds. He began with an ex-
egesis of Article I, Section 4, of the U. S. Constitution, which says: "The
Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections for senators and represen-
tatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof, but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as
to the places of chusing [sic] Senators." Written in the pithy language that
characterizes all of the Constitution, this section seems, at least superfi-
cially, to give Congress power to regulate federal elections. Whereas Lodge
had taken the broad interpretation of the Constitution, believing that such
power was so clearly expressed that he hardly bothered to frame an argu-
ment about it, Hemphill took the opposite opinion and approach. He
pointed out that seven of the original thirteen states "declared against the
power of Congress to exercise this authority" mentioned in Section 4. These
objectors would have struck that section from the Constitution altogether,
said the South Carolinian, had they been given the choice. Since they did
not have that choice, however, they could only ratify or reject the docu-
ment as a whole. Early Congresses harbored no illusions about their own
powers thereafter, said Hemphill, and did not try to invoke Section 4 of the
Constitution to try to control federal elections until 1842, when a Whig-
dominated Congress passed a law requiring that every congressman be
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elected from a separate district within each state. A curious assortment of
southern, western, and northern states—Georgia, Mississippi, Missouri, and
New Hampshire—blatantly disregarded the law, however, and, in effect,
nullified it. Hemphill then read the New Hampshire nullification resolu-
tion, which said, "Resolved, That we can not sanction so unauthorized an
interference in our domestic relations... and we can not regard the same as
binding upon the States." Ohio and New York also sent resolutions to Con-
gress protesting the new law. Hemphill emphasized the fact that three north-
ern states had taken that position. He gleefully added, as a footnote to history,
that the American people showed what they thought of the law in the mid-
term elections of 1842: Congress went Democrat by a two to one margin.29
Hemphill then tackled specific provisions within the Lodge bill that
seemed to him to defy logic. First, at that time there were seventy federal
circuit court districts in the United States and 335 congressional districts.
Within those congressional districts were thousands of counties. Within
some of those counties were dozens of cities with a population of twenty
thousand or more. Surely there would be an overlap of citizens petitioning
for supervision in many of these places, which would undoubtedly cause
utter chaos, declared Hemphill. It would easily be possible that, in some
districts, each ballot would be handled by seven different supervisors and
canvassers and counted in as many as six separate circuit courts.30
Furthermore, noted Hemphill, the bill provided a chief supervisor
for each federal judicial district, three canvassers for each congressional
district, three local supervisors for each polling station, and as many deputy
marshals as the chief supervisor of the district saw fit to appoint. Under the
old supervisory law, six thousand supervisors and eleven thousand deputy
marshals had been stationed in New York City alone for the election of
1876. One hundred fifty-five of these marshals protected a single polling
station. Likewise, under the old law, one thousand armed guards patrolled
a single precinct in South Carolina in 1876. The sheer number of supervi-
sors, canvassers, and marshals that would be involved under the Lodge bill,
if supervision resulted from petition, said Hemphill, would be staggering.31
To compound the problem, continued the South Carolinian, all su-
pervisors and deputies would be residents of the districts they were ap-
pointed to oversee, meaning they would have a stake in the outcome of the
elections. As paid officials, they would, in effect, need to find evidence of
abuse in order to keep their jobs. In addition, for some, their jobs would
not be complete until two months after election day, when all of the votes
would have been counted, when the governor would have certified the re-
turns, and when the documentation of a fair election would have reached
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the House of Representatives in Washington, D.C. At five dollars per day
for each person so employed, complained Hemphill, the amount that the
government might spend to ensure a free ballot and a fair count could be
astronomical.32
If all such problems did not provide reason enough to kill this bill,
said Hemphill, plenty more reasons could be listed. For one, the people of
any given district would have no voice in who supervised their elections.
Instead, federal district judges, most of whom were either Republicans or
sympathetic to the GOP, would appoint the supervisors, whereupon those
supervisors would serve for life. Which would be worse, asked Hemphill, to
give such unbridled power to the Republicans for life or to let the several
states manage their own elections as they had always done before? Answer-
ing his own question, he asserted that it would be better for a few congres-
sional districts to get stuck for two years with representatives who won
their elections through fraud than for the whole country to live perpetually
under a system that could easily devolve into a national tyranny at any time.
If even half the corruption of the ballot that Lodge alleged actually existed,
Hemphill reasoned, then one could only conclude that the American people
must be fundamentally corrupt. If that was the case, would not the super-
visors be corrupt, too? How could Congress possibly trust these supervi-
sors who would be appointed for life? As appointees of the judicial branch
of the federal government, they would be all but beyond the reach of con-
gressional oversight. As federal agents, they would be beyond the reach of
the states. In essence, there would be no way to control the supervisors
other than by blind faith in the judicial system. Hemphill spoke on behalf
of all Democrats in saying that, while he respected the judiciary, he did not,
and could not, have blind faith in it.33
The South Carolinian then turned the tables on the Republicans, com-
plaining of their milder form of corruption—the gerrymander—and criti-
cizing Speaker Reed at the same time. Consider Maine, he said, "the State
so ably represented by the gentleman who has been elected dictator of this
House," where seventy-three thousand Republican votes elected four con-
gressmen in 1888, while fifty-four thousand Democratic votes elected none.
Hemphill cited similar statistics for six other northern states, using them as
evidence that the supposed Republican dominance of the North was really
a "sham." He compared the GOP to a preacher who spoke beautiful words
on Sunday but served the devil with all his might the other six days of the
week. At that point, Representative Sereno Payne of New York stood to ob-
ject, but Hemphill cut him off before he could interrupt, saying, "Just wait
a moment; you can say it afterward. . . . it does not amount to anything
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anyhow," to which the Democrats gave a hearty laugh.34 Such insulting lan-
guage certainly did not help the Democrats' cause, but Hemphill, like most
of his colleagues on both sides of the aisle, could not resist the opportunity
to mock the opposition.
Continuing his counterattack, Hemphill noted:
A good deal has been said in this country of late about the New
South. What this country really needs is a new North. It needs a
North that will take a view of all the facts and not be guided by
their own preconceived prejudices. It needs a North which will
not waste all of its time and energy in reforming other people's
abuses. It needs a North that will sometimes look at its own
shortcomings and not always on those of people a thousand miles
away; and it needs a North which will believe that when a man
in the South of the Anglo-Saxon race happens by any untoward
circumstance to come into serious collision with another man
of the African race that it is not always because the other man is
black.35
Hemphill ended the opening statement for his party by remembering
the ills of Reconstruction in the Palmetto State. He read from a speech that
former carpetbagger governor of South Carolina Daniel Chamberlain had
recently made in Boston, saying, "I see men running to and fro . . . wringing
their hands in despair... over our portentous race problem. I confess I share
in no such excitement It is, in my judgment, at least nine parts out of ten
the babble of professional or ill-informed philanthropists and the [self-in-
terested jargon of demagogic politicians." After Chamberlain left South Caro-
lina in 1876, he did not return until 1889, noted Hemphill, whereupon he
found a much better state of affairs in his erstwhile southern home. "I find
that since 1876 both races in South Carolina have prospered . . . that the
negro has never known such an era of advancement and prosperity." What
more evidence could any rational person possibly need that Democratic con-
trol since the redemption has been good for the South, asked Hemphill? There-
fore, he concluded that local white Democrats must rule, no matter the cost
to the GOP or to African Americans. Besides, he explained, "It is the home of
our fathers," who purchased it with their blood in the American Revolution.
Hemphill's remarks drew great applause on the Democratic side, but these
opponents of the elections bill had no time to savor the moment, for the
Republicans stood ready to counter his arguments.36
In congressional debates, the opening statements generally set forth
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the main points that each side will argue for the remainder of the debate.
Successive speakers, more often than not, merely expand upon the argu-
ments made in the opening statements. The House debate of the Lodge bill
was no exception. Although Democrats protested that, under the Reed Rules,
they did not have adequate time to make their case against the bill to the
American people, the fact is, in six days of debate, they added little of sub-
stance to what Hemphill said on the first day. Some, however, squeezed the
maximum number of provocative thoughts into their limited time, and all
added more substantive discussion to the debate than did the Republicans,
who preferred to spend the remainder of their time throwing the Demo-
crats off stride with bloody-shirt diversions. Indeed, the Lodge bill debate
offered the perfect opportunity for Republicans to revisit the ill feelings
engendered by the Civil War and, often, to gloat over the Union victory.
The Democrats' felt compelled at every turn to digress from the issues of
the Lodge bill in order to defend both the South and the defunct Confed-
eracy against these bloody-shirt attacks.37 Other diversions cropped up, as
well. Both sides argued over, for instance, the superiority of their respective
states and sections to the rest of the nation and world, the character and
intellectual capacity of African Americans, interpretations of the Holy Bible
and the U. S. Constitution, and the future course of national politics, among
other topics.38
These digressions interested most congressmen participating in the
Lodge bill debate much more than the topic of supervising federal elec-
tions, and they can likewise prove more entertaining to the historian. They
can easily distract from the task of understanding the provisions of the
Lodge bill and determining whether it represented good legislation based
upon fundamentally sound principles that might have helped solve the
southern race problem. In order to avoid that pitfall, these fascinating di-
gressions, although duly noted, must otherwise be ignored in this study.
Some diversions in the debate cannot be ignored, however, because
they illustrate the unusual divisiveness of the Federal Elections Bill. The
most notable such cases involved individual congressmen who engaged in
heated verbal exchanges that would have likely led to fisticuffs or some other
form of physical assault had they occurred outside the halls of Congress.
One case involved two young, first-term Virginians, a black man named
Edmund Waddill Jr. and a white man named Henry St. George Tucker. The
point of contention between them was nothing more than which man
should be entitled to the floor. Tucker held the floor until his allotted time
expired, upon which Waddill rose to speak. Tucker, however, insolently re-
fused to yield to Waddill, as he would have customarily done had a white
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man interrupted him. Tucker instructed his black challenger to "sit down"
and not speak until some white representative offered the floor to him.
Needless to say, Waddill could not appreciate Tucker's angry, insulting
outburst of racial prejudice, and the two men exchanged threats. To pre-
vent a possible physical altercation on the floor of the U. S. House of
Representatives, the Speaker called both men to order repeatedly, but they
continued their mutual harangues for several minutes until both men
wearied of the situation. Waddill subsequently got his chance to speak.
Ironically, both men would go on later in life to distinguish themselves at
the bar. Waddill became a U. S. Circuit Court Justice, and Tucker became
the dean of two law schools—Washington and Lee University and George
Washington University.39
A similar case involved Democrat Richard Bland of Missouri, the re-
nowned cosponsor of the Bland-Allison Silver Purchase Act of 1878, and
Louis E. McComas, a four-term Republican representative of Maryland,
who would later become a U. S. senator and a professor of international
law at Georgetown University. They almost came to blows over the ques-
tion of which of the two of them evinced more hypocrisy in his record of
legislation toward African Americans.40 If such encounters between un-
happy statesmen are any indication of the acrimony that a federal elections
law would have unleashed upon American society between blacks and
whites, northerners and southerners, or Democrats and Republicans, one
might reasonably conclude that it was for the best that the Lodge bill never
became law.
The few speeches made after the opening statements that actually
addressed the issues under consideration in the Lodge bill can be summa-
rized briefly. Those speeches were especially rare on the side that supported
the bill, because the bill's sponsors did not need to strengthen their case in
order to secure passage. Jonathan H. Rowell of Illinois, who had helped
author the bill, argued that both a constitutional duty and an obligation to
practice noblesse oblige toward the minority race dictated that the Fifteenth
Amendment be enforced through a federal elections law.41 Robert R Kennedy
of Ohio, a former brigadier general in the Union Army, pointed out that
the democratic ideal of majority rule, regardless of who constituted the
majority, demanded passage of the bill.42 Frederick Greenhalge, an English-
born first-term representative of Massachusetts, who would later go on to
serve as governor of the Bay State, rationalized the need for the bill through
an analogy. If all is well in one's own house, he asked, but a neighbor's
home is being robbed, is it not morally imperative that one rush to that
neighbor's aid? The happy homeowner in this parable represented white
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northerners, the victim of robbery represented black southerners, and the
robbers were white southerners. How could white northerners possibly jus-
tify not rushing to the aid of black southerners by passing a federal elec-
tions law, Greenhalge asked?43
The Democrats delivered significantly more numerous and well-ex-
pounded (if not more historically accurate) arguments against the Lodge
bill than did the Republicans for it. Three of the most notable indictments
of the bill came from dissenting southern Republicans. Hamilton Ewart of
North Carolina, a single-term representative who was purported to be the
originator of the Lodge bill's sobriquet, the "force bill," declared that party
icons such as Abraham Lincoln and Ulysses Grant would never have sup-
ported such a plan to federalize congressional elections. He also pointed
out that the "Boston blue-blood" Henry Cabot Lodge had never stepped
foot on southern soil in his life, except in Maryland and the District of
Columbia, and consequently had no firsthand knowledge of either south-
ern elections or the southern people. Had he spent time in the South as had
Lincoln and Grant, said Ewart, he would never have proposed such a scheme,
but would rather show mercy and leniency toward the South, as did these
deceased Republican icons. He added that, if his party really wanted to do
something to help black southerners, it would pass a national education
bill along the lines of the then-defunct Blair Education Bill.44
A single-term southern Republican from Louisiana named Hamilton
Coleman agreed. Coleman added that, besides passing an education bill,
the Republican Congress should allocate more money for building levees
in flood-prone regions of the South, pay off the balance due to depositors
of the failed Freedmen's Bank, and pay off the southern people's Civil War
damage claims. All of these ideas would, he claimed, benefit the southern
people, black and white alike, make everyone happy, and thus destroy the
solidarity of the Democratic Party in the South. A federal elections law
would not, he contended. It would exacerbate the problem instead.45 Yet
another single-term southern Republican, Nathan Frank of Missouri, agreed
that the Lodge bill, as it now stood, would have that effect. He made the
objective and sensible observation that, until such time as Congress could
draft a Federal Elections Bill with bipartisan support, the idea should be
tabled.46
All thirty-six northern House Democrats joined their southern coun-
terparts and the handful of Republican dissidents in denouncing the Lodge
bill. James Covert, a seven-term representative of New York argued that
Lodge's plan allowed "an irresponsible and insignificant minority," with
absolutely no proof of wrongdoing, to call in supervisors on demand.47
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Later, Benton McMillin, a six-term representative from Tennessee, asked
Lodge directly about the veracity of that charge. Lodge answered that, if
one hundred citizens of a given district called for supervision, surely they
would only do so because they had a legitimate reason. Joseph E. Washing-
ton, in his second term from Tennessee, immediately chimed in that "one
hundred of the worst citizens in my district would call for supervision at
every election."48
Other northern Democrats added equally significant points to the
discussion. Roswell P. Flower of New York, a future governor of the Empire
State; Richard Vaux of Pennsylvania, a former mayor of Philadelphia, who,
at seventy-four, was the oldest member to speak on the Lodge bill; and
John L. Chipman, a former judge, now in his second term from Michigan,
all attacked it on the grounds that it would "prostitute the judiciary." Giv-
ing judges power to control the outcome of elections by appointing federal
supervisors would be a "constant temptation . . . set before them. Visions of
political advancement will haunt their waking and sleeping hours."49
William McAdoo, a three-term Democratic representative of New Jer-
sey who would soon become the assistant secretary of the navy in Grover
Cleveland's second administration and later the police commissioner of
New York City, proclaimed that the Lodge bill would also prostitute the
clerk of the House of Representatives. The bill provided for a $5,500 fine
and possible imprisonment for any clerk who received the certificates of
election presented by the states rather than those presented by the federal
supervisors. McAdoo, a native of Ireland who, as an immigrant, claimed to
possess an above-average understanding of both contemporary and his-
torical European politics, added that the bill was so "revolutionary, dan-
gerous, and drastic" that not even the most centralized and despotic
governments in Europe would think of passing such a law. How then could
the democratic United States tolerate this bill?50
Amos J. Cummings, a two-term Democratic representative of New
York, argued that the Lodge bill called for three supervisors per polling
station, only two of whom could belong to the majority party in Congress
at the time of the election. He noted that the language of the provision
implied that the other supervisor must be a member of the other major
party, but that was not necessarily true. He actually could be a "Greenbacker,
Prohibitionist, Woman's Suffragist, Mugwump, Independent, Featherhead,
or anything but" a member of the majority party.51 William Mutchler, a
three-term Democrat from Pennsylvania, and Samuel Yoder, in his second
term from Ohio, spoke about the character of actual supervisors already
employed for life under the existing supervisory law. Mutchler read a list of
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the criminal records of fifty of the worst supervisors in New York City and
Philadelphia, which he took from newspapers and police reports in both
cities. The list consisted of the names of people guilty of almost every type
of illegal and immoral behavior imaginable, from running brothels to or-
ganizing gambling rings and from buying and selling votes to stealing money
and horses. Yoder read House Report 2681 from the Forty-eighth Con-
gress, in which the House impeached U. S. Marshal Lot Wright of the south-
ern district of Ohio for violating his power as an election supervisor. The
House Committee on Elections found Wright guilty of appointing and arm-
ing various felons to serve as his deputies and to oversee the polling in
Cincinnati in the elections of 1882.52
Southern Democrats generally could not stick to the facts as well as
their northern counterparts because of the sectional distractions already
mentioned. Occasionally, however, one would make a salient point. Tho-
mas R. Stockdale of Mississippi, for instance, in the longest speech deliv-
ered on the Lodge bill, explained that the core of the Republicans' case for
passing the bill lay in the claim that "honest men who do not commit elec-
tion frauds need have no fear of this bill. Why, Mr. Speaker," he remarked,
"the gentleman from Massachusetts [Lodge]" is enough of a historian "to
know that the Inquisition was established and maintained upon precisely
that theory."53 Just as the Inquisition represented a display of force by the
Church against alleged heretics, added James B. McCreary of Kentucky, so
did the Lodge bill represent a display of force by the GOP against the al-
leged political heresy of Democrats and racial heresy of white southerners.
The term "force bill" described the measure perfectly, he said, because it
would force black and Republican rule upon the South and because the
GOP had determined to force it through Congress against the will of the
majority of the people in the United States.54
The greatest contribution of the southern Democrats to the debate
doubtless came from Hilary Herbert of Alabama. Herbert was perhaps the
most important leader of the Democratic Party in fighting the Lodge bill
because of the book he edited especially for the purpose entitled Why the
Solid South? The book extensively documented the alleged evils of Recon-
struction in the various southern states. Fourteen southerners from the
House and Senate contributed chapters covering their respective states. This
hastily prepared collection of essays did not convince Republicans to drop
the Federal Elections Bill, but it did help persuade the vacillating segment
of the northern public to join the Democrats in opposing a return to the
sectional animosities of Reconstruction. More important, it turned out to
be a masterpiece polemic against black suffrage and the extension of fed-
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eral power, to which future historians, such as William A. Dunning and his
doctoral students at Columbia University, would turn to help justify their
negative interpretations of Reconstruction. The book contained fourteen
chapters, one for each of the eleven Confederate states, plus chapters on
Reconstruction in Missouri, West Virginia, and Washington, D.C. Although
the book had no effect on the way any member of the House voted on the
Lodge bill, under Herbert's able editing, these firsthand accounts certainly
presented a formidable amount of ideological ammunition with which
Democratic senators could bombard their Republican counterparts dur-
ing the Senate filibuster later in the year.55 The essential argument of the
work merely reiterated the traditional Democratic Party line of local au-
tonomy and state rights, which is well summarized in this excerpt: "Our an-
cestors believed that local self-government was the greatest of blessings....
The unwisdom [sic] of departing from this theory has never had a more
convincing illustration than in the reconstruction laws of Congress and
the results which followed.... there is always danger of mistake when vot-
ers in any one part of the Union undertake to pass upon questions peculiar
to a far-distant section of the country."56
Despite waging a fierce battle, the Democrats had no power to fore-
stall the vote on the Lodge bill beyond the time allowed under the Reed
Rules. Thus, after six full days of debate, the Speaker called for the vote.
When the clerk took the roll, 155 representatives voted "yea" and 149 voted
"nay," with twenty-four members absent and not paired for voting. No
Democrats voted for the bill, only one Independent voted for it, and only
two Republicans (the two southerners named "Hamilton") voted against
it. Thus, July 2, 1890, became the humanitarians' finest hour in the Fifty-
first Congress. And to Democrats, it appeared to prove their suspicions
that the GOP majority represented a juggernaut, an unstoppable force crush-
ing all opposition, even the will of the American people. Yet, they saw the
passage of the Lodge bill in the House not as a milestone but merely as an
expected stepping stone toward absolute Republican control of the nation.
They also realized that the House debate was only the opening scene in a
much larger drama. They expected the real test to come in the Senate, which,
as yet, had adopted no equivalent of the Reed Rules for limiting debate.
The bill arrived in the upper chamber on July 7, ready for discussion and
modification. Meanwhile, the white South cursed, stomped, and then settled
down to grieve while it awaited the Senate debate that it believed would
inevitably occur before the summer was over.57
House Democrats did not let the bill go to the upper chamber peace-
fully. They continued to make impromptu speeches and arguments against
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the Federal Elections Bill at every available opportunity, hoping to provide
Senate colleagues with more ammunition for their own verbal fusillades
against the hated measure. For instance, on August 6, the Republicans in-
troduced an appropriation bill, which was a routine and daily custom in
the House that usually garnered little notice. This particular bill, however,
caught the attention of the Democrats because it called for back payment
of special deputy marshals who had supervised congressional elections in
1888. After almost two full years, they had not been paid the $34,745 col-
lectively owed them. William McAdoo used this bill as a launching pad for
one last tirade against the Lodge bill, the substance of which showed how
difficult it was to keep track of the amount of money owed to the supervi-
sors already employed—imagine how much harder it would be, said
McAdoo, under the Lodge bill.58
Such ex post facto arguments in the House had little impact on what
senators thought of the bill. All Democrats and most Republicans had their
minds made up already. The course of the bill in the Senate seemed sure to
everyone. It was common knowledge that without a change in the Senate
rules, Democrats would filibuster the Federal Elections Bill indefinitely, thus
turning one of the most important debates in late nineteenth-century
America into nothing more than a test of endurance. Such had occurred
with a similar bill in 1875, and the Democrats had won. Republican floor
manager of the Senate George Frisbie Hoar thus called for a limitation of
debate immediately upon introduction of the controversial bill on August 7
and scheduled a vote for September 4.59
William P. Frye, a Republican senator from Maine, spoke up in agree-
ment with Hoar's plan, saying that if debate was not limited, everyone knew
the outcome of the bill from the beginning. Other Republican senators
concurred, including Frank Hiscock of New York and George Edmunds of
Vermont. Over the next two weeks, three other Republican senators, Henry
Blair, Matthew Quay, and Rhode Island senator Nelson Aldrich, all followed
suit in proposing to limit debate. While most Senate Republicans agreed
on that much, they disagreed about the scheduling of the debate on the
Federal Elections Bill because they also had to make time to hear the
McKinley bill, which had already been on the docket awaiting action for a
month. On August 12, Republican power broker Matthew Quay arranged a
deal with Senator Arthur P. Gorman, whom the Democrats chose to be the
floor manager on their side of the Federal Elections Bill debate. Gorman, a
party boss from Maryland, like all of his fellow Democrats, considered rais-
ing the tariff to be by far the lesser of the two evils. He agreed to debate the
McKinley bill immediately and postpone consideration of the Lodge bill
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until the second session. Hoar, in frustration and disappointment, drew up
a document called "Senators Agreement as to the Election Bill and the pro-
posed change of rule." It ensured that the Federal Elections Bill would be
top priority in the second session and would be immediately considered
upon the Senate's reconvening in December. Thirty-five colleagues signed
it immediately, and six others signed it before the beginning of the second
session.60 Outside of Congress, astute observers suspected that something
was amiss with the Quay-Gorman deal. One northern newspaper voiced
that fear, saying Senate Republicans "have allowed themselves to be fooled"
again by the Democrats.61 Frederick Douglass held out hope, however, that
the deal did not mean the end of the bill, only its delay, saying: "Shall we get
mad and denounce and renounce the Republican party? Has that party
sinned away its day of grace? Are there no remaining reasons for giving it
our confidence? I entertain no such thought. The Federal election and edu-
cational bills are not dead, nor are their friends idle. Mr. Cabot Lodge and
Mr. Blair and their friends in the Senate and in the House may permit delay
but will not suffer defeat."62
While it was evident to onlookers that the Democrats intended to
make the passage of the Federal Elections Bill as difficult as possible for the
GOP, and while it was also clear that some Republican senators felt luke-
warm about the bill, most observers agreed with Douglass. Few questioned
that the bill would ultimately become law. Public opinion therefore imme-
diately judged it as though its passage was a foregone conclusion, as the
next chapter will reveal.
Chapter 5
JUDGING THE INSANITY
Public Reactions to the Inflammatory "Force Bill"
and the Tyranny of the Majority
As a matter of force an election is just as decisive as the battle of Waterloo.
—Kansas City Journal
We need no great standing armies . . . our revolutions are bloodless.
—New York Press
During and after the tension-filled week of debate between Democrats and
Republicans in the House, the press and the public likewise discussed the
merits and demerits of the Federal Elections Bill. For a variety of reasons,
far more opposition to the bill appeared than support for it. Albion Tourgee,
who had pushed so vehemently for a new supervisory law, actually op-
posed Lodge's bill, considering it too lenient toward the South.1 Murat
Halstead also changed his opinion in 1890 to side with the money Repub-
licans, who opposed the bill as an unnecessary stumbling block on the path
to North-South reconciliation.2 Carl Schurz opposed it because he believed
it would destroy southern prosperity by driving out northern capital and
would simultaneously cause a swift worsening of southern race relations.
What would the GOP get in return for these calamities, asked Schurz? It
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would get "assurance of future tariff bills by the hundred." He added, "Let
the peace and prosperity of the South go to the bottom of the sea, if only
the protectionists can gain some more congressmen in Negro districts to
pass more tariffs in their interest! This is the milk in the election bill!"3 The
reputed leader of the GOP, James G. Blaine, urged party leaders "to drop
the force bill and assiduously cultivate the Farmer's Alliance," which he
correctly predicted would soon cause a "great political upheaval at the
South."4 Blaine meant only the white Alliance, of course, because it op-
posed the bill, while the black Alliance supported it.5
In the newspapers, the supporters' and the detractors' arguments were
predictable. One paper stated the supporters' main point of contention
succinctly—that if Congress did not pass the bill, it would be a "silent par-
ticipator" in crimes committed against blacks in the South.6 Another pro-
claimed that the motto of the GOP should be "Let justice be done, though
the heavens fall."7 One opposing paper commented that when the Lodge
bill "is translated into cold-blooded Anglo-Saxon, it means that if the South
doesn't vote the Republican ticket it must be made to," and that "Its pas-
sage would be the most ominous incident in the history of our times."8
Another pegged the bill as "the most infamous measure which ever en-
gaged the attention of Congress . . . it is too plain that sectional hatred is the
germ from which [this] legislation has sprung," yet it stood merely as an
example of what lay in store for the nation with "the autocracy which has
assumed control of American legislation" in power.9 Not all of the opposi-
tion came from newspapers focusing on the South's race problem. The
Catholic press equally despised the bill simply for the fact that it seemed to
threaten local autonomy, which wove the very fabric of American democ-
racy. Reciting the same mantra used against the Blair bill, Catholics asked,
if Congress would regulate race relations, might it not soon regulate reli-
gion, too? One Catholic paper opined that the Lodge bill "would govern
this country on the same plan that Great Britain governs Ireland. Undoubt-
edly this is the worst bill of this generation."10 The opposition press had
more reasons to hate the bill than the supporting press had to commend it
and was thus more outspoken and adamant in its opinion.
The most notable newspaper opposition came in the third week of
July 1890, when the Atlanta Constitution attempted to foment support for
a revolutionary action to show southern and Democratic disdain for the
Lodge bill, which it labeled the "stillborn child of hate!"11 On the advice of
Governor John B. Gordon of Georgia, the paper called for a southern boy-
cott of all northern products should the bill pass the Senate. Although this
drastic measure caused alarm in certain manufacturing centers of the North,
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it received little support outside of Atlanta. Most Democratic papers mulled
over the idea for a few days before calling for unity among themselves in
repudiating the idea of the boycott. A general agreement surfaced that held
such a move would be tantamount to the South's threat of secession in
1860 if Abraham Lincoln were to be elected president. Once such a threat is
made, it must be carried out. And, just as secession led the South into a
devastating military conflict, so would a boycott bring economic warfare
that might prove just as disastrous for the South.12 One paper thus called
the boycott "the weapon of the weakling" and informed readers that the
South should not think itself that weak.13 Another warned that threatening
the North with a boycott would only strengthen the GOP's resolve to pass
the bill.14 The Constitution soon dropped the idea.
The Savannah Morning News supported a much more practical ap-
proach in protesting the Lodge bill. It reported that the Savannah Board of
Trade sent a resolution to "the mercantile houses of the North who enjoy a
lucrative trade" with the southern port city, which definitely lassoed the
attention of some influential New York City businessmen. If only other
southern cities would follow this example, the Savannah paper believed,
the "force bill" could still be defeated.15
The most significant reaction to the Lodge bill came in the form of
Mississippi's constitutional convention, which lasted from August 12 to
October 1. The purpose of the convention was to establish new qualifica-
tions for voters in order to limit, if not altogether eliminate, the black vote
in the Magnolia State. Contemporaries and historians alike have well un-
derstood the paramount importance of Mississippi's fourth constitution
to the course of American race relations. Immediately after it went into
effect on November 1,1890 (not by popular ratification but simply by de-
cree of the state legislature), Albion Tourgee called it "the most important
event" in American history since South Carolina's secession from the Union
in 1860. Tourgee correctly predicted that, like South Carolina's action, the
new Mississippi Constitution would serve as a catalyst prompting other
southern states to follow a bad example and that the results would ulti-
mately prove ruinous for the South.16
Wisconsin Senator John Coit Spooner basically agreed, although he
modified Tourgee's argument slightly. He considered the new constitution
to be the most important thing to happen to American race relations since
the formulation of the "Mississippi plan" of 1875, which Mississippi Demo-
crats used to overthrow the Republican administration of carpetbagger
Governor Adelbert Ames. That plan had called for native white Democrats
to "redeem" the state from black and Republican rule by any means neces-
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sary, including violence and intimidation toward black voters and impeach-
ment of Republican officials. Like South Carolina's secession, it also served
as a model for other southern states to emulate in overthrowing their Re-
publican governments. Spooner thus dubbed the Mississippi Constitution
of 1890 the "second Mississippi plan."17 This term accurately described the
document's intent, for over the next few years all former Confederate states
and even several non-Confederate states followed its example, rewriting
their constitutions to disqualify African American voters.18
Modern historians have almost unanimously agreed with the con-
temporary humanitarian assessment of the significance of the Mississippi
Constitution to American race relations after 1890. Rayford Logan, for in-
stance, argues that the document had a more detrimental effect on African
Americans than anything else since slavery. He also points out that the con-
stitution did not merely spring from the devious minds of white Demo-
crats in Mississippi. Ironically, the Republican leadership of Massachusetts
actually paved the way for the new constitution. Logan notes that the con-
temporary northern press called the qualifications to remove black voters
from the rolls "the Massysip' idea," although the venerable historian never
explains exactly what the term meant, precisely what the Massachusetts-
Mississippi connection entailed, or how that nexus came about.19 Nor has
any other historian adequately explained "the Massysip' idea." An explana-
tion is thus long overdue, and it adds a great deal of important information
to our story.
To begin, the Mississippi legislature called the constitutional conven-
tion of 1890, with the approval of the state's Democratic machine, which
consisted of newly elected Governor John M. Stone, Senator J. Z. George,
and Supreme Court Justice Lucius Q. C. Lamar. Its sole purpose was to
draft a constitution that would circumvent the federal supervision of elec-
tions by disfranchising blacks without violating the Fifteenth Amendment.
The idea for the convention had been debated in the newspapers of the
state and in the legislature without success for six years already, but Robert
Lowry, the Bourbon governor from 1881 to 1889, refused to agree to the
idea. Lowry opposed wholesale black disfranchisement, partly because of
his Bourbon mentality of paternalism toward blacks and partly because he
feared federal retaliation. After the election of the Republican president
and Congress in 1888, however, the threat of the Federal Elections Bill sud-
denly and dramatically brought the issue of the constitutional convention
to the fore. It became the main issue of the gubernatorial campaign in 1889,
which Stone won easily by promising to approve a constitutional conven-
tion should the legislature call one.20 In his inaugural address in January
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Republican Leaders Past and Present. The old leaders and the new. {Puck,
1890.) The original leaders of the GOP (Charles Sumner, William
Seward, Salmon P. Chase, and Abraham Lincoln) are shown here repre-
senting monuments of good government who tower above and easily
overshadow their 1890 counterparts (George Frisbie Hoar, Thomas B.
Reed, Matthew Quay, and Benjamin Harrison).
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1890, Stone made public the plans for the convention but, fearing federal
interference, added that "Never was a look more important before a leap is
made."21
Mississippi Democrats thus watched the developments on Capitol Hill
in early 1890 carefully. Soon they realized that the GOP fully intended to go
through with its plan to pass a Federal Elections Bill, whether Mississippi
changed its state constitution or not. Thus, there was no need to postpone
the convention any longer—they had nothing to lose. Moreover, the Mis-
sissippi machine, trying to find the silver lining inside the cloud of doom,
reasoned that now might even be the most opportune time imaginable to
rewrite the state constitution. Perhaps with national attention focused upon
the Federal Elections Bill battle in Washington, the convention could do its
work without too much northern Republican scrutiny. If not, at least all
the congressional discussion of election laws would provide the Mississip-
pians with the perfect opportunity to find out what type of voter qualifica-
tions, if any, northern Republicans might allow them to write into their
new constitution. The two main options that the Mississippi press had been
considering throughout the early months of 1890 before the convention
were literacy tests and property qualifications. The question was, which, if
either, would the GOP be more likely to let Mississippi get away with.22
How the literacy test option won out over property qualifications is
the most interesting part of the story. It begins not in Jackson, Mississippi,
but in the northern press and in Washington, D.C., fully a year before the
constitutional convention. In adjoining articles published in the North
American Review in 1889, Albion Tourgee and John Tyler Morgan precipi-
tated a new strain of thought concerning potential solutions to the race
problem by mutually advocating that southern states adopt literacy tests.
Tourgee predicted that the constitutional limitation of suffrage based upon
a literacy test would be the only solution to the race problem that would
"command the approval of a majority of the people of the North."23 Mor-
gan was not sure about that, but he and fellow southern Democrats had
always lamented the fact that the Republican-controlled federal govern-
ment held the former Confederate states to a different standard than north-
ern states with regard to voter qualifications. He explained that
Massachusetts had enacted a literacy test in 1857 for the sole purpose of
controlling the voting strength of its ethnic immigrant population. Why
should not southern states be allowed to disqualify their undesirable voters
as well, asked Morgan? How is one a violation of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, but not the other?24
Morgan later took his argument even further, making the ultimate
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racist case for disfranchising black voters. In 1890, in an introduction to a
new edition of Alexis de Tocqueville's classic volume Democracy in America
(1830), which he coauthored with John J. Ingalls, the Alabamian incorpo-
rated Tourgee's theory into his own philosophic musings. He noted that
the famed young Frenchman Tocqueville had been fascinated with "the
general equality of conditions" in America, despite the existence of the pe-
culiar institution of slavery in the South at the time. Morgan explained that
the foreign visitor meant only equality "among the white race, who are
described as 'We, the people,' in the opening sentence of the Constitution."
The Founding Fathers never included blacks in their definition of "the
people," said Morgan. Adding blacks to "the people" was, he asserted, a
political maneuver of the Republican Party, which, despite the Reconstruc-
tion amendments, public opinion never sanctioned. If the American pub-
lic did not put its stamp of approval upon such a radical amendment to the
Founding Fathers' Constitution, the amendment could never be enforced.
"Public opinion," Morgan declared, "is the vital force in every law in a free
government."25
Morgan went on to explain that the Founding Fathers and Tocqueville
both considered it axiomatic that public opinion is always the driving force
behind any democratic political system. Not even the Declaration of Inde-
pendence or the Constitution, Morgan opined, could have survived with-
out a majority of the American public supporting them. Thus, if the majority
of the American people refused to support the Fifteenth Amendment, should
it stand? Should it be law? And by contrast, if the American public decreed
that only members of the male sex should vote—and it did—or if it ap-
proved an educational test for voters, as Albion Tourgee claimed, then why
could it not also dictate that race or skin color be among the qualifications
for voting? It should be able to, contended Morgan, because it would put
the government back exclusively in the hands of "the people," as the Found-
ing Fathers defined that term.26
Even if Tourgee was right in predicting that northern public opinion
would support southern literacy tests, the question remained whether Re-
publican congressmen would accept the same as the solution to the race
problem or fight the spirit of the times as they had done during Recon-
struction. Southern Democrats who seized upon the idea of adopting lit-
eracy tests, therefore, probed their northern colleagues across the aisles in
the House and Senate to find out. In January 1890, Senator Samuel D. Pasco
of Florida, in a long soliloquy that few senators were present to hear, took
the lead in urging his southern brethren to look seriously at the Massachu-
setts example of adopting the literacy test as the best potential solution to
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the South's ballot problems. Fearing a backlash from Hoar and Massachu-
setts' senior senator Henry L. Dawes, Pasco sought to disarm them with an
outwardly humble but cleverly sarcastic appeal for the Bay State "to be pa-
tient with her Southern sisters," for most, he said, were not as old and ex-
perienced in establishing sound principles of democratic government as
was the state whose origins dated back to the Mayflower.27
All southern Democrats desired to know whether there was any real
chance of northern Republicans granting the South leniency in estab-
lishing new voter qualifications, but that desire absolutely consumed Sena-
tor J. Z. George of Mississippi. He, like all other southerners, sincerely
believed the Republicans had strictly prohibited such qualifications in the
Reconstruction constitutions that the several Confederate states had been
forced to adopt as a prerequisite to readmission to the Union. In addition,
George was sure that if Mississippi disfranchised black voters based on a
literacy test—even a fair one—the Republicans would strip the state of a
proportionate amount of congressional representation, essentially cutting
its representation in half. Facing the prospect of a dreaded Federal Elec-
tions Bill that threatened to bring back the onerous days of Reconstruc-
tion, however, even emasculated congressional representation looked good
to George in 1890, if that was what it would take to prevent a return to
black and Republican domination of the state. Congressional representa-
tion or not, at least native white Democrats would control the internal af-
fairs of their state.28
As the only member of Mississippi's Democratic machine in Con-
gress, George had the burden of probing the opinions of the northern Re-
publican policy makers in Washington about voter qualifications. In March
1890, while speaking on behalf of the Blair Education Bill, the Mississip-
pian lured George Frisbie Hoar into a conversation whereby he might as-
certain directly whether the Republicans would allow the Magnolia State
to follow the example of the Bay State in adopting a literacy test. He began
his snare with a tirade against the northern Republican congressmen's neo-
abolitionist habit of trying to settle the South's race problem from afar, or,
as he put it, trying "to prescribe . . . the rules by which electors shall be
made" in other states. He looked at Hoar, saying: "If you would keep your
intermeddling from outside of the State of Mississippi; if you would allow
these diverse races, locally intermingled, and yet in all attributes which dis-
tinguish men from one another as far apart as the poles—if you would
allow us to work out our own salvation without your external and, I might
add, infernal intermeddling, we might at last work out something."29 Hoar
responded by asking George what potential solution he proposed. George
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answered that he wished Mississippi could adopt a literacy test as Massa-
chusetts had done long ago, but the state's Republican constitution of 1867
prohibited it. He then read the section of the 1867 constitution which for-
bade both education and property requirements. Hoar corrected George,
saying that the Republicans' intention in making that rule was merely to
ensure that if whites kept black southerners down intellectually and eco-
nomically—and surely they would try—they would only be hurting them-
selves, because those poor, uneducated blacks would still get to vote, and
they would still control the outcome of elections. It was a way of convinc-
ing white southerners that they would enjoy better government if those
black voters were educated, property-owning taxpayers. George asked Hoar
if he was sure about that interpretation. Hoar proudly responded that of
course he was sure about it. He had been one of the Republicans who helped
draft the readmission act and the Reconstruction amendments, and, there-
fore, his interpretation of the Mississippi Constitution of 1867 was abso-
lutely correct. So, George in effect asked, if Mississippi wanted to have a
literacy test now, it could do so? Hoar replied that, so long as it was fairly
applied to both races, it would be fine. George then asked Hoar to repeat
for the record that one of the founding fathers of Reconstruction approved
of Mississippi having a literacy requirement. Hoar obliged. In this collo-
quy, George essentially made it appear that the literacy test about to be
written into the new constitution was all Hoar's idea. Thus, if it later proved
to be an instrument of racial discrimination, as George knew that it surely
would, he and all other white Mississippians could point the finger of ac-
cusation toward the senator who represented the "cradle of liberty."30
Hoar's stance during this exchange made him appear to onlookers as
either a traitor to the humanitarian cause or incredibly naive. The latter is
the more plausible of the two theories, considering how the national press
excoriated him for falling into the Mississippian's trap. One northern pa-
per ridiculed him thusly: "Can Senator Hoar be of that class who learn not
even from experience? Several times before has he returned to 'tackle' the
Mississippian and each time . . . he has 'gone to grass,' but never before did
his back strike the ground with such emphasis The republican senators
confess with some amusement that Senator Hoar's 'walloping' as they call
it, left him in such distressed condition mentally that he had to 'haul off for
repairs.'"31 By the time the Federal Elections Bill debate finally arrived in
the House of Representatives in June, George and Hoar had already set the
table for the Mississippi constitutional convention to adopt the literacy test
to disqualify black voters. The coup de grace, however, came in the House
debate itself, as Henry Cabot Lodge made the opening statement for the
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Republicans and, in effect, urged the southern states to adopt literacy tests
as voting qualifications. At first glance, it seems a curiosity of the highest
order that Lodge would encourage the southern states to disfranchise their
illiterates—most of whom were black—in the same bill he hoped to use to
enforce their voting rights. The fact is, he did not believe any southern state
would adopt an education qualification to control its voting population, as
his own state of Massachusetts had done, because of the South's desire to
allow illiterate whites to continue voting. He later explained that "Nothing
in this bill . . . prevents a state from excluding ignorance from the suffrage.
Massachusetts has an educational test." Any southern state, he said, "can
do the same, but will not because . .. [each] wishes to exclude black igno-
rance and let white ignorance vote."32
Lodge was foolishly convinced, as were many other northern Repub-
licans (including Hoar), that this notion was true. He was, of course, wrong.
He simply misread the southern Democrat mind-set. The Democratic lead-
ers of some southern states, most notably Mississippi, would have eagerly
adopted education qualifications long before 1890 had they thought they
could get away with it. Like Hoar before him, Lodge did not realize that the
statement he made in Washington about the literacy test would soon be
used by some of his most fierce adversaries in Jackson, Mississippi. Other
Republicans realized Lodge's error, however. As Jonathan P. Dolliver of Iowa
put it, criticizing Lodge's skewed logic, "I had rather see the nation governed
by men who obey the Constitution without being able to read it than by men
who trample upon the Constitution, but can read it in ten languages."33
At the assembly in Jackson, Mississippi, which began, coincidentally,
on the same day that the Quay-Gorman deal took place in Washington, the
delegates discussed the two main ideas for circumventing the Fifteenth
Amendment—the property qualification and the literacy test. With Hoar
and Lodge having already pronounced their blessing upon the literacy test,
most of the delegates in Jackson considered it the best choice. Moreover,
educational qualifications for voters seemed to be the wave of the future,
while property qualifications seemed to be a throwback to the pre-Jackso-
nian generation when aristocrats controlled state governments and excluded
the common man from politics. The delegates quickly discarded the prop-
erty requirement idea. Fearing, however, that there could come a time when
some new national education bill might surface, become law, and reedu-
cate (and thus re-enfranchise) Mississippi's black population, the conven-
tion added an "understanding clause" into the new constitution. Its purpose
was simple. It would allow illiterate whites, upon giving a "reasonable" in-
terpretation of some passage of the new constitution, to vote. Blacks would
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be disallowed based upon their rendering what white pollers would have
predetermined to be an incorrect interpretation. Mississippi's government
would thus be securely placed in the hands of whites for generations to
come.34
For added protection, however, the Mississippi convention also in-
corporated into the constitution several other methods of ensuring white
control. One was the two-dollar per voter poll tax, a device that had been
forbidden in some states since colonial times. It was to be paid a year in
advance of each election, and the receipt of payment had to be presented at
the polling station on election day. As with the understanding clause, the
poll tax could be strictly enforced for blacks and laxly enforced for whites.
For another safeguard, a residency requirement of one year in the district
in which a voter intended to vote was added. In addition, the convention
gerrymandered Mississippi's legislative districts, carving thirteen additional
white districts out of the state's black majority counties. Yet another feature
of the new constitution was the adoption of the Australian ballot, which,
like the literacy test, seemed to be a wave of the future. Massachusetts had
already adopted this method of private voting, and other states throughout
the nation were giving it serious consideration as well. This secret balloting
was intended to prevent the buying and selling of votes because, even if
some unscrupulous politico payed a voter to vote a certain way, he would
have no assurance of the voter's compliance. The Australian ballot gave an
air of legitimacy to the new Mississippi constitution because, in theory,
voters of both races would be free to vote their consciences.35
In reality, however, Mississippi's political leaders had a more devious
intention. As one contemporary constitutional expert explained, "If votes
were taken viva voce [as was still done in two states in 1890], so that it could
always be determined with absolute certainty how every person had voted,"
ascertaining the legitimacy of the returns would be easy. "But when secret
balloting is the policy of the law, and no one is at liberty to inquire how any
elector has voted . . . and when consequently the avenues to correct infor-
mation concerning the votes cast are carefully guarded against judicial ex-
ploration," there is no way of proving fraud. It thus becomes one person's
word against another's.36 The Australian ballot, rather than ensuring pure
elections, likely made it easier for the Democratic machine of Mississippi
to control the outcome of elections.37
Despite the constitution's November 1 ratification, it was not designed
to affect the vote cast in the election of 1890. The complicated registration
procedure ensured that it could not be utilized until the election of 1892.
In that first usage, it decreased the number of Democrat voters by more
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than half, but it cut the Republican vote by 96 percent.38 Yet, the fact that it
did actually disfranchise over half of all the white Democrats in the state
partly gave it the legitimacy that J. Z. George so badly desired. The factors
that seemed to add the greatest amount of legitimacy at the time, however,
were black delegate Isaiah Montgomery's public support of the new consti-
tution and the lack of overt criticism from Mississippi's other leading black
public figures, former U. S. Senator Blanche K. Bruce and former U. S. Rep-
resentative John R. Lynch.39
While the Mississippi constitutional convention lingered through the
end of the summer, in Boston, Henry Cabot Lodge continued to try to
influence both the Senate and public opinion with explanations of the pur-
pose of the Federal Elections Bill and the necessity for passing it. In Sep-
tember, he coauthored an article in the North American Review, the
periodical he once edited. The other author, who took an opposing point
of view, was Terrence V. Powderly, president of the Knights of Labor, the
largest labor union in the country. The main point of Lodge's half of the
article was "nothing that is right and honest need fear the light." Of course,
Thomas R. Stockdale of Mississippi had already responded to that point in
the House debate over the Lodge bill with his reference to the Spanish In-
quisition. Lodge found it "amusing" that a portion of the national press
was "raving in mad excitement merely because it is proposed to make pub-
lic everything which affects the election of the representatives of the people
in Congress." Answering that portion of the press which repeatedly called
his bill a "force bill," he declared that it was actually more of an "anti-force
bill," for it was "intended to stop the exercise of illegal force by those who
use it at the polls North or South; and it is exactly this which the opponents
of the bill dread." Concerning the Democrats' argument that the bill was
sectional, expensive, and bad for business, that was basically the old
"doughface" argument of the 1850s repackaged, he said. In those days be-
fore the Civil War, noted Lodge, the South, with influence out of all pro-
portion to its population, blustered and bullied the North and the West
with threats of boycotts, secession, and war. Now, when the North wanted
simply to enforce the Constitution, said Lodge, the South was again overre-
acting. But the North would not be unprepared this time, he cautioned.
New York and Ohio had already armed and alerted their militias in case of
another civil war, and other northern states were soon to follow.40
Powderly used his half of the article to declare himself neutral in party
politics and to oppose the Lodge bill on the grounds that it was a hypocriti-
cal attempt by one section of the country to control another. "We do not
hear of the brutal assaults, shootings, mobbings, and violent demonstra-
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tions in the North that we read of as happening on election day in the South,"
because the Republican Party "employs a more refined system of doing
violence to the election laws of the nation." Powderly was particularly dis-
turbed by the many instances in the North of industrial employers forcing
their workers to vote the Republican ticket in order to keep their jobs and
by the property requirements that kept so many urban workers disfran-
chised there. He believed the answer lay not in federal supervision of elec-
tions but simply in adopting the Australian ballot throughout the country.41
Lodge's half of the article drew a negative response from southern
Republican A. W. Shaffer, chief federal supervisor of elections in North
Carolina, who had perhaps the best perspective on the issue of any person
on either side. He explained that the original 1871 Supervisors' Lawworked
at least somewhat in the North because of "faithful courts, honest juries,
and a correct public opinion," but it had no such effect in the South be-
cause "Here public opinion tolerates, when it does not justify, all crimes for
the maintenance of the supremacy of the Democratic party." Thus, the origi-
nal bill was "a visible monument of the folly" of the Lodge bill, which was
nothing more than a "miserable caricature of a long dead and forgotten
statute." Moreover, said Shaffer, the Lodge bill was political "quackery and
malpractice," a "sickly-sentimental and half-hearted" attempt to fix
America's electoral system. The best evidence for this conclusion, he said,
could be seen in the presidential election of 1888 in North Carolina. One
"district was as well supervised . . . as it could have been if Mr. Lodge had
been present in person at every poll," yet it still suffered great corruption.
Finally, Shaffer complained that southern Republicans "who have borne
the brunt of the political crimes for the last twenty-five years" have always
been ignored by party bosses and policy makers of the North. "They have
asked for bread, they have received a stone."42
In Congress, various House Democrats answered Lodge's article, and
none of them yielded an inch. On September 26, "Fightin' Joe" Wheeler of
Alabama, a former Confederate military leader, used a momentary lull in
the daily business to launch an attack on the bill, which he believed would
turn "back the wheels of civilization."43 He read from one of the GOP's
main organs, William E. Chandler's National Republican of Washington,
dated July 3, the day immediately following passage of the Lodge bill. It
predicted that, once the bill became law, six or seven southern states would
go Republican, adding twelve or fourteen new senators and twenty new
representatives to the GOP's majority. Following this new Republican he-
gemony in the South, separate schools for the races would then be abol-
ished, and laws against intermarriage of the races would be repealed. Wheeler
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then blasted the North for what he considered hypocrisy, pointing out that
interracial marriages were presently illegal in both Indiana and Pennsylva-
nia. He read an excerpt from the Keystone State law that explained, "It is
not prejudice, nor caste, nor injustice of any kind" to prohibit racial inter-
marriage "but simply to suffer men to follow the law of races established by
the creator himself." He added that "balance," not "force," was the key to
good and healthy government in the United States. Indeed, he explained,
"the world marvels at this wonderful structure. . . . the wisest and most
sagacious statesmen see the secret to our success in this one great safeguard
within our constitutional system."44
As a result of the Lodge bill pending in Washington and the Missis-
sippi Constitution being drafted in Jackson at the same time, national pub-
lic attention became focused on the issue of black suffrage and the extension
of federal power in the summer of 1890 more than any other time since the
ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870. The debate over America's
race problem even garnered considerable attention abroad. Many Euro-
pean intellectuals, who were collectively under the influence of Social Dar-
winism and racial imperialism at the time, agreed that African Americans
should be disfranchised. As one contemporary English writer observed, the
most humanitarian thing that Congress could do for black people under
the circumstances would be to allow the race problem to work itself out
naturally, without federal interference. This do-nothing policy would spare
them the violence and retaliation that would surely result from enforcing
the Fifteenth Amendment. Whether blacks "should" have the right to vote
was a question best left for theologians to decide. Politicians in the here and
now could only do what was pragmatic. In other words, the issue of right and
wrong was not as important as the issue of cause and effect. If the Republi-
cans insisted on doing right, the effect would be catastrophic for blacks.45
In the midst of this important public debate came the midterm elec-
tion of 1890, and Democrats waited expectantly for voters to vindicate them.
Indeed, many incumbent Republicans, especially those who had played a
role in the Lodge bill debate, lost their bids for reelection. Several others
had understood that their party's controversial record in the first session
would make it difficult for them to be reelected and thus chose not to run.
Even President Harrison, who engaged in a month-long national speaking
tour in October, realized the tenor of public opinion on the Federal Elec-
tions Bill controversy and rarely mentioned it in his speeches, emphasizing
more popular issues instead. Republican congressmen who ran on their
record of legislation in the first session of the Fifty-first Congress found,
however, that most voters could not appreciate their work.46
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Thus, despite the GOP's best efforts, the result of the midterm elec-
tion was the largest turnover in the history of Congress. The GOP lost 154
seats. Whereas the Republicans had come to power in 1888 with a seven-
vote majority and then increased that majority to twenty-four after settling
the seventeen contested elections, in November 1890, voters gave the Demo-
crats a 130-vote majority. House Democrats who had prophesied a public
backlash against the activism of the Reed House felt absolutely vindicated
by the result and squandered no opportunity to say so. They listed the rea-
sons for the backlash as the "force bill," the Reed Rules, the McKinley Tar-
iff, and the exhausting of $461 million from the treasury surplus on pensions.
They also proclaimed that voters had intentionally overthrown the
"Jacobins" (Republican radicals), who suppressed the moderate voice of
the "Girondins" (Democrats and money Republicans).47 Allusions to Revo-
lutionary and Napoleonic France appeared in the Democratic press as well.
Several newspapers hailed the election as the "Waterloo" of the Republican
Party, and some considered it a "death blow" to the GOP.48 Although opin-
ion was divided over which issue in particular caused the backlash, a con-
tingent of newspapers of all stripes and from all sections of the country
considered the election a "referendum" on the "force bill."49
Despite such contemporary interpretations of the election, there is a
more historically accurate explanation for the turnover of 1890. The North
always contained a large number of uncommitted voters who, more often
than not, went Republican, but in this election they chose the Democrats
merely as the lesser of two evils. Democratic propaganda was more sophis-
ticated and thus more effective at convincing these doubtful voters of the
improprieties of the GOP's legislative agenda than the Republican propa-
ganda machine was at countering it. Further evidence suggests that, had
the Republican-led Senate passed the Lodge bill instead of the McKinley
bill in the first session, the outcome of the election could very well have
been different. Some House Republicans held that opinion long before the
midterm election, but the Quay machine silenced them.
The most notable case occurred in September, when Robert P. Kennedy
of Ohio denounced the Senate, and Quay in particular, for choosing to
table the Lodge bill until after the election. Kennedy said, "The other day
when I went down the steps of this capitol, after I had spoken in this assem-
bly, on the pavement below I met an old colored man, bowed with years,
his hair gray, curly, and crisp; and with tears in his eyes and quivering lip he
shook my hand and blessed me because I had spoken on behalf of his
people." Why was Quay and his faction of the Republican Party afraid to
do the same, he begged to know? Fellow House Republicans did not think
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Kennedy's criticism was justified, however, and voted to expunge his whole
speech from the Record, calling it "out of order." As a result, Kennedy chose
not to seek reelection in 1890.50
Democrats hoped, of course, that the result of the election would con-
vince Senate Republicans to drop the Federal Elections Bill, but they also
feared that it would make the Senate humanitarians even more determined
to pass it while they had the chance. When the upper chamber assembled
on December 1, Democrats were disappointed but not surprised to learn
that the Senate, which was relatively unaffected by the House shake-up,
was determined to push ahead with its "utterly desperate . . . suicidal act."51
Arkansas Senator James K. Jones expressed the Democrats' incredulity at
the Republicans' determination: "The session of this Congress which has
recently closed was distinguished by three things, the passage of the
McKinley bill, the attempt to pass this [elections] bill, and the violent meth-
ods of forcing measures through the popular branch of Congress. Upon
these issues we went to the people, and the result is the most astounding,
crushing, overwhelming defeat of the party responsible for all this."52
John G. Carlisle of Kentucky, the former Speaker of the House, who
had been elected to the Senate in early 1890 to serve out the remainder of
deceased Senator James B. Beck's term, predicted that the Republicans'
staunch refusal to change their current course would backfire, for it would
only strengthen the white South's resolve to remain solid. "As long as po-
litical parties are divided upon the present issues [elections bill, protective
tariff, and centralization]," he explained, "the South will be Democratic,
no matter what repressive laws maybe enacted or how arbitrarily they may
be enacted. . . . But while the politics of the South cannot be changed by
law, its business may be ruined by the agitations and disturbances" of the
Federal Elections Bill. Carlisle also predicted that, despite all of the clamor
surrounding the bill, the Senate would ultimately "allow it to die on the
calendar and be buried with [the] other rubbish at the end of the session."53
The result of the midterm election put no damper on the House's ex
post facto debate over the Lodge bill. As the second session began, House
Democrats continued to blast it at every opportunity. Benjamin Enloe of
Tennessee called it a "legislative bastard," because no one knew who its real
father was. Was it Lodge, Rowell, Hoar, Spooner, or Chandler? Or was it
really the longtime Republican supervisor of elections in New York City,
John I. Davenport, a man who sat in the gallery every day during the House
debate, and a man whom Democrats hated even more than Reed, Harrison,
or any of the other reformers? Davenport, who had held his position per-
petually since 1871, had developed an unsavory reputation as a manipula-
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tor of election results and soon became a focal point in the Senate debate
on the Federal Elections Bill. One of the Democrats' first actions in the
upper chamber was to demand that Davenport's and his many assistants'
payroll records for the last twenty-nine years be sent from the U. S. Trea-
sury to the Senate for investigation. Meanwhile, Enloe showed that some-
one had written a second version of the Lodge bill before November for
distribution as election propaganda. Whereas the old version was seventy-
five pages and fifty-seven sections long, the new one was nine pages and
eight sections long. Whoever wrote it had cut out the parts containing the
"force" in the "force bill," said Enloe, ostensibly to make it more palatable
to voters.54
If that was the case, the strategy did not work. No doubtful voters
went Republican because of an easier-to-swallow version of the Lodge bill.
Nevertheless, the bill's sponsors in the Senate believed that making the bill
shorter and milder was a prudent move. Hoar and Spooner realized that
the original bill would not only be impossible to drive through the Senate,
but that it might also make the opposition's protest, which had been peace-
ful to that point, turn violent. Indeed, Hoar had already received a great
amount of "hate mail" for supporting the bill. More important, Hoar feared
that the coming Fifty-second Congress, which would be controlled by
Democrats in the House, would repeal a stringent bill, rendering all of the
Republicans' efforts futile. Thus, the Senate Committee on Privileges and
Elections, which included Democrats James L. Pugh of Alabama and George
Gray of Delaware, diluted, reworded, and shortened the original bill con-
siderably, taking out long sections that dealt with issues peripheral to elec-
tions, such as selection of juries for trying cases of alleged fraud. Moreover,
the committee "mitigated the severity of the penalties" for crimes commit-
ted at the ballot box, changed the number of petitioners necessary for hav-
ing supervision in a district from one hundred to five hundred, and cut the
number of supervisors per district from three to two. Hoar reasoned that
"it is better to have the second best law kept permanently on the statute
book than to have the best law there half the time."55
The result was a bill that looked much like the one Hoar had intro-
duced in April. According to Hoar, the replacement bill was merely a blend
of the old Supervisors' Law of 1871 and "provisions of a law which has
been in operation in England for twenty-two years with general public sat-
isfaction." On August 7, Hoar expressed his obvious contentment with the
new bill as he introduced it to the Senate, telling his southern colleagues
that "this is not a question of the domination of a negro majority over you;
it is a question of the domination of a white man's minority over us."56
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Hoar and fellow sponsors of the Senate bill understood the necessity
of diluting congressional bills in order to secure their passage, and they
seemed well satisfied with their proposed legislation. The public, however,
could not appreciate such compromises. Indeed, many African Americans
and rabidly partisan Republican newspaper editors expressed either disap-
pointment in the Senate bill or outright opposition to it. As John Mercer
Langston of Virginia, who had given his undivided support to the Lodge
bill, complained with obvious disgust, the Senate bill "isn't worth the paper
on which it is written."57 Hence, the changes in the bill ultimately had the
opposite effect of what Hoar intended. The strategy converted no Demo-
crats, money Republicans, or Independents into supporters, and, even worse,
it created dissension in the humanitarian ranks. To partisan Republicans,
the Senate bill was a poor substitute for the original, and to the rest of the
nation, it was no improvement over the original because it was merely less
severe. Senate Democrats especially could not appreciate the magnanimity
of the new bill. It actually frustrated them that the new bill seemed so mild
compared to the old. How could they fight a mild bill as zealously as their
House counterparts had fought the harsh Lodge bill? They resolved to cre-
ate the zeal by demanding, upon Hoar's introduction of the new Senate
bill, that Lodge's bill, which partisan Republicans had rammed through the
House in a mere seven days, be read in its entirety to the upper chamber.58
The American public was likewise not ready to embrace the new bill
as an improvement over the old Lodge bill. As one independent newspaper
put it, it was still a "force bill," and it was still "putrid . . . a stench in the
nostrils of the nation, and it should at once be consigned to the grave that
is beyond the reach of the resurrection trump . . . let the clods of oblivion
rattle on its coffin without delay."59 Making matters worse for the humani-
tarians, however, was the fact that losing the support of vocal African Ameri-
cans such as John Mercer Langston fanned the flames of southern
demagoguery, which were already blazing out of control. With a "see, I told
you so" attitude, South Carolina governor-elect Ben Tillman commented
that if Senate Republicans continued to swim against the tide of public
opinion by passing the Federal Elections Bill, they would be sorely "disap-
pointed in their calculations. The negroes in the South are no longer so
wedded to the Republican party that they will do its bidding, and the at-
tempt by Federal officials to drive them as heretofore is bound to produce
most injurious results. . . . the negroes have become indifferent to politics.
It would be a great misfortune to them and to the country if they should be
stirred up again as they were in the Reconstruction era."60
The aged and experienced Hoar sincerely wanted to help black voters
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enjoy their constitutional rights, yet he might have listened to the appeals
of such detractors had it not been for his younger and more cavalier cohort
Spooner. The Wisconsin senator was just as sincere as Hoar in his desire to
purify southern elections, but he was less convinced of the odds of failure
than the elder statesman from Massachusetts. Spooner even assumed the
mantle of his ill colleague from New Hampshire, William E. Chandler, in
persuading a reluctant President Harrison to support the Federal Elections
Bill publicly in his third State of the Union address. Indeed, Spooner's ear-
nestness, zealousness, and vigilance in supporting the bill were practically
all that kept interest in the controversial measure alive.61
As Chairman of the Committee on Privileges and Elections, it was
Hoar, however, not Spooner, who had the daunting task of driving the un-
popular bill through the Senate. He also had the dubious honor of match-
ing wits with the Democratic manager of the debate, Arthur P. Gorman.
This Maryland politico privately planned "one of the most spectacular fili-
busters in the history of the Senate," although he was careful not to admit
it publicly. He claimed instead that the Democrats needed to debate the bill
and its amendments thoroughly in order that both parties could work out
a final, compromise version.
Gorman was an interesting character. He did not fit the description
of a typical Gilded Age senator. In appearance, he was one of the few public
men of his day who wore neither a beard nor a mustache. His clean-shaven,
boyish-but-handsome face did not make him look the part of party boss.
Nor did his age and experience. At fifty-one, he was not old by Senate stan-
dards, and he was only in his second term. Moreover, he was not a lawyer
and had no legal training, yet his natural forensic abilities caused many of
the best legal minds in the Senate to defer to him. He had been a page in the
Senate from age eleven to twenty-seven and had helped guard the Capitol
against possible Confederate attack during the Civil War. He called himself
a Unionist War Democrat at the time and was a friend and confidant of
Andrew Johnson, whom he faithfully supported throughout his tumultu-
ous term, including the impeachment trial of 1868. Later in the same year,
he became president of the "National Association of Base Ball Players,"
when the soon-to-be national pastime was still in its infancy. Gorman, in
fact, helped raise the game to the level of respectability that it would enjoy
throughout the twentieth century. He subsequently became a Maryland
tax collector, a state legislator, and the president of a local canal company.
In 1888, he became the leader of the pro-Cleveland bloc at the Democratic
National Convention. As a Democrat who came of age during the Civil
War and Reconstruction, Gorman understood what it meant to be in the
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minority and to stand on the unpopular side of great public issues. Such a
lifetime of hardship in the political arena only served to bolster his deter-
mination to fight the Federal Elections Bill.62
An important part of Gorman's job as floor manager was to schedule
the order in which his Democratic colleagues would speak. At the outset of
the debate, the eight former Confederate generals in the Senate—William
B. Bate, Matthew Butler, Alfred Colquitt, J. Z. George, Randall L. Gibson,
John Tyler Morgan, Matthew Ransom, and Edmund Cary Walthall—resented
Gorman's dictation to them about when they could speak, yet all eventually
fell in line behind his leadership. To these seasoned veterans of war and poli-
tics, the battle would be about preserving white supremacy in the South and
protecting their states from the interference of the neo-abolitionists, whereas
to the Unionist Gorman, it would be more about protecting the rights of
the minority party in the Senate. These divergent motivations for opposing
the bill complemented one another nicely, however, so there was no no-
table dissension within the minority party once the battle began.63
Aside from the two party managers of the debate, the other key player
in the upcoming Senate drama was Vice President Levi P. Morton, who had
followed an interesting path to the second-highest office in the land. In
1881 and again in 1885, this extremely wealthy, Vermont-born, Dartmouth-
educated businessman had failed in his only two runs for the Senate from
his adopted state of New York. He had served as Minister to France under
the Garfield-Arthur administrations, and by all accounts he was a good
diplomat. Prior to that appointment, he had served two terms as a repre-
sentative in Congress from New York City. His early career as an interna-
tional banker and shipping tycoon had earned him such a fortune that he
could have lived comfortably without ever working again. His sense of duty
as a patriotic American citizen with a pedigree that extended back to the
Mayflower, however, and his need to be in a position of power, compelled
him to seek high office. His ancestors had helped build the Plymouth colony,
and he had helped build Wall Street into the world's premier financial cen-
ter. What was he to do with the rest of his life if not serve his country?
Morton would do just that, sometimes to the consternation of the Demo-
crats, and sometimes to his own party, for he was a money Republican, a
neo-doughface, and a genuinely nonpartisan presiding officer of the nation's
highest legislative body.64
As the relatively peaceful autumn of 1890 gave way to winter, the na-
tion awaited with great anticipation the coming struggle in the Senate. Even
though the American public had already passed judgment against the Fed-
eral Elections Bill, Hoar and the humanitarian Republicans were undeterred
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in their determination to force it upon the nation. Gorman and the Demo-
crats thus felt they had no choice but to assemble their forces for the inevi-
table conflict and draw up their battle plans. In December, the nation, and
indeed the world, would watch in amazement as the unstoppable force met
the immovable object.
Chapter 6
THE STORMY AND TURBULENT SEA
OF DEMOCRATIC FREEDOM
The Senate's Epic Struggle for Control of the
Nation's Racial Destiny
There is force all through this bill. It is the prominent and salient feature,
and the people, with instinct that rarely fails them, have dubbed it "the
force bill," and so it is known throughout the length and breadth of this
country, and will never have any other popular title than that.
—Senator George Gray of Delaware
There is no force in it but the force of law.... Still Senators on the other side
call it a force bill.
— Senatorjoseph N. Dolph of Oregon
The Federal Elections Bill debate captivated the American public like few
other congressional debates had ever done. Even the showdowns over simi-
lar measures on Capitol Hill during Reconstruction paled in comparison,
for two reasons. First, during Reconstruction, the public expected and ac-
cepted partisan and sectional fights in Congress as a residue of the great
and terrible war that had recently engulfed the nation. Since Reconstruc-
tion, however, a spirit of sectional reconciliation and, to a lesser extent,
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bipartisanship had prevailed. The introduction of the Federal Elections Bill
destroyed those congenial feelings. It thus seemed to be out of place and
time, making it more fascinating to the public than any similar measure
ever introduced before. The second reason was the sheer amount of time
that the bill pended in Congress. Altogether, it lay before Congress for about
eight months, more than seven of which were spent in the Senate. From the
time the House took up the bill in July 1890 until the Senate finally tabled
it in February 1891, the national press reported on its status almost every
day. Adding even more drama to this already dramatic debate was the Demo-
cratic filibuster in the Senate, which lasted longer than any previous fili-
buster ever had—about two months. The filibuster itself might have bored
the public rather than fascinated it had it not been for the fact that Repub-
lican leaders threatened to break the stalemate by changing the rules, as the
House had already done, to limit debate. The contest in the Senate cap-
tured national attention, therefore, because it raised two separate questions:
would the revolution that "Czar" Reed began in the House carry over to
the Senate? And would the Republicans force federal supervision of elec-
tions on the nation?1
Historians have generally been more interested in the filibuster of the
Federal Elections Bill in the Senate than with the actual measures that the
bill contained. In fact, rarely have historians adequately analyzed the con-
tents of the bill to determine if the bill was good legislation and if it was a
sensible solution to suffrage abuses and the race problem. This oversight
must be corrected. Historians have also, despite their preoccupation with
this particular filibuster, often failed to recognize that all filibusters are not
the same. The stereotype of the filibuster is that it is always purely a time-
killing mechanism and that it cannot possibly bring any illumination to
the bill under consideration. That misconception must also be corrected.
While all filibusters are by nature obstructive, some can also be instructive.
The first half of the Senate filibuster of 1890-1891 actually cast far more
light on the contents of the Federal Elections Bill than the brief House de-
bate ever did, and was thus instructive to the American people. The Demo-
crats stayed on-message and hammered away at the provisions of the bill
throughout December, a fact that some Republicans, in moments of frank-
ness, acknowledged. When they did digress, they still tried to stick to sub-
jects that were at least peripheral to the bill. Although a few notable verbal
altercations occurred between hotspurs on opposite sides of the aisle who
brought sectionalism into the discussion, the Democrats tried to continue
the Senate tradition of congeniality toward their Republican adversaries, a
hallmark that had long set the upper chamber apart from the lower.2
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The Democrats' explanations for the necessity of a filibuster of the
Federal Elections Bill were quite rational considering the upper chamber's
tradition of unlimited debate, which was as old as the Senate itself. George
Gray of Delaware justified his side's belief in thoroughly debating a bill
before voting on it by reading from John Richard Green's History of the
Making of England. He paraphrased Green as saying that the world has of-
ten "laughed at Parliaments as 'talking shops.'... But talk is persuasion and
persuasion is force, the one force which can sway freemen to deeds such as
those which have made England what she is." Matthew Butler noted that
filibustering was "often the most effective way to bring a question sharply
to the attention of the people and give them the opportunity to pass upon
it." He anticipated correctly that the longer the Federal Elections Bill stayed
in the public eye—no matter how it stayed there—the more the American
people would have the opportunity to evaluate it; and the longer the people
looked at it, the more they would protest it. Therefore, it was in the best
interest of the nation, as William B. Bate of Tennessee put it, "to exhaust all
parliamentary means" to keep the bill in the public eye as long as possible.
John W. Daniel of Virginia pointed out that even the bill's Senate sponsor,
George Frisbie Hoar, conceded that this bill was "more misunderstood than
any measure" in American history. Was that fact not all the more reason to
go through it line by line in careful consideration of every provision? John
E. Kenna of West Virginia added that, considering how controversial this
particular bill was, its "discussion may go on indefinitely."3
Republicans, when it was in their best interest, agreed that extended
discussion of congressional bills promoted the general welfare of the na-
tion by preventing passage of bad legislation. As Thomas B. Reed wrote just
before his party gained the majority in Congress and, consequently, just
before he was elevated to Speaker of the House: "What is a legislative body
for? It is not merely to make laws. It is to decide on all questions of public
grievance.... A negative decision by a legislative body is of as much value
to the community as a law. Time is not lost when cases are investigated and
action refused. Half the grievances of mankind turn out to be unfounded
as soon as somebody is found to listen to them."4 George Frisbie Hoar, in
an article in the popular Boston periodical The Youth's Companion, wrote
something very similar just before the Democratic filibuster began in the
Senate: "In the United States the process of change is slow and is meant to
be slow.... If any citizens be disposed to be impatient... let them remem-
ber that it was in this way that our fathers laid the foundation of their Gov-
ernment. . . . They meant that it should declare the will of the people. But
the will so declared was to be mature, deliberate, well considered.... They
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were building for centuries, not for hours." Hoar added in conclusion that
the plodding pace of Congress served as a "constitutional barrier against
popular error or caprice."5
Historians thus should not automatically deem all filibusters as wastes
of time, for if a filibuster resulted in the Senate jettisoning poorly framed
legislation, it was time well spent. Filibusters can also have another desir-
able effect: they can force impatient sponsors of bills to compromise, and
to perfect their otherwise imperfect legislation before passage. Either re-
sult is not only a victory for the minority party, but can also be a victory
for the American people. In the case of the Federal Elections Bill filibus-
ter, the Democrats hoped to kill it, but realistically expected to keep it
under consideration at least long enough to force compromises in its pro-
visions. In this study, therefore, the filibuster is treated not as time wasted,
but as integral to understanding precisely why the Democrats hated the
bill so vehemently.
On December 1,1890, upon convening the second session of the Fifty-
first Congress, the Senate quickly dispensed with the routine business of
swearing in new senators, introducing resolutions for pensions and local
pork, and listening to the Clerk read the president's annual address to Con-
gress. As soon as practicable, Hoar moved to consider HR 11045, the Lodge
bill. Gorman countered with a motion not to take up the bill, reminding
the Republicans of the results of the midterm elections. He urged his op-
ponents to drop the bill and move on to the more pressing economic issues
that the voters wanted Congress to address. Banks all over the country were
on the verge of collapsing, he noted, because the U. S. Treasury Depart-
ment had no power under the law to help prop them up beyond the actions
it had already taken. In addition, a serious flaw had been discovered in the
McKinley Tariff, which threatened to wreck the tobacco industry if not
addressed in this brief session. Hoar responded that such issues proved the
need to vote on the Federal Elections Bill as soon as possible. When Hoar
called for the yeas and nays on taking up the controversial measure, his
motion carried forty-one to thirty, with fifteen absent and not paired for
voting. Knowing that Hoar's next move would be to introduce his shorter,
milder substitute bill, the Democrats began their stall tactics immediately,
demanding that the longer, harsher House bill be read in its entirety, which,
under existing Senate rules, was their privilege. After the Clerk had droned
monotonously through half of the old Lodge bill to an almost empty cham-
ber, Hoar interrupted to introduce his substitute bill, which the Clerk then
began to read at length. In due time, William Boyd Allison of Iowa, whom
one contemporary described as a man who always "looks wise and says
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nothing," made a motion to print the House and Senate bills side-by-side
in parallel columns for easy comparison.6
Upon completion of the mundane reading of the bill, Hoar chose to
forgo making an opening statement. Democrat David Turpie of Indiana,
therefore, actually opened the Senate debate on the bill. It is interesting
that, out of eighty-eight potential speakers in the Senate, Turpie should
have been the first to speak on the Federal Elections Bill. He was in his first
term in the Senate after having defeated Benjamin Harrison for the seat in
a contested election in 1887. Harrison had been the incumbent, and his
party had controlled the Indiana House. The Democrats controlled the
Hoosier State's Senate, however. When the final tally resulted in Turpie hav-
ing two votes more than Harrison, the Republicans levied a charge of fraud,
but they could not substantiate it. The loss freed Harrison to become a
willing and available presidential candidate the following year—one who
knew all too well the need for electoral reform. Since Harrison went on to
urge passage of a Federal Elections Bill, it seems somehow ironic, yet ap-
propriate, that Turpie was the first senator to speak against it.7
Turpie's opening argument had little to do with the substantive issues
of the bill, nor was it even remotely similar to anything previously said in
the House debate. It was a strange history lesson about black-white race
relations in America from colonial times to 1890, which showed that an
important part of the Democrats' strategy was to use history and tradition
to fight the Republican racial agenda. The benefit of this strategy was two-
fold: first, the Democrats could easily consume a great amount of time by
providing what they considered necessary background information before
launching into the actual attack on the provisions of the bill; and second,
they strengthened their ideological position by contrasting the traditions
of earlier generations on racial matters with those the GOP now proposed.
The gist of Turpie's speech was that American race relations had passed
through two stages. First, there was a "primitive era" when the nation ei-
ther practiced or silently condoned black slavery and when it committed
fratricide against Native Americans. After the Civil War, the nation had
moved into the "medieval age" of race relations, which contained "the seed
and promise of progressive betterment."8 Yet, as much as some Republi-
cans wished they could expedite the process of racial equality, said Turpie,
only time, not force, could move the nation into its age of racial enlighten-
ment. And, most important, if the Republicans hoped to improve the lot of
black southerners, they would first need to grant full social and political
equality to blacks in the North. As an Indianan, Turpie knew that blacks in
the North were only marginally better off than their southern counterparts.
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Since his northern Republican opponents could not refute that argument,
Turpie's opening speech accomplished its purpose. It immediately reversed
the roles of the parties in the debate, putting the Republicans on the defen-
sive from the outset.9
Later, fellow Indiana Senator Daniel Voorhees reinforced Turpie's ar-
gument about Republican hypocrisy toward African Americans living in
the northern states. "The tall sycamore of the Wabash," as Voorhees was
known, had a largely undistinguished career in the Senate, but he enjoyed
one great achievement in being the catalyst behind the building of the
Jefferson Building of the Library of Congress, which is considered one of
the great architectural marvels of modern history. Voorhees had a long his-
tory of supporting the southern viewpoint on state rights and racial issues,
having once been a member of the infamous Knights of the Golden Circle,
a northern Democratic organization that supported the Confederacy in
the Civil War. He complained of what appeared to him to be Republican
hypocrisy on the issue of voting rights, particularly in his home state of
Indiana. He noted that "the present Administration of this Government
had now been in power one year, nine months, and eighteen days. Its entire
existence has been filled with sighs and groans and lamentations over the
sins and shortcomings of other people in their alleged frauds on the ballot
box." Yet, sixty days after fellow Hoosier Harrison took office, noted
Voorhees, GOP leaders hatched a plot to "import" black voters to Indiana,
West Virginia, and Connecticut to ensure Republican control of those states.
The plan was to "colonize" from eight to ten thousand black men or fami-
lies in each state to increase Republican numbers there. For proof, Voorhees
read letters written by high-ranking Republican officials in the three states.
He then astutely pointed out that never in any of the letters was the welfare
of those blacks mentioned. He concluded his objurgation of the GOP by
complaining that "the suppression of the colored vote" in the South con-
tinued to be "the perpetual theme of the Northern sectionalist who, in pro-
portion to his ignorance, increases in zeal and malice. . . . As the maiden
wants her lover every hour, so the Republican politician . . . wants the Afri-
can, provided always that he is a voter and votes the Republican ticket."10
James L. Pugh of Alabama, who had already expressed his views on
the subject eight months prior, was the first southern Democrat to speak in
the Senate debate on the Federal Elections Bill. This haggard old ex-Con-
federate was a carryover from the "primitive era" of which Turpie had spo-
ken. Far from embracing Turpie's idea of "progressive betterment" for the
races, he favored a regressive approach, recasting the old slaveholders' ar-
gument of paternalism to imply that southern blacks had been disfran-
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chised for their own good. He complained of the "fatal mixture of white
and black suffrage" in which were "compounded natural elements that no
chemist has ever yet discovered could be mingled together in the same labo-
ratory so as to prevent fermentation and explosion." Pugh then questioned
why the Republicans believed that suffrage was "the sole measure and only
test of 'justice' to the negro." Clearly, it would be in the best interest of
black southerners not to vote, said the Alabamian, because of the volatile
nature of black-white race relations that currently prevailed.11
Hoar soon expressed his impatience with the Democrats' racial
pontifications and moved for a vote on the bill immediately. George Gray
of Delaware, a first-term Democrat who left no distinguishing mark on the
Senate after 1890, answered the motion, saying that before he cast his vote
on the bill he would like the opportunity to "trespass a little further on the
time of the Senate." He did just that for the next two days. Gray, realizing
that Hoar's impatience resulted partly from the fact that the first two Demo-
cratic speakers hardly mentioned the provisions of the Federal Elections
Bill at all in their long speeches, thought it wise to pursue a different line of
argument. Thus, he initiated another phase of the Democratic strategy,
which he called "smoking out" the flaws in the bill, marking the first sub-
stantive discussion of the actual provisions of the bill.12
Gray began by making a comparison of the existing supervisory law
of 1871 and the bill at hand, trying to show that both measures gave the
federal government the most sweeping powers of centralization and intru-
siveness in American history to that time. Both authorized the supervisors
to make investigations of suffrage abuses by house-to-house canvasses in
which they could demand that residents answer their questions on the spot,
under penalty of law, without the presence of an attorney or any other
safeguard to the liberties of private citizens. Gray continued by tediously
picking apart the Federal Elections Bill's hiring provisions. He explained
that not only were chief supervisors appointed for life, but they also had
the power to appoint their own successors, which he equated to an abso-
lute monarchy in disguise. "We do not want this chief supervisor. He is
here for life, and you say we can not get rid of him I will tell you what I
would do with him if I had my way. I would put him on board a ship ... and
I would make him a present to the Czar of Russia. Let him go there . . . and
[populate] again the wastes of Siberia."13
Gray then explained how his own little state had conducted elections
since 1776. Having only three counties, Delaware never took a statewide
canvass. Each county presented its returns to the legislature separately. When
a charge of fraud arose in any county, that county investigated the charge
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thoroughly before sending the returns to the legislature. In recent years,
noted Gray, his state had been one of the "doubtful" or "swing" states and
had experienced its share of suffrage abuses, none of which had anything
to do with disfranchisement of black voters. The state's leading politicians
from both parties had discussed possible ways to clean up the system, but
they ultimately agreed that it would be best to leave it alone. Each side feared
that any changes might give advantage to the other. The point was that
Delaware's system represented the purest form of local sovereignty to be
found in any state and, Gray believed, the most closely in line with the
intention of the Founding Fathers. If his state did not even allow a canvass
at the state level, how could it support national supervision of elections?
Gray concluded his speech by stating with patriotic fervor, "I prefer, as all
free American citizens, I think, must prefer, the stormy and turbulent sea
of democratic freedom to the calm of a despotism."14
Northern Democrat and three-term Senator John McPherson of New
Jersey later reinforced Gray's argument, saying of the chief supervisor un-
der the Federal Elections Bill, "No Bonaparte who ever scaled the throne of
France started with greater power towards a monarchy than that conferred
upon this officer." Congress should discard this bill, he said, and allow the
states to write their own laws reforming elections, just as New Jersey had
done earlier in the year. The Garden State had provided for casting secret
ballots and for establishing canvassing boards comprised of two members
of each party. It was local, bipartisan, and was passed under the tutelage of
a Democratic governor.15
First-term Senator James H. Berry of Arkansas continued the sub-
stantive attack on the provisions of the bill for the Democrats. This Con-
federate veteran had lost a leg in the Civil War before going on to enjoy a
distinguished career in Arkansas politics. Elected governor in 1883, he
served one two-year term, after which the legislature sent him to the U. S.
Senate. Berry claimed to know with absolute certainty that federal super-
vision of elections would perpetuate one party's power over the other
because the GOP had recently applied the old supervisory law of 1871 in
Arkansas. In 1888, Arkansas played host to two highly controversial con-
gressional elections, both of which involved alleged Democratic fraud,
intimidation of voters, and even murder. The defeated Republicans, need-
less to say, contested and won both under the Reed Rules in early 1890.
Then, in September 1890, President Harrison appointed a new Republi-
can district court judge to serve the state's eastern congressional district.
Under the terms of the 1871 law, the new judge in turn appointed a chief
supervisor for his district for the November 1890 midterm elections. The
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Harrison appointee chose John McClure, a highly partisan Republican
who had been Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court during Re-
construction and who later worked as editor in chief of the main Repub-
lican newspaper in the state. McClure was currently serving as chairman
of the state's Republican Executive Committee. Not surprisingly, com-
plained Berry, the eastern district of Arkansas went Republican in 1890.
When McClure did not find a legitimate case of Democratic wrongdoing
he trumped up charges in order to hand the election to the Republicans.
There had never been even the remotest chance, contended Berry, that a
Democrat would win the eastern district under the watch of such a bla-
tant, outspoken partisan.16
Continuing the criticism of the supervisory aspects of the Federal
Elections Bill, John Tyler Morgan later commented on the expense of main-
taining the elaborate supervision required by the measure. He noted that
each deputy supervisor would be paid about $50 per election. Each pre-
cinct would have three of these well-compensated deputies, for a total of
$ 150. Some highly populated districts contained as many as forty precincts,
bringing the cost of supervision to $6,000 per district, per election. Said
Morgan: "That is a large sum of money to go into the hands of the class of
people who will apply for these positions of supervisors. There are many
post offices in the United States that do not pay anything like that amount
of money, and yet the mails of senators are burdened with petitions and
applications for appointments to those places." Morgan added that many
poor Alabamians would love to have a job that paid so well, even if it was
only temporary employment.17
John W. Daniel of Virginia hammered away at the theme of corrup-
tion in the supervisory process, criticizing John I. Davenport, the chief su-
pervisor of elections in New York City, who was a controversial character
and an easy target for Democrats. Daniel explained that, in 1877, Charles
Devens Jr., the U. S. Attorney General under the Hayes administration, cen-
sured Davenport for arresting and holding five thousand immigrants who
had voted in the election of 1876. These immigrants had a right to vote,
argued Daniel, because they had been naturalized in 1868. In the censure,
Devens complained that Davenport should have been removed from his
position but that there was no power vested in any agency or branch of the
federal government to remove a corrupt supervisor from office under the
1871 statute. Who in their right mind, asked Daniel, would grant an indi-
vidual such a powerful job for life knowing there would be no way to en-
sure his honesty? No one, he answered, not merchants, farmers,
manufacturers, or even most black southerners. Who wanted this bill then,
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he begged to know? Again, he answered his own question: no one but "a
few partisans and Negroes" who needed "a banner to carry in battle."18
Daniel relentlessly attacked the Federal Elections Bill, reading from
the December 10, 1890, edition of the New York Sun to show the probable
effects of the extension of Republican supervision under the measure. The
paper reported that a U. S. Grand Jury had just "administered a stinging
rebuke" to John I. Davenport for his supervisory activities in the recent
midterm elections. Davenport had issued five thousand warrants of arrest
for alleged perpetrators of voting fraud, but the jury indicted only three of
them. Daniel asked his fellow legislators to pause and consider that statistic
carefully. Three out of five thousand seemed an unbelievable number, yet a
jury of carefully selected American citizens made that judgment. What
would the Republicans do in light of such a fact, asked Daniel—arrest the
jury itself for conspiracy to commit vote fraud? It seemed so, given the
paranoia of GOP leaders, said the Virginian.19
Zebulon Vance of North Carolina pounded away at the same theme,
reading excerpts from the 1879 House committee investigation into the
conduct of John I. Davenport. The report showed conclusively that Daven-
port was guilty of highly questionable activities as chief supervisor of New
York City elections. George Frisbie Hoar rose to the defense of the ma-
ligned supervisor by reading a letter that Davenport had recently written to
him denying all allegations against him and welcoming the opportunity to
appear before Congress again to testify and be cross-examined. John Tyler
Morgan answered that it would change nothing. In his opinion, the super-
visor-for-life idea, which was the heart of the Federal Elections Bill, simply
created too many opportunities to make dishonest officials out of other-
wise honest men. Party allegiance would take precedence over impartial
judgment. Consider how the five Supreme Court justices voted in the presi-
dential election dispute of 1876, argued Morgan: "Can any man deny in the
United States Government to-day, after the eight-by-seven vote and after
all the other things we have seen done in the Government . . . that every
judge when he puts on the ermine still remains a Democrat or still remains
a Republican and that whenever he has an opportunity without the viola-
tion of his oath he will throw all of his influence in favor of the party to
which he belongs?"20
Second-term Senator William P. Frye of Maine rebutted the attack on
John I. Davenport, saying "five times he has been brought before the court
and five times he has been pronounced not guilty." Furthermore, he noted,
in the first case, Tammany Hall naturalized between forty and sixty thou-
sand resident aliens in a matter of days for the purpose of voting in the
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1868 election. These new voters were given between fifty cents and two
dollars each to vote the Democratic ticket, with "a glass of whisky thrown
in." Then, adding his thoughts on the Federal Elections Bill for good mea-
sure, Frye asserted that it "is not one-tenth part stringent enough" and if
he could, he "would put the bayonet behind it." He concluded with his
opinion of why virtually all white southerners opposed the bill, wryly de-
claring that "the devil never was fond of holy water." He then sarcastically
apologized for bringing up the sectional issue, because he did not want to
start on the "Southern question at this [late] hour of the day. When I dis-
cuss that, I propose to start in the morning." He actually had no intention
of prolonging the debate by such an abrasive and unnecessary digression,
but he could not resist the immediate opportunity to throw one quick,
venomous barb at his southern Democrat adversaries.21
John E. Kenna of West Virginia smugly reminded Frye that there were
not enough Republicans in all the nation to put a bayonet behind the bill in
order to enforce it because the Democrats now controlled far more votes
than the GOP. Frye quickly responded that there would be more than enough
Republicans if the disfranchised black southerners got to carry their fair
share of bayonets. Matthew Butler later answered that charge by noting the
contradiction in Frye's statement: "A 'free ballot and fair count' at the point
of the bayonet is an impossibility. They are incongruous elements and will
not assimilate."22
Near the midpoint of the December debate, J. Z. George of Mississippi
took the floor and, in one of the longest speeches ever made in the history of
Congress, explained why the Democrats believed that the Federal Elections
Bill was unconstitutional. He delivered what was, according to most contem-
porary accounts, an extraordinary exegesis of the U. S.Constitution. George
sought to prove that the Founding Fathers never intended the federal gov-
ernment to become so centralized that it abolished the sovereignty of states.
He covered the ratification conventions of the original thirteen states one-
by-one to illustrate how concerned the citizens of those states were about
protecting their local sovereignty under the new Constitution. He recounted
how, over the long course of early American history, both the Federalist
and Whig Parties had tried numerous times to subvert the will of the vast
majority of the American people by steering the federal government to-
ward centralization. He read resolutions of the Illinois and Ohio legisla-
tures against the 1842 law that the Whig Congress passed requiring uniform
elections throughout the states and noted how the voters turned out the
Whigs in record numbers in the next election. George also read an 1843
resolution of the Massachusetts legislature, which condemned the three-
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fifth's compromise and called for a constitutional amendment to change it.
The Bay State took that action, however, not because it wanted blacks to
have equal representation in Congress, explained George, but because it
wanted to eliminate their representation altogether. If they had no repre-
sentation at all, the northern states would gain even greater control over
the House of Representatives. He concluded by inserting into the Record
the documents of the states of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New
York ratifying the Constitution and by muttering in exhaustion, "I feel like
the weary traveler who is almost in sight of the promised land, and would
like to make a landing."23
Fellow Democrats called George's argument "invincible and unan-
swerable," and some ranked it alongside the best speeches ever delivered in
Congress, including those of the Great Triumvirate of Clay, Webster, and
Calhoun.24 The Democratic and Independent newspapers of the country
agreed, calling George an "intellectual giant." Even the Republican press
begrudgingly admitted that George, whether right or wrong in interpret-
ing the Constitution, had made a brilliant case against the authority of the
national government to pass a Federal Elections Bill. George's genius lay
not in making some new and original argument, however, but merely in
repackaging the old states' rights argument and presenting it with more
clarity than any antebellum southerner ever did.25 As an interesting sidebar,
the New York Herald characterized George as "a very able man" with "a
good store of learning," but a man who "takes his shoes off when he feels
like it, props his feet on his desk, talks aloud to anyone whenever he wants
to, stamps about the chamber, goes to sleep when he feels inclined, snorts
at speeches he does not like, and does not care what anyone thinks about
him." He acted, said the paper, quoting one observer, like an "educated
hog." Upon reading this "educated hog" characterization, Senator Ingalls
of Kansas exclaimed, "Great Scott!... Who in all this world has ventured to
call that man 'educated'?" That witticism no doubt represented the feelings
of many Republicans concerning George.26
Unlike the national press and public, the Republican advocates of the
bill in the Senate could appreciate neither George's interpretation of the
Constitution nor his extensive soliloquy, which they believed had little bear-
ing on the substantive issues under consideration. Thus, they offered a reso-
lution that the Senate go into all-night sessions in order to speed up the
business at hand. It was the classic anti-filibustering ploy whereby the ma-
jority party hoped to outlast the minority party. Not surprisingly, the Demo-
crats rose en masse to object. John Tyler Morgan rebuked the Republicans
for not engaging them in debate, fuming, "You had better consider this bill.
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You had better debate it with us . . . you had better convince the country
that the bill is right and we are wrong," or, he was sure, the American people
would soon revolt against the Senate the way they revolted against the
House in the midterm elections. Later, Morgan accused George Frisbie
Hoar of not even knowing what all of the provisions of his own bill said.
He compared the bill to Sanskrit for its complexity. Surely, such a com-
plex and controversial document required a point-by-point explanation,
said Morgan.27
The seasoned veterans on the Republican side realized that the best
strategy to combat the filibuster was to resist Democratic efforts to lure
them into unnecessary defenses of their position, which would only pro-
long the debate. Some less-experienced Republicans either would not or
could not resist, however. Morgan's tirade struck a nerve with several of
them, who finally took the Alabamian's bait and made brief defenses of
their bill during the next few days. James F. Wilson, Iowa's junior senator,
took the floor in an attempt to refute George's interpretation of the Consti-
tution. Wilson had a long history of supporting both Republican economic
programs and humanitarian causes. In his first year in Congress, 1861, he
had been a driving force behind the law giving African Americans the right
to vote in Washington, D.C. He later strongly supported all three Recon-
struction amendments and every subsequent Radical measure, while si-
multaneously milking federal tax dollars for his own benefit in the Credit
Mobilier scandal of the Grant years. The scandal hardly damaged his repu-
tation, however, and the Iowa legislature even promoted him to the Senate
in 1882. In 1890, he was among the only Republicans left who still held on
to the old abolitionist's adage that the U. S. Constitution was a "covenant
with hell." Wilson summarily explained that the Constitution as originally
written had been a "great mistake," for it undermined the enlightened doc-
trine of egalitarianism in the Declaration of Independence. The Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, he argued, realigned America's two
most famous documents ideologically.28
Another young Republican who entered the fray against George's inter-
pretation of the Constitution was Joseph N. Dolph of Oregon. This second-
term senator never enjoyed a distinguished career in national politics, as
did many of his colleagues, yet his role in the Federal Elections Bill debate
was among the most prominent for the Republicans. This Oregonian, who,
although only in his forties, wore a long white beard, became the main
antagonist of the Democrats, playing the role of gadfly or majority party
whip. In defending the Republican philosophy of a strong central govern-
ment, he waved the bloody shirt relentlessly, accusing the South of all man-
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ner of evils and mercilessly attacking both the new Mississippi Constitu-
tion and South Carolina's newly elected governor, "Pitchfork" Ben Tillman.
Dolph's South-bashing, not surprisingly, incited a verbal riot that was to-
tally counterproductive to helping illuminate the provisions of the bill un-
der consideration. John Tyler Morgan answered Dolph's attack by reading
an Oregon constitutional statute prohibiting interracial marriages of whites
to either blacks, Chinese, or Indians. Citing Frederick Douglass, who was
married to a white woman, as an example, Morgan pointed out that if the
Douglasses were to leave Maryland and move to Oregon, they would be
branded as criminals. According to state law, they would be sent to jail for
not less than six months. Morgan relished his chance to lash out at what he
perceived to be the hypocrisy of some northern Republicans by telling
Dolph, "You took care, very good care, never to take any of your own medi-
cine." When the testy young Oregonian asked Morgan to yield the floor in
order that he may offer rebuttal, the experienced Alabamian refused, say-
ing, "I want the Senator to have due time for reflection before he speaks."
Dolph did not get the floor again that day. Later, Shelby Cuilom of Illinois
and even the normally tactful George Frisbie Hoar entered the fray with
denunciations of the South's racially discriminatory social structure, which
resulted in further verbal sparring between northern and southern senators.29
Although the debate was routinely sidetracked by someone injecting
the venomous fangs of North-South sectionalism, reasoned arguments and
valid points still managed to find their way into the exchanges now and
then. John W. Daniel of Virginia noted, for instance, that the National Farm-
ers' Alliance, a nascent political force controlling more than a million votes,
had denounced the bill earlier in the week in its Ocala Platform. Did Re-
publicans not care to compete for the votes of farmers? he asked. George
Vest of Missouri added that the National Colored Farmers' Alliance, which
had met at Ocala, Florida, at the same time but in their own segregated
facility, did not even mention the bill in its platform. The black Alliance
complained instead, said Vest, about the McKinley Tariff and the Conger
Lard Bill, both of which were economic measures that directly affected farm-
ers, black and white alike. Did this not prove, he asked, that most black
southerners were more interested in economic betterment than in political
equality? Did it not also show that Senate Republicans had their priorities
out of order?30 He continued, saying that he had recently read a statement
opposing the Federal Elections Bill written by "the most intelligent negro
whom I have met in years." He referred to Mississippi planter Isaiah Mont-
gomery and his now infamous support of the Mississippi Constitution and
simultaneous denunciation of the elections bill published in the New York
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World in September. Henry Blair interrupted to ask Vest whether Mont-
gomery was a full-blooded Negro. Before Vest could answer, Randall L.
Gibson of Louisiana chimed in, "as black as the senator's coat." Blair re-
plied sarcastically, "I wanted it settled, whether a pure negro knew any-
thing or not." Blair intended his comment to tear down the common racist
stereotype of the day that only mulattoes, not pure blacks, had the mental
capacity necessary to make insightful political judgments.31
Edmund Cary Walthall, the junior senator from Mississippi, also
employed the Democratic strategy of defending the South while simulta-
neously attacking the Federal Elections Bill. This highly regarded former
Confederate general was not fond of public speaking and took the floor
only when he felt absolutely compelled to do so. His defense of the South
centered upon the new Mississippi Constitution. He wanted everyone to
know that, despite the stereotype of his state as a backwater of illiterate
farmers and racist demagogues, there had not been a single act of violence
committed with regard to an election in the Magnolia State in the five years
and nine months that he had been a senator. "Compare this record with
that of any other State, large or small," he said, "and see if any Senator can
produce a better one from his own state." George Edmunds of Vermont
injected, "the Senator is more crazy than usual," because ever since the
Democrats "redeemed" the state in 1875, "nobody needed to be killed any
more." Walthall stopped to question his detractor, asking if he had any
firsthand knowledge of affairs in Mississippi. Edmunds answered no, "I am
not familiar with it at all, any more than I am with Poland, where there is
peace." With smug satisfaction Walthall retorted, "I imagined that the Sena-
tor from Vermont, as he admits, was entirely ignorant of the matter . . . and
I will proceed."32
"I venture the statement as a matter of opinion," continued Walthall,
"that there are more negroes in office this day in Bolivar County [Missis-
sippi] than in any other county in the United States and more than in the
entire States in the North which have always been under Republican con-
trol. Out of forty-four officeholders in that county, thirty-one of them are
negroes." He noted that the county was 90 percent black, but added that
"the white population is intelligent and enterprising," implying that if the
whites had wanted to, they could have easily thrown off the yoke of black
rule. He also pointed out that Isaiah Montgomery was not the only African
American in Mississippi to oppose the Federal Elections Bill and support
the new state constitution. A "colored Representative from Adams County
[George F. Bowles of the Mississippi legislature], whose Republicanism is
as orthodox as any Senator here," also made a public speech to that effect.33
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Racial Harmony in the South. "Mean, but futile .. . President Harrison's Spite can
not Disturb the Growing Harmony between the Whites and Negros [sic] of the South."
(Puck, 1890.) In a double entendre that simultaneously lampooned Benjamin
Harrison's physical stature and his political impotence, cartoonists often portrayed
the president as a midget wearing his grandfather's giant-sized hat. Here he repre-
sents the Republican Party attempting to break up the happy union that black and
white southerners supposedly enjoyed in the post-Reconstruction era.
Zebulon Vance continued the simultaneous defense of the South and
attack on the Federal Elections Bill by accusing northern Republicans of
hypocrisy once again. He pointed out that, while the Republicans com-
plained about the Democrats having more than their fair share of repre-
sentation in the southern states, they were guilty of the same thing in a
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different way in the northern states: "In voting to admit Idaho and Wyo-
ming, whose united population does not equal that of one Congressional
district in my State, [they] voted to make one man, Mormon, Chinaman,
or Indian, in these States equal to three [men] in North Carolina in the
House of Representatives. And this exertion does not seem to produce [in
them] either weariness of muscle or the least shortness of breath." Vance
added that, after the November midterm elections, which turned the ma-
jority party into the minority party, Republicans now controlled only twelve
states with a combined population of nine million, while the Democrats
controlled thirty states with a combined population of fifty-three mil-
lion. Yet, the GOP would still exercise the majority power in both houses
of Congress until the current session ended in April 1891, making one
man in Republican states in the meantime equal in representation to ap-
proximately six in the Democratic states. Vance then attacked the sup-
porters of the Federal Elections Bill as pseudoreformers, asking why they
never called for changing the political system that allowed twelve million
Americans to have more congressional representation than fifty-three
million other Americans.34
Following the same line of reasoning, John R. Reagan of Texas read statis-
tics designed to prove that black southerners were no more underrepresented
in Congress than were white Democrats in the North. While there were
approximately 397,000 Republican voters in the South who enjoyed no rep-
resentation in Congress because of black disfranchisement, there were about
585,000 Democrats in the North who enjoyed no representation in Con-
gress because of Republican gerrymandering.35 Rufus Blodgett, a Demo-
crat in his first and only term from New Jersey, agreed, arguing that peace
in the South was more to be desired than voting rights for black southerners.
After all, he reasoned, what are egalitarianism and democracy supposed to
produce but a society of peace and prosperity? If, as experience had shown,
they produced the exact opposite, then why insist upon them? Perhaps gov-
ernments based upon those noble ideals are not always the best governments,
said Blodgett; perhaps every situation is different and should be dealt with
accordingly.36 Later, Alfred Colquitt of Georgia—a second-term senator,
former Confederate general, and member of the state's so-called Bourbon
triumvirate that had "redeemed" Georgia from Radical Republicanism—
echoed those remarks with his usual poetic flare: "Suffrage is no panacea.
Has it prevented sectionalism, race prejudice, or class prejudice? Can it heal
the grief of a wound, satisfy hunger, clothe the naked, educate the ignorant,
reform the criminal? Is it not everywhere abused? Where do you not hear
complaints of impurities in balloting?"37
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William B. Bate of Tennessee continued upon that train of thought
and delivered one of the most provocative speeches of the entire debate.
Bate was a former Confederate general who had been severely wounded at
Shiloh. He was also a two-term governor of the Volunteer State who was
now in his first term in the Senate. He expounded on the theme that Reagan
had introduced the day before, asking why, if there were so many
underrepresented groups of American citizens, did blacks get all the atten-
tion? The answer, he asserted, was that a group of professional politicians
called "convention negroes" incessantly agitated the issue. "Where is the
evidence of the existence of incurable disease which demands the use of a
quack medicine like this bill.... It is the whine of the 'convention negro'...
which is the only real excuse for its enactment." Bate expressed his antipa-
thy for the nation's black political leaders, declaring that "The convention
negro, or professional colored politician . . . toils not, neither does he spin,
yet Solomon, in all his glory, was not his equal in politics." He continued
his racist pronouncement by noting that "We have in this country many
thousands Irishmen, Germans, French, Spaniards, Scandinavians, [and]
Welsh; but they amalgamate with the natives and disappear from our poli-
tics as members of a different race from the American people. It is only the
'convention negro,' who is an American citizen of the African race, who
does not disappear," implying that some black leaders earned their liveli-
hoods by agitating the race problem.38
Besides airing his racist views, Bate also offered the Senate a history
lesson, comparing and contrasting the American and French experiments
with democratic government in 1789. He thought it more than just a little
coincidental that in the same year the National Assembly of France abol-
ished the long-standing right of the king to order arbitrary arrests and im-
prisonments the United States ratified its Constitution. He asked whether
any senator thought that the American people of that generation would
have been willing to give arbitrary power to the central government of the
United States, such as was contained in the Federal Elections Bill, at the
same time that the French people were finally taking away arbitrary power
from their central government. Bate then compared the present situation
in the southern United States to that of Great Britain's rule of Ireland. In
Ireland, as in the American South, the people were being subjected against
their will to the force of obtrusive central government. "In one country its
measures are known as coercion acts; in the other, as force bills; they are
interchangeable terms. . . . In Ireland or America, it matters not how this
bill may be disguised by terms, it means government by military power."39
Bate concluded with what he called a "Synopsis of Argument Against
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the Election Bill," which contained five reasons that the bill was bad legis-
lation in his opinion: first, the public opposed the bill; second, it was un-
constitutional; third, it would reignite the flames of sectional hatred left
smoldering from the Civil War; fourth, previous supervisory laws proved
that federal supervision of elections did not work; and fifth, it was incon-
sistent with America's governmental traditions. The fifth point contained
nine subpoints: (1) it would establish supervisors with tenure for life; (2) it
would mix the judiciary with partisan politics; (3) it would invite one form
of corruption into the political process in an attempt to get rid of another;
(4) it would increase rather than decrease contested elections; (5) it would
require military force in order to be effective; (6) it would incite riots; (7) it
would cost more than the nation could afford if implemented at every elec-
tion in all districts where supervision was requested; (8) it would quickly
prove to be an unworkable system; and (9) it was an attempt by one party
to take advantage of its majority status and gain absolute, permanent hege-
mony over the nation.40
Following Bate on December 19 was the first western "Silverite" Re-
publican to join the debate, William M. Stewart of Nevada. A sagacious-
looking man with a long white beard, Stewart had been one of Nevada's
original senators, elected upon the admission of that state to the Union in
1864. This venerable, complex statesman had been more instrumental in
moderating the Radical Republicans' racial agenda during Reconstruction
than any other member of Congress still serving in 1890. Before the Civil
War, he had actually been a doughface—inclined to agree with, or at least
be sympathetic to, the southern point of view on racial matters. In the 1850s,
he had established a law firm in California with one of the South's most
famous pre-Civil War statesmen, Henry Stuart Foote of Mississippi. He
had also married Foote's daughter, Annie, and had developed a great re-
spect for southern culture as a result. When the issue of black suffrage was
first put to Congress in 1866, he opposed it unequivocally, saying "I believe
the Anglo-Saxon race can govern this country. I believe it because he has
governed it. I believe it because it is the only race that has ever founded
such institutions as ours... . I believe the white man can govern it without
the aid of the negro." In that same year, Stewart also voted to kill the
Freedmen's Bureau. Afterward, like most other Republicans, he quickly grew
to despise President Andrew Johnson, which caused him to convert to a
Radical on subsequent racial issues, seemingly for no other reason than to
spite the Tennessee tailor. The most important of these issues was the Fif-
teenth Amendment, the final draft of which Stewart authored.41
After Reconstruction, Stewart experienced another conversion, revert-
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ing to his initial disapproval of black political equality. His main reason
for doing so was to please his Nevada constituents, the western silver lobby,
and the railroad tycoons of the West Coast, all of whom seemed inter-
ested in humanitarianism only so far as it did not impede the nation's, or
their own personal, economic progress. He also placated his southern fam-
ily members and his own conscience with his change of position, ratio-
nalizing that economic growth and technological advancement would help
African Americans more than would the right to vote.42 Stewart thus op-
posed the Federal Elections Bill and became the first Republican to dis-
sent publicly on the issue. In speaking against it in the Senate, he cited
five reasons for his disapprobation: first, if a supervisory law was needed,
the existing supervisory law was sufficient; second, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the U. S. Constitution provided that persons charged with vio-
lating the civil rights of blacks could have their right of habeas corpus
suspended, which, if carried out, would be the only punishment neces-
sary for individual violators; third, the Fourteenth Amendment also pro-
vided for reducing the representation of states found guilty of violating
the civil rights of blacks; fourth, the Democratic interpretation of Article
I, Section 4, of the Constitution was correct—the states alone, not Con-
gress, had the right to decide voter qualifications; and fifth, the Federal
Elections Bill would have the opposite effect of what its authors intended,
for it would only consolidate the white vote of the South even further,
increase the misery of blacks, and revive the sectional antagonism that
was otherwise dying out.43
Stewart indicted colleagues who professed humanitarianism for what
he deemed hypocrisy, especially those who had served in the Senate during
Reconstruction. He asked why they had voted against giving President Grant
arbitrary power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment in the "force bill of
1875" but now wanted to give the same type of power to President Harrison.
George Frisbie Hoar, although experienced enough as a senator to know
better, was unable to sit silently before his accuser. He responded that the
1875 bill was designed to circumvent the U. S. Supreme Court ruling that
only states, not individuals, could be guilty of violating the Fifteenth Amend-
ment. It said that if two or more individuals acted in concert to deprive a
black man of his right to vote, the state where the guilty parties resided
could be held liable for their actions, and the president could then enforce
martial law in that state. Hoar believed that such an interpretation of the
Supreme Court ruling was incorrect and dangerous because it would pun-
ish too many people for the crimes of a few and would give the president an
unwarranted amount of arbitrary power. The current bill under consider-
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ation, by contrast, applied only to specific congressional districts, not to
entire states. Stewart disagreed with Hoar's recollection of the design and
intent of the 1875 bill, saying that if Congress were ever to do something
about the southern race problem, Reconstruction had been the time to do
it, not now. If it was not done then, the failure to do it proved that wise men
saw the folly of continuing the course and abandoned it. Why resurrect it
now?44
What the historian can glean from this discussion between these two
Republican ideologues is that those senators who lined up on the money
Republican side of the party did not always favor the "let alone" policy
merely for avaricious economic reasons. Sometimes they had genuine con-
victions on interpretations of the Constitution and Supreme Court rulings
that differed from the reformers' view. Other times, a senator's personal
recollections of Reconstruction and his role in making the laws of that tur-
bulent era contributed to his reluctance to lead the nation into another
period of racial and sectional turbulence in the 1890s.
Stewart's entry into the debate as the first Republican dissenter marked
the turning point in the battle over the Federal Elections Bill. It showed for
the first time that the Democrats' hope of a Republican split might come to
fruition. It also caused the bill's sponsors to begin to exhibit desperation
along with their exasperation. It forced them to abandon their initial strat-
egy of saving precious time by not engaging the Democrats in debate. They
realized that, while there had never been any hope of persuading Demo-
crats to change their minds through a long-winded defense of their bill,
they would now be forced to contend with the disenchanted money Re-
publican faction of the party in order to succeed in passing the bill. Their
decision to engage in the debate initiated the second stage of this Senate
showdown. Whereas legitimate Democratic complaints that actually helped
illuminate the provisions of the bill consumed the first half of the debate,
Republican attempts to vilify southern Democrats and to achieve cloture
by any means necessary would largely consume the second half.
The Democrats had accomplished four major goals in the first half of
the debate: (1) they had staved off a quick Republican victory in the Senate
and forced the sponsors of the Federal Elections Bill to engage them in a
battle of attrition; (2) they had defended their position skillfully, seized the
offensive in the battle, and now forced the supporters of the bill to explain
to the nation precisely why this legislation was necessary and how it would
solve the race problem; (3) they had divided the Republicans into rival fac-
tions; and (4) they had swung the tide of public opinion even further against
the bill through their clever arguments. The Democrats, whether right or
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wrong in their position, had certainly demonstrated through the first half
of the debate that they were excellent politicians, orators, and propagan-
dists. The only question was, could they finish what they had started? The
next chapter provides the answer.
Chapter 7
SHOWDOWN ON CAPITOL HILL
The Filibuster, the Cloture Rule, and the
Defeat of the Federal Elections Bill
We are about to witness the final act in the great political drama in which
the Republican party has been playing the role of star for a quarter of a
century. . .. Whether the performance shall end in comedy or tragedy .. .
remains to be seen.
—Senator John E. Kenna of West Virginia
The majority and the minority each stand responsible to their several con-
stituencies for their course, their conduct, and their speeches. There may
be a difference, as there is upon the election bill, as wide as the poles be-
tween those who favor it and those who oppose it. Each must stand upon
his own judgment, his convictions, and his conscience as to what his duty is
and how he shall perform it.
—Senator John R. Reagan of Texas
As the year 1890 came to a close, the annual yuletide mood of joyful cel-
ebration and goodwill toward men enveloped the nation as usual. Unfor-
tunately, good cheer did not make an appearance at Capitol Hill, for the
Senate was engaged in one of the most heated ideological battles it would
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ever see. Senate sponsors of the Federal Elections Bill found themselves in a
quandary after fellow Republican William M. Stewart of Nevada made
known his emphatic opposition to the bill. They already knew that several
of their Republican colleagues were not strong supporters of the idea of
passing a new federal elections law, but they had hoped these senators would
not express such strong opposition as Stewart had voiced. The sponsors
realized that they did not possess the votes necessary to pass the bill with-
out the support of at least some of the Silverites and eastern money Repub-
licans. The historian can only speculate whether they wrangled with these
unsupportive colleagues in the cloakroom or in some other place outside
the Senate chamber to try to persuade them to remain faithful to the re-
formers' cause. What is certain, however, is that after Stewart's speech the
sponsors changed their initial strategy of not defending and explaining their
bill to one of at least seizing the initiative, answering their critics, and try-
ing to put them on the defensive.
The result of this change of strategy was a much livelier and more
interesting debate. The American public and the national press, which had
previously followed the debate with plentiful interest, now became more
fixated than ever on the issue. The senators themselves recognized their
moment in the spotlight, and some of the key performers in the drama
enjoyed every moment of their starring roles, playing to their national au-
dience like actors on a stage.1 Leading national newspapers poked fun at
these prima donnas who held both the nation's attention and its racial des-
tiny in their hands. The New York Herald, for example, cleverly wrote with
tongue-in-cheek: "Look down from the gallery of the Senate, you patriotic
Americans, and contemplate a most impressive spectacle.... Notice as you
enter the chamber the atmosphere of eminent respectability, profound,
sombre, palpable, almost thick enough to be cut with a knife— That is the
air of Senatorial dignity which envelops each member like a cloud. It ex-
udes from his personality as the odor of sanctity from the saints."2 Beneath
such hyperbolic humor lay a serious problem that the newspapers were
addressing: senators, because of their exalted position, seemed to be re-
moved from the mainstream of American society and thus out of touch
with the common people. Indeed, no man, no matter how underprivileged
he had previously been in life, could remain a commoner at heart after his
selection to the U. S. Senate. The prestige of the office changed even the
humblest public servant. Those who spent the majority of their long and
celebrated careers in the Senate tended to undergo the most stark transfor-
mations. They, as a class, possessed a degree of arrogance rarely seen in
democratic government. They considered the House of Representatives,
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the president, the Supreme Court, and all state governments subservient to
the Senate, and they put on airs accordingly.3
Throughout the late nineteenth century, both parties' designated lead-
ers always had their hands full trying to keep this collection of massive egos
in the Senate in line with party leadership. The personal ambition of sena-
tors certainly clouded their judgment at times and made them unruly at
other times. Many senators hoped to inherent the mantles of Daniel Webster,
Henry Clay, and John C. Calhoun as the recognized leaders of their coun-
try (or at least their respective sections of it). As one historian has noted,
"The public now and again picks out here and there a Senator who seems
to act and speak with true instinct of statesmanship and who unmistakably
merits the confidence of colleagues and of people," and several senators in
the Fifty-first Congress—the leaders on both sides of the aisle—hoped to
be the one picked in the present generation.4 Their leadership on the Fed-
eral Elections Bill would be their moment to prove their mettle. George
Frisbie Hoar, the somber, highly cultured junior Republican senator of Mas-
sachusetts who now led the fight to solve the southern race problem through
electoral reform, was not among those seeking celebrity. He debated or ar-
gued when necessity dictated, but he always preferred action to rhetoric.
He sometimes criticized overly loquacious colleagues, even when he agreed
with them, no matter how renowned they were as orators, or how esteemed
they were as pillars of American government.5 He once said of Republican
icon Charles Sumner that "Mr. Sumner thought the rebellion [Civil War]
was put down by a few speeches which he made in the Senate, and he looked
upon the battles fought as the noise of a fire engine going by while he was
talking."6 Now Hoar had the difficult task of scheduling the sequence of
Republican speakers and trying to keep order among those who did seek
celebrity.
The first speaker for the reformers in the second phase of the debate
was John Coit Spooner, who helped write the bill under consideration but
had not yet spoken on its behalf. In the longest Republican speech of the
debate (he held the floor for more than three hours), he opened discussion
on December 20, blasting the Democrats for their frequent "rudeness" to-
ward the reformers, saying an "epithet never convinces any intelligent
mind." He launched into a bloody-shirt tirade, in which he fired a volley at
the Mississippi Constitution, complaining that, for some inexplicable rea-
son, a majority of the American public seemed to think it was a "unique,
beautiful" solution to the Soufh's race problem. He asked whether public
opinion or the Constitution should rule the country. He explained that
"Senators on the other side belong to a different school of constitutional
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construction from that in which we have been brought up. They belong to
the strict constructionists . . . to a  school of constitutional lawyers who
readily found in that instrument power to tear the Union to pieces, to scat-
ter the Constitution to the winds, but never were able to find in it power to
maintain the Government or enforce the Constitution or the laws enacted
under it." Finally, Spooner engaged in a shouting match with George Gray
of Delaware, who wanted to know whether Wisconsin was without spot or
blemish in regard to election purity. Spooner responded that his state was
more pure than most and that it was working to achieve perfection, which
was more than any southern state could say. He favored taking the
southerners who disfranchised African Americans "to the whipping post"
where they should be "given a generous castigation."7
Judging from newspaper reports, Spooner's speech, although lacking
in a substantive discussion of the provisions of the Federal Elections Bill,
proved quite effective at convincing the large portion of the northern pub-
lic that had previously become disillusioned with the reformers' cause to
rally around the banner of racial justice once again. As one paper put it,
Spooner's impassioned appeal "breathed life into the dying bill."8 Unfortu-
nately for Spooner, his speech changed no Silverite or eastern money
Republican's mind and only aggravated the Democrats. It particularly stirred
the ire of the ex-Confederates in the Senate, including the former adjutant
general of the Confederacy, Wilkinson Call of Florida, who threatened that,
should the Republicans pass the Federal Elections Bill, every state in the
South would resurrect and apply the old southern doctrine of nullification
to it. Call's threat provoked an unproductive and very time-consuming ex-
change between northern and southern senators, much to the satisfaction
of the Democrats. Spooner's speech irritated J. Z. George to an unusually
high degree. George vowed to make a long, elaborate defense of the Missis-
sippi Constitution before the filibuster was over, which he soon did, con-
suming more than four-and-a-half hours on the last day of 1890.9
Despite the fact that time was precious in the brief second session, the
proponents of the Federal Elections Bill continued, day after day, chipping
away at the veneer of legitimacy that made the Mississippi Constitution
possible. They argued that, even though the constitution did not blatantly
violate the letter of the Fifteenth Amendment, everyone knew that the only
real purpose of the document was to ensure white supremacy in Missis-
sippi. Even Mississippi newspapers admitted as much. But since the elec-
tion provisions in the constitution were not to be implemented until 1892,
there was not yet any actual, concrete evidence of wrongdoing on the part
of the state. The proponents of the Federal Elections Bill could only hope
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that, by repeatedly putting J. Z. George and supporters of the constitution
on the defensive, they could wear down the filibusterers while simulta-
neously convincing the eastern money Republicans and western Silverites
of the necessity of passing their bill. Their strategy backfired, however, for
George consistently proved up to the task of defending the Mississippi Con-
stitution with rational arguments against all who challenged it. He reminded
the Senate, for instance, that his state's new constitution contained the very
prescription for ending violations of the Fifteenth Amendment that both
George Frisbie Hoar and Henry Cabot Lodge had advocated in the first
session of Congress—the literacy test. Throughout his defense, George kept
a cool demeanor, showing himself able to withstand the constant public
scrutiny that naturally accompanied his elevation to the status of a politi-
cal celebrity without cracking under the pressure.10
The strategy also produced exactly the opposite result among the east-
ern money Republicans and western Silverites than the sponsors of the bill
had intended. In the midst of one of George Frisbie Hoar's harangues against
the Mississippi Constitution, fellow Republican Henry M. Teller of Colo-
rado interrupted to ask whether there was "anything in this bill which
touches the wrong of which he [Hoar] complains?" Teller seemed an un-
likely detractor of the Federal Elections Bill and an even more unlikely sup-
porter of the Mississippi Constitution. He had established a reputation as a
humanitarian during and after Reconstruction. In 1878, he had headed a
congressional committee to investigate electoral frauds and violence in the
South, in which he found Louisiana and South Carolina culpable. Yet, now
he desired to know whether any provision in the Federal Elections Bill would
address the problem of circumventing the Fifteenth Amendment through
use of literacy tests and understanding clauses, which provoked one of the
most important exchanges of the entire debate. Hoar realized the poignancy
of the question, and, in a moment of complete candor, meekly answered,
"No, I do not suppose there is." Teller responded, then "it is not worth
while for us now to raise the question whether Mississippi has violated
morals and ethics or not. She has kept herself within the Constitution and
the law, offensive as her action may be." He also reminded Hoar that Mas-
sachusetts had "what is called there the intelligence restriction" in its con-
stitution, the purpose of which was to prevent illiterates and other
undesirables from voting.11
Teller's interjection effectively silenced Hoar and the reformers long
enough for the Silverites to take control of the business of the Senate. They
tabled the Federal Elections Bill temporarily in order to consider other bills
waiting on the docket. Edward O. Wolcott, Colorado's junior senator, took
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the floor to explain the abrupt change of business. He proclaimed matter-
of-factly that the authors of the elections bill needed time to rethink some
of its provisions before forcing it upon the country. A man who was noted
not for the power of his intellect but for the passion of his oratory, Wolcott
declared that "there are many things more important and vital to the wel-
fare of this nation than that the colored citizens of the South shall vote."
Several other important bills needed consideration before the end of the
session, he said, adding that "were none of those vital measures before us
for consideration, I should still be against" the Federal Elections Bill. He
noted that the bill made no distinction between state elections and con-
gressional elections, both of which were held on the same day in most states.
Such a system would allow the supervisors conceivably to intervene in lo-
cal elections as well as federal. Wolcott declared that "any meddling with
state elections is, to my mind, intolerable." He urged the bill's framers to
insert a provision changing congressional elections to a separate day, a pro-
posal that fellow Silverite William M. Stewart seconded. Both men agreed
that only after making this change would they even consider voting for the
bill. In the meantime, they would move on to other business.12
When John Coit Spooner rose to express his disdain for the westerners'
action, Henry M. Teller explained that there were presently 150 resolutions
pending to amend the Federal Elections Bill. He accused the bill's propo-
nents of trying to force their will on everyone else by refusing to give those
amendments due consideration. Besides, he notified Spooner, the people
of the West did not support the bill; they supported "financial legislation"
instead, because "the best minds in this country assert to-day that we are
on the very verge of a financial panic."13 As a result of the Silverite motion,
the Senate spent nine days considering modifications to the Sherman Sil-
ver-Purchase Act, much to the pleasure of the Silverites, eastern money
Republicans, and Democrats and much to the consternation of the reform-
ers. One observer wryly commented about the traitorous act of the Silverite-
money Republican faction: "Silver is a base metal, and it has always had a
base effect on weak characters like Judas."14
At the end of the nine-day delay, the sponsors of the Federal Elections
Bill were able to regain control of the business of the Senate, whereupon
they immediately resumed consideration of the bill. Realizing that time
was now more precious than ever, the sponsors of the bill finally resorted
to the all-night sessions that Senator Preston B. Plumb of Kansas had long
advocated. This action initiated the third phase of the debate, when the
Democrats began to filibuster not for instruction but mainly for obstruc-
tion. Even then, they occasionally made an illuminating point. The Demo-
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crats knew that the Republicans' patience had reached its end, and that the
remainder of the debate would be little more than a test of endurance. They
anticipated that they could survive all-night sessions as well as the Repub-
licans, but they also knew that it would not take many nights of making
such a sacrifice before the proponents of the bill would begin to call for a
cloture rule. The Democratic press tried to prepare the American public
for the defeat that seemed inevitable should the Senate adopt a cloture rule:
"The most important and valued right of a minority in all deliberative bodies
is that of a full and free discussion, and whenever the day comes that it is
denied, that will be the dawn of a day which will see the downfall of the
liberties of the people.... The election or force bill may, before the close of
the present congress, become the law of the land, and our people must
prepare themselves to meet the contingencies that may arise, bravely and in
the same spirit of patient endurance that distinguished them in the dark
days of reconstruction."15
During the first all-night session on Friday, January 16, 1891, griev-
ing Democratic Senator Charles Faulkner of West Virginia, who had just
returned from attending his wife's funeral in Martinsburg, began the slow
and deliberate mechanism of obstruction. In a speech that had little direct
relevance to the Federal Elections Bill, Faulkner made it to 2:30 A.M. on
Saturday morning before the bill's sponsors issued the first quorum call to
"compel" attendance of senators, a process that was repeated frequently
over the coming week. For the next two hours, the sergeant at arms, E. K.
Valentine, tried to locate senators and notify them of their duty to attend.
Since the Senate traditionally requested rather than compelled the atten-
dance of senators during filibusters, Valentine knew that his action would
be highly unpopular among the gentlemen with whom he would have to
work for the rest of the session, and he accordingly made only a halfhearted
effort to honor the chair's order. He reported to the Senate at 4:30 A.M. that
he had been unable to locate several senators and that others could not
attend due to illness. Interestingly, almost as many Republican reformers
had vacated the Senate during the filibuster as had Democrats and their
allies. Thus, at times, it was they rather than their filibustering opponents
who dragged out the quorum call. The roll call lasted about five hours.
Finally, at 9:30 A.M., a quorum arrived, and the most spectacular filibuster
in American history to that time resumed. Faulkner then concluded his
speech some eleven hours after having begun it.16
As the filibuster dragged on through Saturday, January 19, frustra-
tion increased among the sponsors of the Federal Elections Bill, and the
determination of the opposition grew proportionately. Both sides began
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The Republican 'Chariot'Runs into Resistance. Blocked! (New York Herald, 1891.)
In December, the Republican Reformers in the U. S. Senate ran into the most
notorious filibuster in American history to that time, as Democrats sought to thwart
their efforts to pass the Federal Elections Bill. Here, the cartoonist shows Speaker
of the House Thomas B. Reed trying to help pull the legislation from one side
while Senate floor manager George Frisbie Hoar tries to push it from the other.
Vice President Levi P. Morton is shown trying to drive the bill through (which is a
marginally accurate portrayal at best), while President Benjamin Harrison (inside
the coach), Secretary of State James G. Blaine, and nearly blind Senator William
M. Evarts of New York are merely along for the ride. John J. Ingalls of Kansas, who
was voted out of office because of the rise of Populism in November, is shown as
having fallen off the political wagon and his career sinking fast.
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attacking each other mercilessly, with little mention of the provisions of
the bill under consideration. The sponsors of the bill cited case after case
of southern ballot box abuses that were documented in southern news-
papers and in the testimonies of victims and witnesses at congressional
hearings between Reconstruction and 1890. Democrats matched them
case for case with examples of alleged Republican duplicity that were
documented in northern newspapers, periodicals, and in letters that
northerners wrote to Democratic congressmen. Senator Samuel D. Pasco
of Florida read, for example, a statement from Terrence V. Powderly of
the Knights of Labor:
There can be no worse intimidation practiced anywhere in the
country than is practiced in Pennsylvania, the cradle of protec-
tion and the headquarters of the great party of so-called moral-
ity. I have seen the mine bosses stand around the polls with cigar
boxes on their arms, in which were tickets, and as an employee
came along the cover was raised and a ticket handed to him. The
poor workman was not told in so many words to vote the ticket,
[but] if he failed to do so he would lose his job in about a week's
time, without being told why he was discharged.17
George Vest of Missouri followed with yet more condemnation of the
GOP, citing a specific case of corruption that occurred in Indiana under
the old supervisory law of 1871 involving William Dudley, who, at the time,
was the U. S. Marshal for Indianapolis and the treasurer of the Republican
National Committee. Vest related the story of how Dudley appointed six
hundred Republican deputies to supervise the city election of 1880. Demo-
cratic Senator Joseph McDonald of Indiana petitioned the federal court to
appoint some Democratic supervisors to work alongside the Republicans.
Over the course of the election day, only four repeaters were arrested, but
the Democratic supervisors, not the Republicans, had caught all four. The
repeaters went to trial and to jail, but the Republican machine immediately
bailed them out and sent them out of town. Democrats later secured a let-
ter allegedly written by Dudley to GOP leaders in Indiana discussing how
much money the party's treasury had allotted to pay "floaters" to vote the
Republican ticket in 1888. Dudley went to trial for this allegation, but ap-
pealed to the federal judge in private to release him, because he claimed to
have enough "dirt" on high-ranking Republicans in both Indiana and Wash-
ington, D.C., to cause an "explosion" that would destroy the Harrison ad-
ministration, wreck the Republican National Committee, and end the
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political career of Senator Matthew Quay of Pennsylvania. Through a se-
ries of unexplained circumstances, the judge resigned his post, presumably
because of intimidation from the Quay-Harrison machine, and the Hoo-
sier president appointed his replacement. To no one's surprise, said Vest,
the new judge pronounced a mistrial, and Dudley escaped scot-free.18
Quay, who was the leader of the money Republicans and thus not a
supporter of the bill, immediately interrupted Vest, hoping to deflect at-
tention away from his shady dealings as a party boss and to show the Demo-
crats that he was firmly on their side. He thus introduced his own sarcastic
version of the Federal Elections Bill, which he intended as an illustration of
the absurdity of the idea of the national government supervising elections.
His bill took the idea to its logical extreme, giving full power of enforce-
ment to both the army and the navy, such that the military could blockade
the southern coastline and treat the southern states as belligerent nations if
they did not allow blacks to vote. Nothing came of his bill, of course, and
whether it had any effect on the thinking of any of his colleagues is doubt-
ful. It certainly did not hurt the opposition's case, however, and the Demo-
crats never again mentioned Quay's questionable character in the debate.19
Thirty hours into the all-day and all-night filibuster, Nelson Aldrich
of Rhode Island finally called for a recess. Before leaving, however, he served
notice that he would call for a vote on limiting debate, and then schedule a
vote on the Federal Elections Bill on Tuesday, January 20. When Tuesday
arrived, Aldrich indeed tried to call for a vote on cloture, but Isham G.
Harris of Tennessee, a former Confederate governor, managed to draw the
Rhode Islander into an argument over Senate rules that consumed a great
deal of time and steered the issue far away from what Aldrich intended.
The Senate never got the chance to vote on the cloture resolution that day.
The Democrats subsequently regained control of the floor.20
As the Democrats casually yielded the floor back and forth to one
another, the proponents of the Federal Elections Bill and the cloture reso-
lution finally rose in protest, complaining that one party should not be
allowed to hold the floor exclusively and indefinitely, as the Democrats
seemed intent upon doing. They entreated Vice President Morton to stop
the obstructive tactic. Morton, however, initially did not agree that he should
use his authority as president pro tem of the Senate in a way that the public
might construe to be in imitation of "Czar" Reed in the House. Yet, when
John Sherman of Ohio, one of the longest-serving, most powerful, and most
respected members of the Senate demanded the same from Morton, the
vice president finally consented. He instructed the Democrats to choose
one man to hold the floor, or else to yield it to a Republican. But he also
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notified the Republicans that his decision applied only for one day. He
wanted time to consider the propriety of establishing such a rule perma-
nently. He instructed J. Z. George, who held the floor at the time the Re-
publicans interrupted, to continue speaking or yield to a Republican, but
not to yield to a Democrat. George thus continued with yet another ex-
tended defense of the Mississippi Constitution. When, after four hours, he
appeared near the point of physical exhaustion, Nelson Aldrich asked him
to yield the floor. George had no choice but to agree. He had to abide by
Morton's ruling. Aldrich, of course, brought up his cloture resolution again,
but, ironically, there was no Republican majority present at the moment.
He thus left it pending for the next day, when he hoped to force a vote on it.
When the next day—Wednesday, January 21—arrived, however, the Demo-
crats and their money Republican allies engaged in the disappearing quo-
rum act, thus preventing a vote on the cloture rule.21
On Thursday, January 22, Morton, after two days of reflection, in-
formed the Senate that he had reached a decision concerning Democrats
yielding the floor to Democrats indefinitely. Before Morton could finish
his sentence, however, the Democratic floor manager, Arthur P. Gorman,
sprang to his feet in a panic and angrily cut him off. Knowing full well what
the decision would be, Gorman began damning the Republicans, fuming
that "In August last we had two measures before this body. One was the
tariff bill. . . the other was the elections bill." If the latter was a great hu-
manitarian effort to bring purity to the democratic processes of the nation,
he argued, the other was merely a "measure which was intended to rob
four-fifths of the people of the United States for the benefit of the other
one-fifth." Yet, the Republicans took their precious time considering the
tariff bill and were now trying to force the Federal Elections Bill upon the
Democrats without the normal due process of unlimited debate. Morton
tried to call Gorman to order, but the impassioned Marylander refused to
stop speaking. Morton, a nonpartisan and a gentleman-statesman who be-
lieved the vice president's job was to preside with fairness toward both sides
rather than to show partiality toward his own party, did not force the issue
for the moment, but waited for Gorman to finish venting his frustrations.22
When Gorman finally ran out of epithets to hurl and curses to pro-
nounce upon the Republicans, he yielded the floor to fellow Democrat John
G. Carlisle of Kentucky, the former three-term Speaker of the House. At
that point, Morton finally stepped in, asserted his authority, stopped the
debate, and ruled in favor of Aldrich's point of order: Democrats could not
yield the floor to Democrats indefinitely, and this rule would apply for the
remainder of the Federal Elections Bill debate. Isham G. Harris appealed
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the decision, but the majority voted down the appeal and sustained Morton's
decision. Thus, Aldrich took the floor, read his resolution to limit debate,
and Morton authorized the Senate to vote upon it. Gorman begged that it
be tabled, Morton flatly refused, and the Senate voted. In the midst of the
roll call, Matthew Ransom, the seldom-heard senator from North Caro-
lina, rose to a point of order. He claimed that he had attempted to get the
chair to recognize him before the roll call began, but Morton had refused
to stop the vote already in progress. Then, strangely, George Frisbie Hoar
(of all people) came to Ransom's defense, corroborating that the senator
from North Carolina had indeed tried to get Morton's attention before the
roll call began. Morton capitulated, the voting stopped, and a new vote was
taken on whether Ransom should be heard before the voting commenced
on the Aldrich resolution. The majority voted down the question of hear-
ing Ransom, and the roll call on limiting debate resumed. As it proceeded,
Gorman rose to stop it again, asking that the resolution be put into writing.
Joseph N. Dolph rose to object, but Morton sustained Gorman's request,
noting that under Senate Rule XXI, Gorman had the prerogative of asking
for the resolution in writing. After a brief delay to put it in writing, the
Aldrich resolution limiting debate finally carried, thirty-six to thirty-two.23
Although it seemed that the Republicans would easily proceed with
the vote on the Federal Elections Bill at that point, the Democrats had not
completely run out of ways to obstruct its passage. Isham G. Harris rose to
argue that Aldrich had not given the required twenty-four hour notice be-
fore submitting his cloture resolution for a vote, and it was, therefore, null
and void. Technically, Harris was correct. Aldrich had informed the Senate
on Saturday of his intention to hold a vote on Tuesday, and it was now
Thursday. In practicality, of course, every senator knew the vote would in-
evitably come, but Harris objected that the vote upon the Aldrich resolu-
tion should not have been taken without a new twenty-four hour notice.
Morton sustained Harris's objection and ruled in favor of the minority,
saying that debate was in order for another twenty-four hours. The Repub-
lican vice president, based upon a seemingly insignificant technicality, ac-
tually annulled the vote on cloture, and the Democrats continued to
monopolize the floor.24
The opponents of the Federal Elections Bill had thus staved off defeat
for at least one more day, and this small victory gave them their second
wind. Francis "Frank" M. Cockrell of Missouri, a former Confederate gen-
eral who had been wounded in the futile defense of Atlanta in 1864, then
initiated a new phase of Democratic filibustering, aimed primarily at de-
stroying the credibility of the Aldrich resolution rather than dissecting the
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provisions of the Federal Elections Bill. Cockrell, whom political oppo-
nents accused of continuing subversive activities against the United States
long after the Civil War was over, stated that he and his five sons faithfully
read every issue of the popular periodical Youth's Companion. In one recent
issue, George Frisbie Hoar had written an article entitled "The Senate," in
which he explained that the business of the upper chamber was meant to
be slow and deliberate because thoroughly examining each bill before pas-
sage produced the best possible legislation. After reading Hoar's article,
Cockrell said he could not believe that the senator from Massachusetts would
support a resolution to limit debate in the Senate. He read aloud the whole
article, which he called a "mighty beacon of light, a cloud by day and a
pillar of fire by night to guide the footsteps of American youth," then
shouted, "Where is the Senator from Rhode Island [Aldrich]? I do not see
him in his seat. He ought to be in here to hear this. How has he dared to
come in here with this device for cutting off debate?" Aldrich soon arrived
and interrupted Cockrell to notify the Senate of his intention to call for
another vote on his resolution in exactly twenty-four hours. Hoar also rose
to defend himself against Cockrell's cutting satire, saying, "The American
people are not fools" who do not understand the difference between legiti-
mate debate and obstruction. This filibuster, he declared, was just as much
a "conspiracy" against "national authority" as was the "rebel congress that
met at Richmond." George Gray of Delaware chimed in, asking rhetori-
cally whether it was also a "conspiracy" against "national authority" when
Republicans filibustered.25
Cockrell resumed his tirade against alleged Republican hypocrisy,
noting that in his article Hoar had denigrated the House for passing bills
"not only without discussion and amendment, but even in ignorance of
what they contain." The Missourian then endeavored to document the
whole history of attempts to limit debate in the Senate. Attempts had been
made in 1841, 1850, 1862, 1873, and 1883, but they failed each time no
matter whether Democrats, Republicans, or Whigs controlled the Senate.
Cockrell concluded his remonstrance by turning his attention to the Fed-
eral Elections Bill. Evidently, said Cockrell, the proponents of the bill be-
lieved that America's federal system of government did not work and that
they must therefore replace it with a centralized system. "Oh humiliating
confession! What a spectacle to present to the republics of the world who
are imitating our example."26
George Gray of Delaware took up the fight after the Missourian had
grown weary. He decried the Aldrich resolution for its ambiguity. The reso-
lution allowed only a "reasonable time" for debate, after which cloture would
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be forced upon the Senate. George Edmunds of Vermont retorted that the
vice president or acting pro tem would have the authority to determine
what was "reasonable." No one, he said, could question the fairness of Levi
P. Morton in the chair. He also reminded Gray and the Democrats that, no
matter how partisan a senator tended to be when occupying his regular
seat in the Senate, he invariably ceased to be partisan when he took the pro
tern's chair. He named, for example, Isham G. Harris, who was normally as
rabidly partisan as any Democrat, but he suddenly transformed into a fair-
minded statesman when he served as pro tem. Edmunds could have named
himself with equal accuracy and effect. Gray, impervious to the argument,
continued, recounting what was likely an anecdotal story from his youth in
Delaware. "A poor drunken negro," he said, had allegedly stolen two chick-
ens. His trial was accorded all the seriousness of a much graver crime, com-
plete with a superior court judge, a state prosecutor, twelve petit jurors,
and twenty-four grand jurors. The young Gray asked an older, wiser gentle-
man in the audience why the state should waste such time and money on a
petty criminal like this, thinking that a lowly Justice of the Peace should
have simply sent the man to the "whipping post" and let him go. The old
man clutched his arm and replied, "My young friend . . . it is the price we
pay for our liberties." Gray explained that hearing endless debate upon
issues that one party thinks trivial was analogous to holding a jury trial for
petty larceny. It was simply the price to be paid to ensure the liberties of the
American people. He reasoned that the Aldrich resolution should also be
given careful consideration, but only after the conclusion of the Federal
Elections Bill debate. He believed that it should, in fact, be postponed until
the beginning of the Fifty-second Congress.27
Nelson Aldrich himself disagreed, of course, and on Saturday, Janu-
ary 24, just as he promised, he again called for a vote on his cloture resolu-
tion. He amended it, however, to say that debate should be limited to thirty
minutes per senator. When the Democrats and Silverites scorned that no-
tion, a heretofore unheard senator, Wilbur F. Sanders, who would have the
honor of representing the newly admitted state of Montana for only three
years, took the floor. In a speech that lasted much longer than the proposed
thirty-minute time limit, he rejected the ideology of his western Silverite col-
leagues on humanitarian issues. "The time to do right is here and now.... It
is never inopportune to do justice," he stated. Blacks had been preparing
themselves for twenty-five years for the duties of American citizenship, he
boldly declared, and "It is twenty-five years more than we require for the
most ignorant immigrant that comes to our land to instruct himself in the
mysteries of democratic government, wholly new to him, and, in some in-
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stances, petrified in a language of which he is entirely ignorant." The Fed-
eral Elections Bill, he asserted, was not some exotic Republican experiment,
but merely a commitment to enforce the law of the land as already written
into the Constitution. "If we are going to abandon law, if every man is to be
a law unto himself, anarchy is already here."28
John Tyler Morgan, in what turned out to be the last speech ever made
on the Federal Elections Bill, provided the Democratic response to Sanders's
humanitarian appeal. He remarked that the Montanan's speech was like
dumping "a bucket of cold water" on the Aldrich resolution because it lasted
about two-and-a-half hours. He then berated Aldrich, a representative of the
smallest state in the Union, for trying to silence the representatives of so many
large, populous states. Morgan held the floor for the remainder of the day
and into Monday, January 26, adding nothing substantive to the debate.29
As the senator from Alabama droned on tediously, Edmund O. Wolcott
of Colorado noticed that the Democrats and Silverites possessed a major-
ity at that instant. Hoping to capitalize on this rare opportunity to drop the
Federal Elections Bill, he abruptly interrupted Morgan with a motion to
consider an apportionment bill. The supporters of the Federal Elections
Bill objected, of course, but they were outnumbered. When the vote was
taken, the Democrats and Silverites carried the motion 35 to 34. With only
four weeks remaining in the second session of the Fifty-first Congress and
with other legislation awaiting consideration, the sponsors of the Federal
Elections Bill never again got the opportunity to resume debate on the bill.
Nor did Nelson Aldrich attempt to force his cloture resolution again. The
reformers simply gave up and (apparently) accepted their defeat. Just that
quickly, the months of work that had gone into finding a solution to the
race problem had come to nought. Henry Blair, alone among the reform-
ers, tried to be optimistic about the gloomy situation, saying, "Let the Re-
publican party pass the education bill and all will be well."30 That, of course,
was not to be. Thus ended, anticlimactically, one of the most bitter struggles
in the history of Congress.
The defeat of the Federal Elections Bill marked a turning point in
American history. It represented the Republican Party's final abandonment
of the humanitarian ideals of Reconstruction. That meant, in effect, that it
also marked the exact point in time that the federal government abandoned
the cause of finding a solution to the South's race problem and of provid-
ing some means to uplift the African American race. Not until the advent
of the civil rights movement more than a half-century later would African
Americans be able to count on the federal government to protect their rights.
Although the plan of supervising congressional elections had never proven
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to be an effective solution to the problem of ballot box fraud or voter in-
timidation, it was arguably better than doing nothing. History shows con-
clusively the sad results of the do-nothing policy. Therefore, it seems sensible
to conclude that the reformers' idea was worthy of all the attention it re-
ceived both at the time and since then in the history books. Yet, the histo-
rian must give due consideration to the opposition's arguments against the
Federal Elections Bill—some of which were valid, most of which were com-
pelling, and all of which were at least provocative—before reaching any
conclusions about the likely efficacy of the reformers' plan. By far the most
important criticism of the bill was that it would have made life even more
difficult for blacks in the South than it already was, because it would have
renewed the violence and bloodshed of the closing days of Reconstruction,
when blacks paid dearly for their attempts to exercise the franchise. It is
difficult for the historian to argue with that point. The only deterrent to
such a backlash would have been for the federal government to authorize
another military occupation of the South. The historian must ask, would
any Republican administration, even with a majority in both chambers of
Congress, realistically be prepared to enforce the law if necessary through
another military occupation of the South? Considering the fact that nei-
ther Ulysses S. Grant nor Rutherford B. Hayes had been prepared to do so
before, and keeping in mind that the American public in general would
have recoiled in horror at such an action, the answer is, obviously not.
Whether they should have been prepared to do so is another question alto-
gether, and one for posterity to debate, but one that lies beyond the pale of
this study.
If the outcome of the Federal Elections Bill debate seems a tragedy,
the Republican Party's performance in the great drama was nothing short
of a comedy of errors. Levi P. Morton's even-handedness as the moderator
of the debate could be construed as either a lack of leadership or a traitor-
ous act. The contemporary Republican press characterized his action in
both ways. Either way, Morton never found a warm spot in the hearts of
Republican Party leaders thereafter, and, in fact, his betrayal/dereliction of
duty became the death knell of his career in politics.31 More important
than Morton's neutrality, however, was the internecine squabbling between
the money faction of the party and the reformers. The historian must ask,
why did the western Silverites divorce themselves from the reformers and
side with the Democrats in opposing the Federal Elections Bill? This ques-
tion has been answered wrongly in some previous historical studies, and it
has been completely ignored in others. It, therefore, deserves serious con-
sideration and analysis, which the following chapter provides.
Chapter 8
SILVER, SECTIONALISM, SIOUX INDIANS,
AND SlNOPHOBIA
Why Many Westerners Opposed the
Federal Elections Bill
It had been the settled policy of this Government and this country before
the war never to embrace in manhood suffrage the Indian, the Chinaman,
nor the negro. And the first two are still excluded from the ballot.
—Senator Alfred Colquitt of Georgia
It is well enough for our friends on the Pacific coast to stand here and ap-
peal to us to help them to protect American civilization, American homes,
and American firesides from the Chinese. Do they think there is no civili-
zation, that there are no homes, and no firesides in the South?
—Senator George Vest of Missouri
The Senate debated the Federal Elections Bill for fifty-six days, thirty-three
of which the filibuster consumed. Never had the nation witnessed a filibus-
ter of this magnitude, and only rarely would it see such again. While the
nation marveled at the spectacle, Americans breathed a collective sigh of
relief when the battle finally ended. Some partisan Republican newspapers
admitted defeat graciously and called for Congress to move on. As one put
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it, "Give us the shipping bills, the appropriations bills, the apportionment
bill, the copyright bill—give us business, not partisanship. That is what the
people want." Other partisan Republican papers expressed bitterness, and
most that did so ignored the consequences of the defeat as touching black
America, focusing instead on the effects of the failure for the GOP. Many
believed that the bill had served as a litmus test of true republicanism and
that the Silverites had proved themselves traitors. The influential New York
Tribune went further than any other Republican organ in denouncing the
western senators' defection. It harped upon allegations of a quid pro quo
between Democrats and Silverites, whereby the former would support leg-
islation increasing the coinage of silver if the latter would help defeat the
Federal Elections Bill.1 Tribune readers, including other newspaper editors,
picked up on that conspiracy theory and helped perpetuate it. One Ohioan,
for instance, lamented to John Sherman that the West had sold the black
man to his enemies "for thirty pieces of silver, or maybe they got more."2
The western senators clearly betrayed the trust of African Americans,
but to assume that a silver conspiracy lay behind this betrayal is neither
scholarly nor judicious. There is no evidence to support the allegations of
any corrupt bargain between Democrats and Silverites involving silver. The
bill's sponsors gave no indication that they believed in a conspiracy be-
tween the Silverites and the Democrats, although they certainly blamed
both groups individually for their action. But while the Democratic resis-
tance was to be expected, the Silverite defection came as a stunning blow.
"Think of it—," said John Coit Spooner, "Nevada . . . barely a respectable
county—furnishes two senators to betray the Republican Party and the
rights of citizenship" for African Americans. This betrayal so damaged
Spooner's faith in the American political system that he stepped down at
the end of his term and took a six-year hiatus.3
Despite the lack of supporting evidence, the quid pro quo silver theory
continues to find its way into history books that mention the Federal Elec-
tions Bill. Perhaps historians have been prone to accept that explanation
because it is easier than probing for other possible causes of the westerners'
actions. This would be especially true of those scholars who do not con-
sider the issue central to their studies, which comprises most of those who
have written about it. Certainly, historians who focus on the South's race
problem are often inadvertently myopic, missing the panoramic view that
shows the issues affecting the West.4
It is easy to see the mining interests of the western states as a motiva-
tion for Colorado's and Nevada's four senators to push for silver legisla-
tion. Nevada had long been the major producer of silver in the nation, and,
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in 1889, miners struck a huge new vein in Colorado. It is also easy to over-
look the fact that most southern Democratic senators were always strongly
in favor of the increased coinage of silver. Indeed, most southern Demo-
crats were lifelong bimetallists who had always hated the "Crime of '73"
which did away with silver coinage. They strongly supported the Bland Sil-
ver Coinage Bill of 1876 that brought silver back into usage, and they vehe-
mently opposed the Allison Amendment to that bill, which severely limited
the amount of silver to be coined. They considered the Bland-Allison Act
better than nothing, but, throughout the 1880s, they continued to push for
the unlimited coinage of silver. In the summer of 1890, they voted for the
Sherman Silver Purchase Act, which increased the amount of silver the fed-
eral government would coin. The increase, however, was not nearly enough
to satisfy most southern Democrats. Included among these outspoken pro-
ponents of silver were J. Z. George of Mississippi, who wrote an extensive
treatise on free silver in 1893, and John Tyler Morgan of Alabama, who
would have waged a campaign against the Sherman Act were it not for sav-
ing his energy to fight the battles over the Butler bill and the Federal Elec-
tions Bill.5
The South and the West alike had been suffering from economic de-
flation in the late 1880s, and both called for inflation to stimulate the
economy and relieve the suffering farmers. Although some proponents of
inflation advocated printing greenbacks, the method of choice for most
was restoring the coinage of silver at the pre-1873 ratio of sixteen-to-one.
Interestingly, despite the mining interests of the West, southerners called
for this measure just as vociferously as did westerners.6 It is clear, therefore,
that western Republicans could not hope to gain the southern Democrats'
support for their pet silver legislation, because they already had it and, in
fact, had always had it. This fact alone takes all of the credibility out of the
quid pro quo silver theory.7 But it still leaves unanswered the question of
why the westerners opposed the Federal Elections Bill. It certainly was not
because they wanted to get the bill out of the way as soon as possible, whether
by passing it or defeating it, in order to push their economic agenda for-
ward. If such had been the case, they would not have consistently opposed
the Aldrich resolution for cloture.8 Why would they oppose cloture unless
they were honestly following the dictates of their consciences or constitu-
encies in believing, like the eastern money Republicans, that the bill was
bad legislation or the wrong policy for the federal government to pursue at
that time? At least five Senate Republicans, including three westerners, went
on record as opposing the Federal Elections Bill between the time party
leaders first conceived the idea in the campaign of 1888 and the time the
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Free Silver and the Force Bill. "You beat my dog, and I'll beat yours!" (Puck, 1890.)
It was popularly believed at the time that some western senators, such as William
M. Stewart (R-Nevada) shown here, opposed the Federal Elections Bill simply to
spite the GOP leadership (represented here by Benjamin Harrison) who opposed
the coinage of silver.
Fifty-first Congress convened, which proves that there were reasons to dis-
like the measure that had nothing to do with silver.9
Henry M. Teller of Colorado, whom nobody previously questioned
as being a humanitarian, claimed to have opposed the Federal Elections
Bill because he truly believed it would not have solved the South's race prob-
lem but would have instead exacerbated it, an opinion that reflected the
views of his constituency. He emphatically denied that his objection was
based upon any deal with southerners. Moreover, despite the Sherman Sil-
ver Purchase Act, which he voted for in the first session, he still wanted the
Senate to reconsider passing a free silver bill before the second session ex-
pired. According to a Colorado newspaper, Teller would have opposed any
bill the Senate chose to debate near the end of the session that prevented
consideration of a free silver bill. He was clearly disappointed with his party
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in 1890-1891 for not supporting free silver, and his disillusionment with
the GOP only increased thereafter. He subsequently became an indepen-
dent Silver Republican in 1896 (which was tantamount to being a Populist)
and a Democrat in 1903.10
William M. Stewart of Nevada said the same but gave different rea-
sons for his opposition. He still considered himself "a friend of the colored
man" in 1891, just as he proved to be when he drafted the Fifteenth Amend-
ment in 1869. But he claimed that he now knew from experience that such
a bill would cause the white men of the South to make "war upon the de-
fenseless race." It was in the best interest of African Americans, therefore,
not to pass the measure. He also believed the bill "would subvert the Gov-
ernment of the United States and substitute military dictation for civil au-
thority in the elections in the several States." Finally, he objected to the fact
that so many of his colleagues supported the bill—undoubtedly the most
important legislation of its kind since Reconstruction—without having read
it. As he explained, it was "a long bill, sweeping in its provisions, and suffi-
ciently ambiguous to puzzle ordinary readers. I found by my conversations
with Republican Senators that very few of them possessed any real knowl-
edge of the provisions of the bill."11
The explanation that each western senator voted his conscience ap-
pears more than a little plausible when one considers that even among the
senators representing the Great Plains states—which typically supported
radical, partisan Republican legislation—there was barely lukewarm sup-
port for the Federal Elections Bill. William Boyd Allison of Iowa, who had
been a staunch Radical during Reconstruction, uncharacteristically gave
no verbal or moral support to the bill or its sponsors, although he voted
quietly for the Aldrich resolution. His silence was deafening to the reform-
ers who sponsored the bill. Likewise, Preston B. Plumb, who represented
Kansas, a state that was about to become the hotbed of Populism, never
favored the bill but felt torn between following the party leadership and his
conscience. Even though he voted with the humanitarians on the Aldrich
resolution, he and Hoar had a behind-the-scenes argument over his lack of
vocal support, which led to the permanent termination of their long friend-
ship. Plumb's main concern in 1890 was the suffering farmers of his state,
who could not appreciate the attention being given to the Soufh's race prob-
lem at the time, despite the fact that many of them were Jayhawkers or sons
of Jayhawkers. In the midst of the Federal Elections Bill debate, he, appar-
ently working independent of Stewart and the Silverites, proposed a free
silver bill of his own. Plumb's fear of publicly supporting the elections bill
turned out to be well-founded, for his colleague, John J. Ingalls, who was
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the lone vocal supporter of the bill among Great Plains senators, incurred
the wrath of his constituents for his preoccupation with the issue while
Kansas farmers were starving. Indeed, the Kansas legislature turned Ingalls
out of office before the year was out. (Upon Ingalls's ouster, one newspa-
per, alluding to Ingalls's penchant for waving the bloody shirt, reported
that the "people of Kansas decided to fill up the bloody chasm" by throw-
ing "John J. Ingalls into it.") Republican William D. Washburn of Minne-
sota, who faced challenges from soon-to-be Populist leader Ignatius
Donnelly in 1890, was quite aware of his agrarian constituency's concerns,
and he knew that the black voting rights issue was not one of them at the
time. He thus voted with the Democrats to table the Federal Elections Bill
in January 1891 so that the Senate could consider pressing economic busi-
ness before the session expired in March.12 The advent of Populism was
therefore a major reason for the western Republican defection from the
party line on the issue of electoral reform in and after 1890.
The Populist movement arose precisely because of the mutual inter-
ests of the South and West—interests that transcended party lines. The two
regions made strange bedfellows in that, until the end of the 1880s, the
West had been almost as solidly Republican as the South was Democratic.
By 1890, however, many westerners had come to feel that the GOP leaders
served the interests of the northeastern financial establishment to the ne-
glect of the common man in America. It thus appeared to be in the best
interest of some westerners to cross party lines and form an alliance with
the other region of the country also suffering from economic hard times.
This "new sectionalism," as one contemporary writer called it, pitted the
South and West against the Northeast (which was defined as New England,
the Middle Atlantic states, and the Great Lakes states, with its hub being at
Wall Street in New York City). The Northeast contained sixteen states with
a population of some thirty million, whose primary source of revenue
sprang from industry and commerce, while the South and West contained
twenty-eight states with a population of about thirty-two million, whose
main economic base lay in agriculture.13
The "new" sectionalism that caused such friction in the last decade of
the nineteenth century was not really all that new. It represented the con-
tinuation of a long-running ideological feud between rural agrarianism
and urban industrialism that had begun fully a century before under the
aegis of Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton. This dichotomy had
always loosely followed geographic lines, pitting the Northeast against the
South and the ever-shifting West. The rift had only widened over time be-
cause of the achievement of Manifest Destiny in 1848 and the explosive
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settlement of the Trans-Mississippi frontier resulting from the Homestead
Act of 1862 and the railroad boom thereafter. By 1890, in the Populists'
estimation, the settled and developed areas of the West combined with the
South to produce 80 percent of the nation's natural resources, while 90
percent of the corporations that developed those resources were headquar-
tered in the Northeast. As the Populists saw it, the tremendous growth of
northeastern corporations, banks, insurance companies, and railroads
caused a steady stream of capital to flow out of the South and West to the
Northeast.14 Many early historians of Populism agreed with this assessment,
saying the Northeast held the South and West in a state of vassalage like
that of the old European feudal system. Some even described the Northeast's
control of the rest of the nation as a type of domestic economic imperial-
ism. Although recent scholarship has found such assertions suspect, whether
true or not, that perception among Populists at the time certainly muddied
the political waters in and after 1890.15
Exacerbating this sectional tension was the tariff issue, which had long
been one of the main points of contention between the opposing ideolo-
gies of the Northeast and the South and West. By 1890, the tariff had be-
come a particularly sore subject because northeastern congressmen pushed
the McKinley Tariff—the highest tariff in American history—through Con-
gress over the objections of most southerners and many westerners. More-
over, opponents of the high tariff feared that northeastern manufacturing
interests were intent on passing even higher tariffs in the future. While some
southerners and westerners advocated a free-trade policy, others did not
oppose the tariff altogether. They merely called for it to be set reasonably
low. But all agreed that the Republican Party, following the lead of the old
Federalist and Whig Parties, had taken ridiculous liberties in raising the
tariff higher and higher since the Civil War. The highest rate in the original
tariff law of 1789 was a mere 8.5 percent on certain enumerated items.
Now, in 1891, the highest rate stood at 50 percent, which translated (in the
minds of antiprotectionists) into a back-breaking cost-of-living increase
on two-thirds of the American people to benefit the other one-third. Con-
gressmen representing many agrarian districts—even districts within the
Northeast—understandably wanted no part in levying such a high and di-
visive tax as the McKinley Tariff on the nation.16
Further intensifying the sectional tension was the disparity in popu-
lation between the three sections, which assured that the Northeast would
always hold a larger share of seats in the House of Representatives than the
South or the West held. Only by combining their voting strength, therefore,
could southerners and westerners hope to achieve a controlling interest in
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Congress. The very threat of such a combination caused some northeasterners
to complain that both regions were overrepresented in Congress. After the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments abolished the three-fifths compro-
mise, the South, which had recently been in arms against the United States,
actually gained representation in Congress. By 1890, the former Confederate
states boasted thirty more seats than they had held in 1860, while New En-
gland lost one, despite a massive increase in immigration to the Northeast
during that same period of time. Northeastern Republican leaders held over
from Reconstruction resented this apportionment because they had designed
the Fourteenth Amendment especially to benefit African Americans, but white
southern Democrats disfranchised black voters and used the Amendment to
bolster their own numbers.17 To many northeasterners, this seemed to nullify
their victory in the Civil War because it meant, in effect, that the votes of
Confederate veterans were worth more than those of Union veterans. Like-
wise, northeastern critics resented the sparsely populated West's fast-increas-
ing and disproportionate representation in the Senate. Indeed, they decried
the fact that the six New England states, with a population of nearly five
million, had only twelve senators in 1891, while the nine Pacific and Rocky
Mountain states had a combined population of less than three million but
had eighteen senators.18
Yet, even with their disparate representation in the upper chamber
during the Fifty-first Congress, western senators were unable to pass legis-
lation that would relieve the suffering of their farmers because the North-
east still controlled the House. Those westerners in the process of becoming
Populists thus began to see themselves as victims and to feel compelled to
assume a posture of self-defense in dealing with the Northeast, just as
southerners had done for decades.19 Westerners in general began to under-
stand the long-standing southern complaint that northeastern Republi-
cans were arrogant, autocratic, overbearing, and guilty of selective
compassion toward less fortunate peoples. Indeed, while northeastern Re-
publicans often expressed compassion for black southerners, they rarely
did so for white western farmers. For instance, when one agrarian con-
gressman opposed the McKinley Tariff in the House on the basis that the
yeoman farmer, not the factory owner, needed relief, Congressman Henry
Cabot Lodge of Boston responded callously that there were "other people
in this country besides farmers." Such an attitude sounded much the same
to American farmers as Marie Antoinette saying (allegedly) "let them eat
cake" on the eve of the French Revolution. It is not surprising, therefore,
that the so-called Populist revolt followed on the heels of the very Con-
gress that passed the McKinley Tariff, mainly to benefit northeastern
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corporations, while passing almost no legislation for the relief of suffering
farmers.20
Ironically, the reinvigorated West-South alliance of the Populist era
did not emerge because the old North-South sectional strife that created
the post-Civil War bloody-shirt mentality had waned. In fact, it arose pre-
cisely at the same time as the most intense manifestation of the old North-
South sectionalism since Reconstruction—during the Federal Elections Bill
debate. Consequently, the old sectionalism and the new competed for the
hearts and minds of westerners in 1890-1891. Westerners who embraced
the new sectionalism were likely to become Populists, while those who clung
to the old were likely to remain in the Republican fold. But, either way, the
Populist revolt had such a tremendous impact upon not only the West but
the whole nation that it helped bring the long-overdue "farewell to the
bloody shirt." The defection of western Republicans from the party line on
the Federal Elections Bill marked the beginning of the end of the old Civil
War-era sectionalism.21
Besides the economic interests that united the South and West, other
equally important common ground could be found between the two re-
gions. Racial issues helped solidify the burgeoning alliance of white
southerners and westerners around 1890. Like the South, the West was also
burdened with racial problems. Many white westerners saw Native Ameri-
cans, Chinese immigrants, and black migrants as threats to their desired
way of life. Whereas the first two racial groups constituted long-standing
problems for the West, black migrants represented a relatively new chal-
lenge. The migration of black southerners to the West that had begun soon
after Reconstruction showed no signs of ending anytime soon. It seemed,
in fact, that black migration would almost surely increase in the 1890s,
especially in the absence of some new legislation such as the Butler Emi-
gration Bill to help discontented black southerners leave the United States
altogether. The idea of setting aside territory in the West for African Ameri-
cans was highly unfavorable to the average white westerner. At a time when
most white westerners wanted to rid their region of the presence of the
Indian "savages" and the Chinese (not to mention the thousands of Mor-
mons who had settled the Rocky Mountain West), adding a third minority
race to the western milieu seemed out of the question.22 A few blacks in the
West seemed no cause for alarm, but as Colorado Governor John Evans put
it, a "hoard" of them would be an unwelcome addition to his state.23
The West clearly had its own racial problems to consider at the very
time that the Northeast was again becoming absorbed with the South's race
problem. The idea of northeastern Republicans forcing their racial views
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on other sections of the country struck fear in the hearts of white
southerners, but it also seemed abhorrent to the average white westerner.24
If the northeasterners would pass a bill enforcing the civil rights of black
southerners, which would effectively end the white man's hegemony in sev-
eral states, might they not someday launch a crusade to extend the rights of
citizenship with all its privileges to the Indians and Chinese of the West?
Such a scenario was not outside the realm of possibility. Southern con-
gressmen recognized this western fear and aversion and used it to their
advantage. By voting with the West on issues that would keep white civili-
zation there safe from the threat of Indians and Chinese, they could antici-
pate that western congressmen would do the same for them on matters of
importance to white southerners. Here, then, was an ulterior motive for
western Republican senators to vote against the Federal Elections Bill. Al-
though it certainly was not their primary motivation in opposing the con-
troversial measure, it was the closest thing to a quid pro quo deal that the
South and the West ever made.25
It is quite interesting that the western Indian problem came to the
fore in a major, tragic way in December 1890—the very time that the U.S.
Senate began debating the Federal Elections Bill. The problem had deep
roots, of course, in early American history, but the policies of the Republi-
can administration of President Benjamin Harrison beginning in 1889 in-
tensified it. Working with both the Fiftieth and Fifty-first Congresses, the
Harrison administration reclaimed most of the Indian Territory of Okla-
homa and forged a policy of intolerance toward Native Americans not seen
since Andrew lackson's presidency (1828-1836), when the removal of the
eastern tribes was completed with the infamous "Trail of Tears." Harrison's
Indian policy, shaped largely by Massachusetts Senator Henry L. Dawes
who headed the Committee on Indian Affairs, drew sharp criticism from a
vocal minority of Americans, including, ironically, some Democrats and
southerners.26
The most intense opposition, however, came, not surprisingly, from
Native Americans themselves. Tribes situated on Great Plains reservations—
mainly the Sioux under the leadership of Sitting Bull—beseeched federal
lawmakers to provide relief for their suffering. They, like their white neigh-
bors, were experiencing one of the worst droughts in the nation's history,
were not being helped much by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, were literally
starving to death, and were not allowed to live nomadically or hunt wild
game as was their custom. When the Native Americans' appeals went un-
answered, they turned to the only means of help left to them. They called
on the Great Spirit in the Ghost Dance, a religious ritual that had recently
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started in Nevada and that had spread throughout the West in 1890. Al-
though the Sioux harmed no one with their appeals to the Great Spirit,
federal policy makers feared that the Ghost Dance would incite an Indian
uprising. As a result, in a senseless act of aggression, an agent of the U.S.
Army killed Sitting Bull, who had recently starred in Buffalo Bill's Wild
West Show but whom government officials considered an ever-recalcitrant
tribal leader. Sitting Bull's death prompted one western newspaper to re-
port gleefully that now Sitting Bull had finally been transformed into a
"good Indian—[because] dead Indians are always good."27 Two weeks later,
a misunderstanding of the nature of the Ghost Dance and of Indian man-
nerisms ultimately led the Army to massacre a whole village of Sioux at
Wounded Knee, South Dakota. At least 150 Indians died there, and prob-
ably closer to three hundred.28
This tragic episode occurred on December 29,1890, precisely the same
time that the battle over the Federal Elections Bill was reaching the height
of its intensity more than a thousand miles away in the U. S. Senate in Wash-
ington, D.C. Newspapers all over the country carried stories of the unstable
western Indian situation throughout the month of December, leading up
to the atrocity at Wounded Knee. Thereafter, the papers blared headlines of
the massacre right beside the latest updates on the ongoing Federal Elec-
tions Bill filibuster. It is clear, therefore, that the western race problem was
fresh on every senator's mind as the upper chamber debated a potential
solution to the southern race problem. Democrats, particularly southern
ones, relished every chance to point out the Republican Party's less-than-
sterling record on Indian affairs and to note inexplicable differences in how
the party chose to deal with Indians and blacks. The federal government
under GOP control had made blacks citizens of the United States collec-
tively with no strings attached, but Indians were only allowed to become
citizens individually after dissolving their tribal relations and taking land
in severalty. Meanwhile, the Bureau of Indian Affairs had also spent an av-
erage of $6 million annually training the nation's 250,000 Indians (who
were not citizens) in the ways of the white man's civilization, but, with the
defeat of the Blair Education Bill in 1890, it now refused to educate the
nation's eight million blacks (who were citizens). Likewise, it had spent an
untold sum of money moving Indians from place to place against their
will, but it refused to appropriate funds for blacks to emigrate voluntarily
to locations of their own choosing. Finally, while it had liberated blacks
from slavery and allowed them to roam the country freely, it had corralled
Indians onto reservations and severely restricted their freedoms.29
Such contrasting racial policies baffled many southern congressmen,
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Uncle Sam's Double Standard. Consistency? (Puck, 1891.) The convergence of the
Wounded Knee Massacre with the U.S. Senate's deliberation upon the Federal Elec-
tions Bill in December 1890 suddenly and dramatically thrust the issue of the
federal government's traditional double standard on racial issues into the national
media spotlight.
or so they claimed. Senator Matthew Butler of South Carolina called them
"a curious commentary on common sense, to say nothing of humanity."30
Congressman Thomas Hooker of Mississippi, who had a reputation as a
racist in regard to black southerners, asked rhetorically of the Republican
Indian policy, "is it not most unjust?" Senators Wilkinson Call of Florida,
J. Z. George of Mississippi, Arthur P. Gorman of Maryland, James K. Jones
of Arkansas, and George Vest of Missouri all agreed. Other prominent
southerners, including educator and writer J. L. M. Curry of Virginia and
Georgia's former U.S. Senator Joseph E. Brown, also spoke out against the
Republican Indian policy. Although many such southerners seemed super-
ficially to be concerned for the welfare of the Indians, they undoubtedly
hoped that by pointing out the errors of the Republicans in handling In-
dian affairs, they would give the GOP leaders second thoughts about their
renewed activist policy toward southern blacks. Thus, they favored not a
reversal of the Republican Indian policy, which would have given Indians
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the same civil rights that blacks had been granted in the Reconstruction
amendments, but a reversal of the Republican policy toward blacks, which
would have reduced them to the level of the Indians.31
Westerners, realizing that southern concern for the welfare of the In-
dians was largely a political ploy, did not feel threatened by the tactic. Hu-
manitarian appeals to help Native Americans did not faze most western
congressmen, no matter who made the appeals. Indeed, they felt no re-
morse about the removal of Indians from regions that the white man wanted
for his own settlement to reservations in remote, undesirable areas. They
believed that anyone who felt ashamed of the U. S. government's treatment
of the Indians, either currently or historically, was deluded with false no-
tions of that primitive race's true character. As California Representative
William Vandever remarked, "no matter what ideas may have taken pos-
session of the public mind by reason of this fancy sketch of Helen Hunt
Jackson [author of A Century of Dishonor, 1881] a few years ago . . . a man
who goes . . . and sees the Mission Indians as they are will lose his sympathy
for them."32
The personal experiences of various western members of Congress in
dealing with Indians illustrate Vandever's assertion. Henry M. Teller, for
instance, a humanitarian from New York who moved to Colorado in the
1860s, had felt very sympathetic toward Indians before going west. Once he
actually encountered Indians who had not been acculturated into white
society, however, his views changed immediately, radically, and irreversibly.
"We who have seen live Indians," he said, "know that, as a whole, they are a
filthy, lazy, treacherous, [and] revengeful race of vagabonds."33 Accordingly,
he did not believe the federal policy toward the Indians was or ever had
been too severe, observing that "in the history of the treatment of aborigi-
nes anywhere in the world there has been no such lavish expenditure of
money by any nation as we have expended for the Indians it is not true
that we have treated them improperly." Even if they had been mistreated,
said Teller, "it is in harmony with Divine purpose . . . the world was made
not for savages but for civilized men." Joseph N. Dolph, the firebrand from
Oregon who expressed such concern for the welfare of black southerners
during the Federal Elections Bill debate, concurred.34
Despite the fact that Indian problems in the West crested in 1890 and
that the Billion Dollar Congress spent a great deal of time debating Indian
affairs, Chinese immigration represented the great racial issue of the future
in the West. Whereas the number of Indians was declining, the Chinese
population in America was growing, and it seemed destined to overtake
the fast-dwindling Indian population in the near future. Westerners thus
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saw the Indian problem as a passing concern that would soon be alleviated,
while they believed that Chinese immigration would be their region's next
big race problem. Astute southerners realized that sinophobia gripped some
parts of the West with a tenacity comparable to that with which negrophobia
gripped the South, and they capitalized on that fact, forging an alliance
with westerners to ensure white rule in both sections of the country.35
The Chinese had become a notably large immigrant group after the
California Gold Rush of 1849. Overpopulation, drought, famine, and floods
contributed to their desire to emigrate from China. Anti-Chinese senti-
ment appeared on the Pacific coast of the United States with the arrival of
the first large wave of Chinese immigrants in the 1850s. As the railroad and
mining industries grew in the West, the number of Chinese "Coolies" in-
creased to the extent that some westerners wanted to stop their immigra-
tion as early as the 1860s. By the 1880s, calls for their exclusion had reached
a fever pitch, and in 1882, the Chinese Exclusion Bill passed Congress, and
Republican president Chester A. Arthur signed it into law. The bill disal-
lowed Chinese immigration only temporarily, not permanently, which many
westerners thought inadequate. Some wanted not merely a permanent ex-
clusion policy but also a forced removal policy.36
By the time the Fifty-first Congress convened, anti-Chinese sentiment
in the West had reached its zenith. California Representative Thomas
Jefferson Clunie introduced a bill for the permanent exclusion of the "Mon-
golian invaders," arguing that "There is no room in this country for any
race we cannot mix with and dwell with in harmony." Fellow Californian
William R. Morrow, who demonstrated his humanitarianism by helping to
establish the American Red Cross, nonetheless found no place for the Chi-
nese in America. He noted that in the legislation Congress passed in the
1880s restricting Chinese immigration, there was only"one purpose in view
.. . to execute the will of the people of the United States." By 1890, however,
the will of the people had changed, he explained, such that only the "per-
manent and absolute exclusion of all classes of Chinese" would now suf-
fice.37 The national Zeitgeist of race relations was thus transforming rapidly.
Some white westerners objected to the Chinese presence in America
because it provided a labor supply that undercut the standard rates paid to
white workers. Others resented the Chinese for refusing to assimilate into
American society or to adopt white American culture. The Chinese did not
want to become citizens of the United States, detractors argued; they merely
wanted to exploit the American job market and then send their earnings
back home to China. Although such claims were in many cases accurate, at
the bottom of the western sinophobia was, of course, racial stereotyping.
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Unlike the stereotyping of America's other large minority groups, however,
there was no consensus on what the characteristics of the Chinese were
supposed to be. Some observers considered them dumb, cowardly, dirty,
and dishonest, as the following story told by California Congressman Clunie,
a San Francisco resident, indicates:
I once in the course of my profession as a lawyer had a Chinaman
call on me, and, as I understood him, ask how much I would
charge to defend a Chinaman accused of murder. I told him
$1,000 was my fee. He went away, returning after several days
with a sack of silver. He said, "I killee my man; here is your
money." I was shocked. I said, "You killed him? Then you should
hang." He said, "I kill him. How many men you likee me get say
I no killee him?" This but illustrates their regard for truth.38
Conversely, others were equally convinced that the Chinese were su-
perior to whites in intelligence, thrift, enterprise, and industry, which threat-
ened white civilization in the West in a different way. One newspaper claimed
exuberantly that a "Chinaman has yet to be found who can not learn his
English alphabet in one day and be ready . . . to read [English] words" the
next day!39 William Stewart of Nevada agreed, claiming that the Chinese
propensity for hard work and fast learning would "ruin our civilization."40
He concluded that "competition with them is impossible.... It is impos-
sible for our race to labor as incessantly as they do . . . their industry so far
surpasses ours that wherever they come, we must [leave]."41
Although sinophobia was almost exclusively a western phenomenon,
until 1890 it had been the responsibility of eastern politicians to pass legis-
lation restricting Chinese immigration, because so few western states ex-
isted before then. Northeastern Republicans had a mixed record on the
issue, and many seemed unable to make up their minds, changing their
views over time. Benjamin Harrison, before becoming president, incurred
the wrath of western congressmen by twice voting in the Senate against
Chinese exclusion. On the campaign trail in 1888, however, he changed his
position and endorsed exclusion. Interestingly, in the same breath that he
used to advocate a hard-line policy toward the unwanted Asian immigrants,
he proclaimed his support for black voting rights in the South.42 John
Sherman likewise changed his position on Chinese exclusion, voting in 1864
to allow Chinese immigration and voting against it thereafter. In 1890, in
an apologetic explanation, he said that the year 1864 had been the apex of
the Civil War, a time when the "whole country was denuded of labor." As a
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war measure only, therefore, had he welcomed the Asian workers, whom he
since found repulsive as a class of laborers: "Any class of people who were
so low and so lacking in manhood as to barter away their freedom should
not be permitted to be brought into this country, to compete with our la-
borers who were struggling to elevate themselves in the arts of manhood."
He referred to the fact that many Chinese immigrants signed contracts with
Chinese bosses, in which they became indentured servants in America—a
servile working class that Sherman likened to "mere serfs."43
Many other prominent northeastern Republicans who had reputa-
tions as humanitarians never changed their views on Chinese exclusion,
but they also never managed a consensus with one another on the issue.
William M. Evarts of New York made his position known in 1890, saying,
"I have always been from the beginning, and am now, for the exclusion of
Chinese immigration." Both George Frisbie Hoar and Henry L. Dawes of
Massachusetts strongly opposed exclusion, while Justin Morrill of Vermont
and Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island (not to mention William Boyd Allison
of Iowa, who was not a northeasterner geographically, but typically voted
with the northeastern party leaders on most issues) opposed it somewhat
less vocally.44 With northeastern senators divided over the issue, a West-
South alliance stood a fair chance of getting anti-Chinese legislation passed.
In return for helping westerners, southern senators surely hoped for, if not
expected, western support in preventing passage of the Federal Elections
Bill.45
Southern senators excoriated those Republicans who took a racist
stance toward the Chinese while simultaneously showing humanitarian
concern for black southerners. Their typical argument went: "they make
rigid laws against the Chinese and treat them as an inferior race and en-
titled to no rights, and at the same time claim that the African is the equal
in all respects with the white man and should be protected in every privi-
lege."46 Senator James B. Eustis of Louisiana made a particularly compel-
ling case against the inconsistent Republicans, saying, "You have a race
prejudice against the Chinese. So have 1.1 avow it. I proclaim it. I say there
is such a thing as antagonism of the races. You deny it when it comes to the
question of the negro and the white man." Why could the Republicans not
simply be honest and admit that the races were not and could never be
equal, asked Eustis?47
Foremost on the list of Republicans whom southerners enjoyed tor-
menting for their inconsistency on racial issues was Joseph N. Dolph of
Oregon, who struggled to find a  plausible explanation for his conflicting
views on the black and yellow races. His most common argument was that,
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since the Chinese were not citizens, the United States owed them nothing,
whereas it "owed something to the Negro," who was by moral and legal
right a citizen.48 Southern Democrats found such an explanation lacking,
to say the least. In their minds blacks should not be citizens any more than
the Chinese or Indians, and the only reason they were was because of the
vengeful social engineering of the Radical Republicans of Reconstruction.
During the Federal Elections Bill debate, therefore, James B. Eustis asked
Dolph to answer the following hypothetical question:
The population of Oregon amounts to 312,000 people. Suppose
Congress had never passed a law prohibiting the immigration
of Chinese into this country. Suppose that about a million and a
half of Chinamen had immigrated into the State of Oregon.
Suppose that Congress passed a law giving the right of citizen-
ship and naturalization to those Chinamen. . . . Suppose that
those million and a half Chinamen had banded themselves to-
gether and . . . established in Oregon a Chinese State govern-
ment, as they would have had a perfect right to do . . . . Suppose
that the white people of Oregon, not believing that a Chinese
government is exactly the kind of government that they ought
to live under, had overthrown that Chinese government Who
would you support, the Chinese or the whites?49
Dolph initially avoided answering the question, calling it a waste of
time to engage in such meaningless speculations. Yet, when pressed, he ad-
mitted that he agreed with the vast majority of white people on the Pacific
Coast who "do not believe that the Chinese laborers are a desirable popu-
lation." When pressed further, he unfurled the bloody shirt, blurting out
that Oregonians "are made of different stuff" than southerners. Oregonians,
he said, would never defy a law of the United States, reject a constitutional
amendment, or commit treason against their country, as the former Con-
federate states had done. John Tyler Morgan replied to Dolph's statements
by reading the Oregon state constitution, which, until 1887, said that "No
negro, Chinaman, or mulatto shall have the right of suffrage" and which
forbade whites to intermarry with blacks, Chinese, or Indians of one-fourth
or more blood. Considering such laws, were Oregonians really that much
different than Alabamians, he asked?50
Later in the Federal Elections Bill debate, Edward O. Wolcott of Colo-
rado took up the hypothetical question that Eustis had asked Dolph. He
chided his fellow western Republican for an "evasive" answer and declared
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with absolute starkness that, if such a scenario occurred in Colorado, "in
some way and by some method, I know not how, the white vote would
govern."51 Wolcott, whose "total lack of senatorial dignity," as one observer
commented, gave "his associates in the Senate pain," made no pretenses of
being a humanitarian. In that regard, he was more genuine than many of
his fellow Republicans, who professed great compassion for the less fortu-
nate but did not always demonstrate it.52 Wolcott truthfully expressed
what he believed was the will of the majority of his constituency53 and in
so doing embodied a new Republican mentality for the 1890s. He stood,
in fact, among the vanguard of a new generation in his views of American
race relations because he admitted, with neither pride nor shame, what
he believed was the matter-of-fact need for white supremacy in the United
States.
This new frame of mind that Wolcott presaged transcended all sec-
tional and socioeconomic divisions, connecting the three major parties,
bidding farewell to the bloody shirt, New Nationalism, and paving the way
for the ages of Progressivism, Imperialism, and Jim Crowism.54 It showed
that the Civil War and Reconstruction years had merely been an unwel-
come interlude in the traditional, natural alliance between the South and
the West, and that the time for the nation's new "manifest destiny" had
arrived. The old manifest destiny had entailed the overspreading and sub-
duing of the continent by the white man in order to take physical control of
the vast expanses of howling wilderness in the West. The new would re-
quire inundating the continent with the idea of white supremacy in order
to take psychological control of all other races who inhabited the land,
whether red, yellow, brown, or black.55
This new age that began around 1890 would be one of realism rather
than idealism in race relations. It would replace the old dogma of enlight-
ened egalitarianism embodied in the Declaration of Independence, the
Emancipation Proclamation, and the Reconstruction Amendments, with
pseudoscientific Social Darwinism, segregation laws, and state constitu-
tions that contained all kinds of racially motivated suffrage restrictions.
While the South would lead this racist charge, the West would support it,
and, consequently, the Northeast would ultimately be forced to accept white
supremacy as the new American way—the Zeitgeist of the coming age. By
1891, therefore, the southern Democrats, with the help of some influential
western Republicans, had succeeded in destroying the Republican reform-
ers' civil rights agenda for African Americans by portraying them as hypo-
crites on other racial matters. They asked, with great effect, a question that
still today must give pause to the impartial historian: how could these pro-
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fessing humanitarians support a federal policy of virtual genocide against
Native Americans and support a law barring the golden door to the Chi-
nese in the West, while simultaneously fighting one of the fiercest congres-
sional battles in American history to make life better for black southerners?
There is no satisfactory answer to this question, for the reformers' argu-
ment that one group are citizens while the others are not fails to pass the
test of true humanitarianism. That argument represented instead a type of
Nationalism, which fit both then and now much more easily into the larger
ideology of the racists than into the ideology of egalitarians, humanitar-
ians, or racial reformers.
The showdown on Capitol Hill in 1890-1891 was a clear victory for
the racists. It forced many of the reformers to reconsider their positions on
racial issues. Either they would have to begin treating all racial and ethnic
groups with the same humanitarian concern or stop professing to be hu-
manitarians. Unfortunately, they ultimately chose the latter, as the next
chapter will reveal.
Chapter 9
THE "PECULIAR SITUATION" OF
AFRICAN AMERICANS AND ETHNIC
MINORITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
How Racism Became Fashionable in the 1890s
The southern man apparently denied to the negro social recognition, not
primarily because he was a negro, but because he was a slave. The northern
man seems to hate the negro primarily on account of his color.
—John Snyder, physician and archaeologist from Illinois
The proud Anglo-Saxon will not and can not be ruled by Ethiopian blood.
—John H. O'Neall, Democratic representative of Indiana
The white westerners' aversion to Native Americans and the Chinese was
not extraordinary in 1890. Nor was it comparable only to the white South's
negrophobia. It was rather symptomatic of a larger problem afflicting white
America. Put succinctly, white America suffered from the blight of racism.
Each section had its own unique race problems, and none was more racist
than the other. If it seemed that the South was more racist, it was only
because its racial minority was by far the largest, the by-product of earlier
generations of slaveholders. The Northeast, however, despite the presence of
its humanitarian and reformer element, exhibited racism as well. Its two most
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prevalent manifestations of racism were xenophobia (ethnophobia) and black
segregation. The former is a strain of racism that is often downplayed in
histories of American race relations as less severe and, therefore, less impor-
tant than racism based on skin color. Discussion of the latter is more promi-
nent in historical studies, but it has usually, and inaccurately, been considered
a southern, rather than a national, phenomenon.
Northeasterners had generally been more apologetic about racism in
the United States than people in other sections of the country before the
1890s, but many were also in denial about the racism they harbored in
their own hearts and minds. Reverend Henry Field, a New York missionary
to southern blacks, for instance, felt afraid to say what he really thought
about the South's race problem because of the negative reception he would
receive from his northern contemporaries, most of whom had never stepped
foot in the South. "No young author could afford to risk his reputation by
writing a book to apologize" for southern race relations, said Field, for "it
would be howled down as soon as it was born. No man is strong enough to
fight against the sympathies of the age." Yet his conscience compelled him
to do so. As he explained, "I have been so oppressed by [the southern race
problem] that I could not keep from speaking, even if it were only to ask
questions. That is the way to get light, by groping after it. Confession of
ignorance is the first step towards knowledge." His groping ultimately led
him to conclude that, given the realities of the times in which he lived,
white southerners (racist Democrats) had the most sensible opinions on
the subject, not northern Republicans.1 His groping also helped to bring to
light the disingenuousness of many of his professing humanitarian col-
leagues. Dr. Edward H. McGill, president of Swarthmore College in Penn-
sylvania, agreed with Field. He applauded the southern states' recent efforts
to elevate black southerners and indicted the northern states for lack of the
same, saying, "in that part of this country where the Negro has suffered
most, where he has been enslaved, his condition to-day is more favorable
than in the so-called free states... "2 Because of the dual criticism of social
leaders such as Field and the Democratic and Silverite political leaders of
the Billion Dollar Congress, a decrease is visible after 1890 in the number
of outspoken egalitarians and humanitarians of the Northeast who were
willing and able to guide the national racial destiny as they had done dur-
ing the abolitionist and Reconstruction generations. Northeasterners as a
whole began to accept racism and, in many cases, embrace it as a natural
state of affairs in race relations worldwide.3
Dr. James Buckley of New York urged his fellow northern humanitar-
ians at the First Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question to "keep this
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prejudice of the North constantly in view, and endeavor to remove it," oth-
erwise there would be no hope of curing the South of its racism. Former
Union general and head of the Freedmen's Bureau O. O. Howard blamed
northern racism on the lack of true religion in America, saying "I think we
ought to labor to get some genuine Christianity inside of our church edi-
fices and into society." Only then could white Americans—no matter which
section of the country they lived in—learn to love blacks, Chinese, Indians,
and anyone else who was different in color or culture.4
Why did this evolution toward the Northeast accepting racism as nor-
mal and natural occur, and how was it manifested? By 1890, the ethnic
composition of the American people had changed dramatically from what
it had been in the antebellum era. Immigrants from various European coun-
tries, which once had little or no notable presence in the United States,
actually outnumbered the nation's eight million African Americans, mak-
ing new immigrants collectively the largest minority group in the nation.
These ethnic groups included Austrians, Greeks, Hungarians, Italians,
Lithuanians, Norwegians, Poles, Russians, and Turks, among many others.
From the Mediterranean Sea to the North Sea and from the Balkans to the
Baltic, by the thousands they came to fulfill their American dreams. The
vast majority of these new immigrants arrived in the United States in north-
eastern ports, and in the Northeast they largely stayed, overspreading all of
the states north of the Ohio and east of the Mississippi Rivers and trickling
across the northern Great Plains states. Comparatively few immigrants
moved to the agriculturally depressed South, much to the chagrin of white
southerners. In 1888, southern political leaders established the Southern
Inter-States Immigration Commission for the purpose of inducing a larger
proportion of the immigrants to move South.5 The effort, however, proved
futile, mainly because the southerners were selective in their recruiting, aim-
ing for the literate and already-acculturated immigrants. As one Georgia
newspaper explained it: "The South would welcome millions [of immi-
grants] , and be safer and richer because of their presence. But the South does
not need or desire an influx of hundreds of thousands of... peasants, pov-
erty struck and grossly ignorant. She wants immigrants from the North, who
are Americans already... this is not a section where we can afford to . . . add
indefinitely to the mass of ignorance."6 Indeed, the South already possessed
what many white southerners believed was the world's superior and irre-
placeable labor class: African Americans. Thus, the South did not need more
poor, uneducated laborers. It needed only immigrants with, as former Mis-
sissippi Governor Robert Lowry put it, "potential" for establishing busi-
nesses and industries.7
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Why most immigrants shunned the South was a topic of debate in
Congress and the press. Four-term Republican Congressman Louis E.
McComas of Maryland believed the "white man's government of the South"
repelled "the vigorous youth of the North." He added, "I am sorrowfully
convinced that it is a love of a broader freedom that induces the American
farmer to carry his sons to trench and irrigate the parched desert, to face
cyclones, [and to] brave arctic weather" on the Great Plains rather than to
settle in the South.8 One South Carolina newspaper disagreed, arguing that
most European immigrants simply preferred the frigid temperature of the
North to the sweltering heat of the South. The northern climate more closely
replicated the climate of their European homelands. Moreover, those few
Europeans who were willing to move to a hot climate, said the paper, were
choosing the newly opened expanses of Africa as their destination, instead
of the American South.9
Both theories about why most immigrants spurned the South were,
of course, absolutely wrong. Most immigrants stayed in the North simply
because they had more and better economic opportunities there and, as
time went on, increasingly because they had family and friends there. Some
no doubt avoided the South because they did not wish to compete with
African Americans for the few jobs available, but many certainly avoided
the deep South cotton states because they were not immune to racism. They
preferred not to be surrounded by blacks. It was not uncommon for mem-
bers of one racial or ethnic minority group to despise another just as old-
stock white Americans despised both. The feeling was mutual. Blacks
reciprocated the aversion to new immigrants moving south. Black
southerners who were fortunate enough to hold industrial jobs certainly
did not wish to see a flood of white immigrants moving south to compete
for those jobs. Thus, if there was any racial antipathy between immigrants
and black southerners, both groups caused it. The two groups were not
always in competition for jobs, though. Sometimes they worked side by
side in southern coal mines and factories. On rare occasions, their shared
economic interests made them natural allies, as histories of Populism and
unionization in the late-nineteenth-century South reveal. Yet, more often
than not, immigrants avoided allying with blacks because blacks occupied
the lowest station in American society. Most immigrants realized that, in
order to attain social mobility in their new nation, they must not make
permanent alliances or friendships with those at the bottom of the social
hierarchy.10 Thus, for any number of reasons, the new immigrants by and
large remained in the northern states and increasingly posed a new social
problem there in the 1890s.
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These poor masses of ethnic immigrants had come to America for
many of the same reasons that drove the Chinese to the California coast,
with economic opportunity being foremost on the list. Just as the Chinese
largely huddled in San Francisco, the new European immigrants typically
huddled in New York City, Boston, and Philadelphia, although many made
their way west to Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago, Milwaukee, and Minne-
apolis, among numerous other destinations. The eastern seaboard cities,
which had traditionally been controlled politically, socially, and economi-
cally by the old-stock whites—particularly those of English ancestry—sud-
denly found themselves swamped with foreign-born populations speaking
multiple languages, practicing sundry versions of Christianity and Juda-
ism, and having no experience with democratic government. The descen-
dants of the Puritans especially tended to resent these first-generation
immigrants for their peculiar social customs and religious practices, which
threatened to disrupt the traditional, monolithic culture of New England.11
The old ruling elite of the Northeast justified its ethnophobia using
the same type of conservative arguments that the white South and the white
West used to justify their brands of racism. They said that the new immi-
grants jeopardized the welfare of the American polity and the nation's tra-
ditional values because most were uneducated and unaccustomed to
democracy. Moreover, they complained that some were unwilling and oth-
ers were incapable of assimilating into the mainstream of American soci-
ety, which was built predominantly upon the Protestant faith, the English
language, and the democratic political process. Therefore, immigration
should be limited to those who could and would assimilate and who seemed
likely to contribute to the general welfare of the nation, to the exclusion of
those who seemed likely to become a drain on the nation's resources be-
cause of their illiteracy and incapacity for self-improvement.12
Despite expressing concern about protecting the nation as a whole
from such undesirables, old-stock northeasterners were really more inter-
ested in protecting their own social and political hegemony in their section
of the country. John Sherman, who was of New England Puritan ancestry,
championed the cause of poor illiterate blacks—as long as they remained
in the South—yet he argued for the exclusion of the poorest and neediest
white immigrants, saying, "Neither a pauper . . . nor any man unable to
make his living, nor an imbecile, nor one who has a defect or imperfection
of body or mind . . . should be allowed to immigrate to this country."13 His
idea of excluding the mentally, physically, educationally, and economically
challenged carried the day and, in 1891, became the law of the land. Presi-
dent Harrison approved Sherman's immigration restriction plan, which
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Sound Advice to the Fifty-second Congress. Uncle Sam. "Stop Wranglin' 'bout yer
tariff an' yer silver, gents, an' tackle this fust" {Harper's Weekly, 1891.) Upon the
failure of the Republican Reformers in the Billion Dollar Congress to make the
United States a more inclusive society, American politicians and the public as a
whole began to show openly a very pronounced regression in racial and ethnic
attitudes. Notice that the petition to restrict immigration is held underneath an
American flag by a grizzled-looking Uncle Sam.
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barred the golden door to "All idiots, insane persons, paupers or persons
likely to become a public charge, [and] persons suffering from a loath-
some or a dangerous contagious disease... ."w Consequently, immigrants
who could meet the standards of admission to the United States were
occasionally forced to leave loved ones who could not meet them, be-
hind. In fact, this law denied more than twenty thousand immigrants entry
into the United States in the decade of the 1890s. How many of these
denials resulted in broken families is unascertainable, but it must have
been a considerable number. Whatever amount of suffering Sherman's
law caused immigrant families, old-stock Americans remained coldly in-
different to it.15
More often than not, the ethnophobes of the Northeast were, like
Sherman and Harrison, Republicans, which baffled many Americans of
foreign birth. John P. Altgeld, a German-born American who was a federal
judge in Chicago in 1890 and later became the governor of Illinois, ex-
pressed dismay at the treatment of the new immigrants flooding into the
Northeast. He noted that some of the most ardent Republicans currently,
as well as some of the most devoted Unionists in the Civil War, were first-
generation immigrants. He thought it incomprehensible that the GOP
would shun such a large class of Union-loving, potential Republican voters
merely because of their ethnic backgrounds.16 Yet, that was precisely the
case, and the ethnophobes seemed to be justified in their position after
Altgeld pardoned the German immigrant anarchists who were arrested for
Chicago's Haymarket Square riot of 1886. From their point of view, was
such a pardon not proof that ethnic minorities colluded for their own self-
interest rather than promoting the welfare of the nation at large?17
Ethnophobia did not just suddenly arise among northeasterners
around 1890. The old-stock Protestants of New England had always de-
spised the Irish, who first became a large presence in the Northeast in the
1840s. They loathed the Irish's Catholicism and their stereotyped procliv-
ity for drinking, rowdiness, and ignorance. The new wave of European im-
migration during the Gilded Age did not diminish the ill feelings toward
the Irish, either. It merely gave the old-stock Protestants more ethnic mi-
norities to look down upon. To southern and western observers, the new
wave of anti-immigration sentiment represented just one of several ways
that the Northeast displayed hypocrisy on racial matters. One Missouri
newspaper called it merely the latest manifestation of "Puritan Know-
Nothingism," meaning that it showed a continuation of the traditional
Anglo-Protestant mentality of cultural arrogance and ethnocentrism that
the Northeast had exhibited throughout U. S. history. Indeed, most of the
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northeastern reformers who sought to dictate the solution to the South's
race problem in 1890-1891 were descendants of the Puritans and Pilgrims,
whose religious intolerance is well-documented in countless histories of
New England. During the years of the Early Republic, these colonial Anglo-
Protestant groups manifested their self-righteousness politically through
the Federalist Party. In the Jacksonian era, these sons of the Puritans shifted
their political voice to the Whig Party, while they found a new moral con-
sciousness in the abolition movement. Over the next three decades thereaf-
ter, some members of this elite group evolved into Free-Soilers, some into
Know-Nothings, and some into Radical Republicans. By the 1890s, they
were searching for a new identity, which many found in the Immigration
Restriction League that Henry Cabot Lodge organized in 1894.18
Despite being one of the best-educated men in Congress, Henry Cabot
Lodge was also among the most vocal anti-immigrationists in the North-
east. His xenophobia rested upon either stereotypes and generalities or ut-
terly false assumptions that the hordes of "non-Teutonic" immigrants
arriving daily on the shores of Boston and New York were more prone to
criminal and deviant behavior than old-stock Americans. The majority of
them, he asserted, were willing to work for lower wages than the traditional
laboring classes, which eroded "the quality of American citizenship," a
theory that sounded much like a typical western argument for Chinese ex-
clusion. To combat this problem, Lodge favored a national literacy test for
immigrants.19
Lodge's racial views were complex, sometimes inexplicable, often con-
tradictory, and always controversial. He used the term "race" to mean "na-
tionality" or "ethnic group." He believed the existing "races" were evolutions
from the three original, pure racial strains: Indo-European, Hamitic, and
Semitic. As evolutions, they were "artificial" races, yet they were races all
the same. Italians, for instance, were just as different from Englishmen as
were the Sioux Indians or African Americans (he used the word "nigger" in
an off-handed comment embedded within one of his congressional speeches
in 1890). Lodge once remarked that "You can take a Hindoo [sic] and give
him the highest education the world can afford," but he would still be a
"Hindoo." A single generation of education would not convert him into an
Englishman, said Lodge, much less would it make him qualified for Ameri-
can citizenship.20
Lodge's views on what constituted a "race" were not unusual at the
time. They resulted from a lack of scientific understanding of the topic.
Despite the best efforts of the most intellectual thinkers in the world, no
scientific definition for the term "race" had yet been formulated. Conse-
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quently, there was no test that could be applied to determine a person's race
officially. Opinions about how many distinct races existed varied widely,
from as few as four or five to as many as several hundred.21 For the purpose
of determining citizenship and voting rights under the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments, the various states arrived near a consensus, delineat-
ing four races: Caucasian, African, Chinese, and American Indian. The first
two were generally considered citizens eligible to vote, while the latter two
were not. Groups whose race seemed less defined, such as southeastern
Europeans with swarthy complexions, posed a serious problem, however,
and many old-stock Americans did not believe they should be entitled to
citizenship or suffrage.22
Lodge's racial views typified those of most old-stock Americans in
that he believed in the inherent superiority of the "Anglo-Saxon race," by
which he meant the white English-speaking peoples. The term, although
not new in 1890, did not become ingrained in the American lexicon until
about that time. Once ingrained, few people stopped to ponder the mean-
ing of "Anglo-Saxon," and thus few recognized, or were willing to admit,
its inaccuracy. Those who paused to consider semantics, however, under-
stood that "The Anglo-Saxons are as extinct as the mastodon, and the En-
glish people might as well be called Normans or Britons as Saxons" and
that "Americans are not only not Anglo-Saxons; they are not even English-
men." Sometimes Lodge and others substituted "Teutonic" for "Anglo-
Saxon," as if the terms were interchangeable. Technically, the Teutonic
peoples included all those ethnic groups descended from the original, an-
cient Germanic tribes, not just English-speaking groups. As applied to
Americans, it simply meant old-stock whites, and that is exactly what Lodge
intended: people like himself were superior to all others. People like him-
self should, therefore, control the United States and should, in fact, rule the
world.23
In the late 1880s and early 1890s, the notion that Anglo-Saxons were
destined to rule the world began to dominate the thought processes of both
the American public and the nation's political leaders when considering
racial issues. One need only survey widely circulated periodicals of the day,
such as North American Review, Forum, and Arena, to notice this sudden
upsurge in interest and virtual consensus in that belief. This shift in per-
ception was a major factor that helped usher in the age of American Impe-
rialism. Another factor was that the most militarily powerful European
nations had already begun their own programs of imperialist expansion,
and the United States could not afford to lag behind. American naval cap-
tain Alfred Thayer Mahan's book, The Influence of Sea Power On History
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(1890), argued that a strong navy was essential to national defense and
that the United States had better keep pace with the Europeans by engag-
ing in a massive naval buildup. Under the leadership of Secretary of Navy
Benjamin R Tracy and key Republican congressmen such as Senator Wil-
liam E. Chandler of New Hampshire, the Harrison administration began
modernizing the U. S. Navy in preparation for the eventuality of major
naval wars abroad.24
Most southern politicians, needless to say, adhered to this racist/im-
perialist philosophy, but many northern Republicans did as well, including
some of the leading supporters of the Federal Elections Bill. Frank Hiscock
of New York conceded it as though it were a foregone conclusion and com-
mon knowledge, saying, "I grant the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race."25
Likewise, John J. Ingalls, who championed the cause of the black southerner's
right to vote, nonetheless believed in a sort of international manifest des-
tiny whereby the Teutonic peoples should rule the world. John Hay, a north-
ern Republican whose public life began as Abraham Lincoln's personal
secretary and ended as William McKinley's and Theodore Roosevelt's sec-
retary of state, agreed. Hay almost single-handedly brought Ingalls's ideol-
ogy to life. He underwent a life-changing transformation around 1890 in
which he abandoned his early egalitarian ideals. Once he became secretary
of state in 1898, he presided over the most pronounced period of overseas
imperialistic expansion in the nation's history. He rationalized the takeover
of underdeveloped regions of the world on the dual notions that only Anglo-
Saxons were capable of establishing efficient governments and that there
was no chance that the "backward" races would be able to catch up in his
lifetime. The English-speaking peoples would, Hay believed, only be doing
the backward races a favor by ruling over them and schooling them in the
art of good government.26
What is evident and striking is that there existed what may appear to
some students of history an inexplicable contradiction in the northern
Republican imperialist mind-set. Lodge, Ingalls, Hay, Hiscock, McKinley,
and Roosevelt, among many others, believed in the inherent superiority of
Anglo-Saxons and, therefore, the inferiority of dark-skinned peoples. They
relished the idea of establishing Anglo-Saxon supremacy around the world.
Yet, they paradoxically favored allowing the supposed inferior race of the
American South to help rule the southern states based upon the demo-
cratic ideal of majority rule. Since there was not yet a great emphasis on
proving Anglo-Saxon supremacy overseas in 1890-1891, this contradiction
did not surface in any of the congressional debates of the Fifty-first Con-
gress. Had it surfaced, Democratic and western Republican opponents cer-
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tainly would have added it to their formidable arsenal of reasons why they
believed that northeastern Republicans were guilty of applying a double-
standard, or what they would have labeled "hypocrisy," on racial issues.
The professing humanitarians of the Northeast demonstrated other
seeming contradictions between their idealistic beliefs and their actual words
and deeds as well. For example, Henry Blair, during the debate on his edu-
cation bill in the Fifty-first Congress, read aloud a letter written by an un-
named, highly educated black man and, with a choice of words that some
modern observers would judge to be racist, pronounced emphatically that
"His letter is written about as well as though it came from a white man."
This statement seems to indicate that he believed in an inherent difference
in the mental capacity of blacks and whites (or perhaps he just used a poor
choice of words in trying to say that blacks were generally not educated as
well as whites).27 John Coit Spooner, who defended the Federal Elections
Bill so eloquently, once lumped "colored" people together with "idiots,"
"lunatics," and "Injuns," and jokingly expressed gratitude to the Almighty
that no member of his family belonged in any of those categories.28 Even
George Frisbie Hoar, who came as close to being a genuine egalitarian as
any man in Congress and who would emerge in time as one of the leading
critics of American Imperialism, sometimes made statements that seemed
to contradict his professed beliefs in racial equality. For instance, he op-
posed the Harrison administration's nomination of Frederick Douglass as
the ambassador to Haiti on the grounds that Haitians did not respect black
ambassadors as much as they did white ones, and, therefore, the tradition
of appointing African Americans to that post should be terminated. Viewed
in the context of the fact that Hoar had not yet formulated a definite posi-
tion on imperialism in 1890, as he later would, it seems evident that his
objection resulted from a desire to establish Anglo-American control over
the troubled little island-nation and thereby imbue it with stable govern-
ment for the first time in its existence because the black Haitian people had
demonstrated no ability to do it themselves.29
Such examples of seemingly racist attitudes and statements on the
part of professing humanitarians reflect the philosophy of quasi-scientific
realism that arose around 1890 to replace the social/racial idealism of the
Reconstruction era. This realism that began to pervade the thought pro-
cesses of Americans originated mainly in the ivory tower, where the ideol-
ogy of Social Darwinism was fast becoming the orthodox explanation for
racial and ethnic differences and the quasi-scientific justification for white
supremacy. Beginning in 1889, various well-respected professors and intel-
lectuals in America and Europe, who had previously published occasional
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treatises on Social Darwinism, began to write and publish extensively on
the subject. The topic fascinated the American public and no doubt helped
sell magazines and periodicals. The idea that the fittest races survived,
evolved, and developed through ever-advancing stages of civilization was a
simple, plausible explanation for a complex set of questions. Some of the
most educated people in the world applied this ideology to the American
race problem.30
British intellectual James Bryce, who toured the United States in 1890,
was one of these well-educated ideologues. To him, Social Darwinism de-
creed that races evolved from a state of barbarism to civilization over peri-
ods of centuries. To take savages from the wilds of Africa, therefore, and
infuse them into the most advanced national civilization the world had
ever seen, as the United States had done, went against every law of nature.
Enfranchising black Americans was especially a perversion of the natural
development of civilization, argued Bryce, considering that England's white
agricultural laborers, who were roughly their English equivalent in terms
of social status, did not attain the privilege of suffrage until 1885.31
Nathaniel Southgate Shaler, a professor at Harvard who had lived in
the South as well as the North, developed a sophisticated Social Darwinist
argument concerning the races. He believed that northern Europeans had
developed superior brains because of centuries of coping with winter
weather, which peoples who inhabited regions close to the equator did not
have to confront. He incorrectly considered Africa, compared to northern
Europe, to be a land of "enduring ease" where food was plentiful and could
be acquired with minimal effort and forethought. Consequently, he be-
lieved that millions of people had survived and reproduced there over time
who would not have survived had they lived in a region where harsh win-
ters created the need for more-developed brains. Northern Europeans thus
survived by rationing provisions for months at a time, which indicated that
they had a highly developed understanding of cause and effect. Hence,
their descendants had earned the right through centuries of development
to "rule the world."32 Even so, said Shaler, only a few men among the
white race in any given generation were really qualified to possess such
control over domestic political affairs, much less international affairs. "The
combination of political interest, foresight, and valor in the use of the
electoral franchise is so rare among those of our own race," he proclaimed,
"that we can barely maintain the institutions which depend upon it for
their support." How could inferior races, therefore, possibly hope to com-
pete in the white man's political arena? Indeed, if this combination of
characteristics, which was so rare even among the white race, alone pro-
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duced good government, how could blacks make a positive contribution to
the American polity?33
Social Darwinists often cited the lack of forethought, or foresight, as
a particularly pronounced deficiency of the black race. William Chauncy
Langdon echoed Shaler's thoughts on the topic, saying blacks as a whole
lacked the understanding of action and consequence that had become a
hallmark of the white race's scientific and political ingenuity. Thus, blacks
were unable to learn from their mistakes or to heed the lessons of history,
he said, and would make the same blunders time and again. They would
live only for the day, taking no thought of the future, he contended, which
prevented them from escaping the cycle of dependency up on more advanced
races. This dependency then perpetuated itself in each succeeding genera-
tion. Langdon justified his belief based partly on an interview with an un-
named seventy-year-old former slave. The elderly gentleman lamented the
indiscretions of America's black youth who had never experienced slavery,
telling Langdon: "The trouble is that most of the young negroes think that
emancipation and the franchise gave them a right to a living without work-
ing for it; to social equality without manners or decency; to place without
the slightest training or experience; and to the respect of the white people
without any character." Langdon agreed, saying, only those few young Af-
rican Americans who were wiser than their peers would diligently strive to
learn from the past and to improve their condition through hard work,
saving, and investment.34
English biologist T. H. Huxley, who was among the foremost purvey-
ors of Darwin's theory of evolution in 1890, not to mention a strong pro-
ponent of Social Darwinism as well, agreed with Langdon's assessment. He
added that not only must every race earn its place in society by hard work
and common sense, but even every individual within each race must suc-
ceed or fail based on his own initiative or lack thereof. Contrary to the
American political creed expressed in the Declaration of Independence, he
argued, people were not born equal. For evidence, he cited the fact that no
two siblings in any given family, although born and raised in the same home,
having the same parents, and having the same cultural and economic cir-
cumstances, will grow to have the same abilities or desires. Those who de-
sired the right things and had natural ability would succeed, while their
brothers and sisters without those virtues would fail. By nature, it just so
happened, said Huxley, that more individuals possessed those virtues among
the white race than among the black.35
Social Darwinists frequently attributed any success that a black man
had in business, industry, or academia not to his natural inclinations or
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abilities, but to the fact that he had a "habit of imitation" of the white man.36
Some pointed to the fact that the natives of Africa had not achieved the
level of evolution of the white race as proof that African Americans were
inherently inferior. Reverend A.W. Pitzer of Washington, D.C., for example,
asked rhetorically at the First Mohonk Conference:
Has the Negro race at any period of time or in any country of
the globe been a factor in the history-making of the world? If so,
when and where? He has no history, and has never been a his-
tory maker.... The Negro of to-day is the product of his sad and
dismal past. The wild, naked, man-eating savages of equatorial
Africa are the same blood and race as the Negro of this republic.
We must deal with him as he is. We cannot shut our eyes to facts.
They may be hard and painful things, but they are also stubborn
and immovable things. It is not fair to judge him with the same
standard of measure that we apply to the Anglo-Saxon.37
Dr. Merrill E. Gates, president of Rutgers College, agreed, remarking con-
cerning the limitations of educating blacks, "If we expected to bring out a
type of Negro manhood after the model of the Plymouth Rock Pilgrim, we
should probably be disappointed."38 Other participants at the Mohonk
Conference disagreed, however. Albion Tourgee praised the accomplish-
ments of African Americans, noting that "the colored people of the South
have accomplished more in twenty-five years, from an industrial point of
view, than any people on the face of the earth ever before achieved under
anything like such unfavorable circumstances."39 Massachusetts educator
Reverend A. D. Mayo sided with Tourgee. He believed that the propensity
of blacks for imitating the white race showed great promise for their future.
Once the process of imitation had reached completion, he said, black soci-
ety would replicate the white man's civilization, and the cycle of depen-
dency would be broken. He cited Native Americans as an example of a race
who could not, or would not, imitate the white race, to their own peril.
Those races that imitated Anglo-Saxons, believed Mayo, would survive and
prosper; those that did not would die out.40
People who took such an optimistic view of the condition of the black
race were in the decided minority. The majority of the intellectuals of the
day simply painted all blacks with the broad brush of negative stereotyp-
ing. For example, Reverend Dr. A. E Beard, the corresponding secretary of
the American Missionary Association (AMA), claimed to know precisely
what factors were keeping African Americans down and out. He said they
200 Legislating Racism
Black Stereotype. (Boulder [Colorado] News, 1892.) African Americans were typi-
cally portrayed as being happy, albeit ignorant, and, in many cases (such as this
one), conniving and dishonest. Here an unkempt dandy is shown plotting the
theft of a plump Thanksgiving turkey, for which he soon lands in jail. Such por-
trayals could be seen in periodicals from coast to coast, not merely in the South,
by the early 1890s. White Americans by and large, whether northern, southern, or
western, felt no compunction about negatively stereotyping blacks in this way.
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lacked "right character," a "proper home life," a "sense of values," "order-
liness and method," and "accuracy." Concerning the latter, Beard explained
that the terms "'Almost' and 'altogether' mean the same thing to the Negro.
His 'pretty near' is the same as absolute right." Blacks also lacked a sense of
"time," he claimed. "He is in time when he is in church before the benedic-
tion."41 Not all stereotyping was so negative, however. Miss D. E. Emerson
of the AMA countered concerning African Americans that "We all know
their great love of music" and how they "are a very sympathetic people,
very kind," as well as "very forgiving and loving in their natures."42 Even
the most genuine humanitarians, who viewed blacks in the most positive
light they could see in that day, almost universally acknowledged the supe-
riority of the white race over the black.43
Corroborating the ideas of Social Darwinists and other intellectuals
were the discoveries and theories of explorers, adventurers, missionaries,
and diplomats in Africa, especially Henry M. Stanley, George Washington
Williams, and Bishop Henry McNeal Turner. Beginning in 1872, Stanley's
autobiographical accounts of his explorations of Africa first aroused the
American public's curiosity in the dark continent. Stanley's work sparked
American and European interest in Africa throughout the 1880s. Interest
reached its peak in 1890, with the publication of Stanley's Through the Dark
Continent, which was particularly popular. It contained detailed documen-
tation of barbaristic tribal practices committed routinely in the African
interior, which bolstered the argument for the inherent inferiority of the
black race. Most political and scientific journals and periodicals of the day
cashed in on the public fascination with Africa, carrying stories in every
edition, which supposedly reliable eye witnesses recorded, about the bar-
barism and cannibalism of various tribes of inner Africa. The racists in the
Fifty-first Congress cited such fanciful sketches with great effect.44
Williams, a mulatto from Pennsylvania who was on assignment by
the U. S. government in the Congo, reported that Stanley and the other
adventurers were telling the truth about the backwardness and barbarism
of inner Africa. "Cruelties of the most astounding character are practiced
by the natives," wrote Williams, "such as burying slaves alive in the grave of
a dead chief, cutting off the heads of captured warriors in native combats,"
selling boys as slaves and girls as concubines, and other equally gruesome
and savage practices.45
Turner, who visited Africa for the joint purposes of evangelization
and to assess the problems and potential of black American emigration
there, unwittingly advanced the racist mentality of his generation by his
espousal of Social Darwinism and a prominent scientific field of the day,
202 Legislating Racism
phrenology, which was the study of human heads, skulls, and facial fea-
tures for the purpose of determining cranial capacity and intelligence. Phre-
nology gave a great degree of legitimacy to racial stereotyping, and Turner,
like many educated people of his day, conveniently categorized members of
his race as intelligent or mentally challenged based on their physical ap-
pearance. Turner observed several striking physical differences between
native Africans and African Americans. Upon visiting Liberia, he wrote: "I
have found out that we poor American negroes were the tail end of the
African races. We were slaves over here [in Africa], and had been for a thou-
sand years or more before we were sold to America. Those who think the
receding forehead, the flat nose, the probiscated mouth and the big fiat
bottom foot are natural to the African are mistaken." Turner believed that
the "big blood" or "first class" Africans with "straight heads" had not been
sold to America as slaves unless they experienced the misfortune of being
captured in battle. Even if the Africans who ended up as slaves in America
were generally less intelligent than their native African counterparts, opined
Turner, they and their descendants could still "beat the world" in grasping
foreign languages quickly, in learning to play musical instruments skill-
fully, and in practicing honesty and forthrightness.46
Not everyone who visited Africa agreed with Turner's assessment of
the physical characteristics and personality traits of native Africans vis-a-
vis African Americans. There was, in fact, much disagreement among those
who had actually made personal observations. One German colonist in
Africa, for instance, considered the Americanized Africans living in Liberia
to be superior to the natives in physical appearance. He added that natives
tended to resemble monkeys and gorillas, whereas the Americans did not.
"More than once," he claimed, "in the dark forest I have just escaped kill-
ing a negro for a baboon."47 One white Presbyterian missionary in the Congo
wrote about native Africans with much greater esteem, however, saying, "I
find the wild African a very agreeable fellow. He has a good deal of self-
respect, and unbounded instinctive respect for the white man. . . . He is
charmingly unsophisticated, fresh, and natural and is genial, eager to please
and be pleased."48
Black intellectual and religious leader Alexander Crummell, who was,
like Turner, a Pan-Africanist, never claimed to believe in Social Darwinism.
Yet he defined "race" much the same as did Henry Cabot Lodge, with no
mention of skin color, calling it a "compact, homogenous population of
one blood, one ancestry, and lineage. .. . Indeed, a race is a family."49 Like
Turner, Crummell stereotyped races, admitting that his own race was less
advanced than most other races. It was not, however, because of incapacity,
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he argued. Instead, African Americans suffered from a seemingly perma-
nent victim complex, said Crummell, such that they could not overcome a
"morbid concentration upon an intense and frenzied sense of political
wrong." He likened African Americans to the Irish, whom he considered a
separate race. They also seemed incapable of escaping centuries of victim-
ization. The result of the Irish's victim complex was that "commerce, in-
dustry, and manufactures, letters and culture, have died away from them."
Crummell, who was first and foremost a preacher, hoped to elevate the
African American race above the mentality of victimization, which pre-
vented the growth of intellectualism and the entrepreneurial spirit within
the black community. In that sense, he had an interesting and unusually
enlightened position on the question of the development of races.50
Although some people could, like Crummell, draw parallels between
the black experience and the experiences of other racial and ethnic groups,
most Americans could not see the black-white race problem of the Ameri-
can South as comparable to any other race problem in the United States or
the world. While public opinion favored the exclusion of the Chinese, the
final subjugation of the Indians, and a restriction of white immigration for
the public good, there was no consensus about how to deal with African
Americans. One white southerner expressed his frustration over the issue
by commenting, "If we were dealing with a few tribes of red men or a few
sporadic Chinese, the question would be easily disposed of."51 But because
there were some eight million blacks concentrated in the South, all living
with the stigma of slavery and the resulting mentality of victimization, the
issue remained in 1890 what it had long been, a "running sore," as black
professor W. S. Scarborough put it, in the body politic that could not be
cured easily.52 Scarborough mused that, between 1865 and 1890, African
Americans had graduated from the "peculiar institution" and entered the
"peculiar situation." They were now suspended between a "selfish, arro-
gant, and supersensitive South, and a vacillating, over-sympathetic North,"
and both groups prevented the black man from fulfilling his potential.53
Indeed, while blacks and other minority groups shared a common
dispossession from the mainstream of American society, no group was ever
quite as victimized as blacks. In the North, Irish and German servants, whom
old-stock whites looked down upon as dirty and inferior, in turn looked
down upon blacks, refusing to eat at the same table with them or work
alongside them, no matter how clean, educated, or polite the African Ameri-
cans were. Moreover, northern labor unions, which were comprised over-
whelmingly of first-generation, non-Teutonic European immigrants, began
to exclude blacks and, in fact, to act violently toward them. Such ethnic
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minorities were not the main perpetrators of the policy of exclusion to-
ward African Americans in the North, however. The sons of the New En-
gland Puritans actually pioneered the practice of segregating the races in
the United States while the South was still practicing slavery. Gradually,
after the Civil War and Reconstruction, white southerners began to con-
sider segregation as the wave of the future in American race relations be-
cause, like the literacy qualification for voting, segregation had already been
tested and approved in the North. As late as 1884, Henry Woodfin Grady
pleaded with the South's political leaders to adopt the same type of racial
segregation as the North had long promulgated. Indeed, before the Jim Crow
laws of southern infamy were instituted, old-stock white northerners com-
monly refused to share railroad cars with free blacks, to sit with them in
theaters and restaurants, or to use other public accommodations in com-
mon with them. Although the first segregation law appeared in a southern
state in 1873, many southern states had no such laws as late as 1887. Even in
1889, the southern states still lagged behind the North in segregating the
races, and the New York Times urged them to catch up.54 As the Cincinnati
Gazette observed regarding the state of Ohio in 1889, "The color-line is
everywhere. It is in every church. It is in society. It is in politics." Why should
it not be drawn in the South, too?55
During the House debate on the Federal Elections Bill, three-term
Democrat James Richardson of Tennessee used the northern color line with
dramatic effect to bolster his party and section's cause. He documented
with a massive amount of evidence instances of racial discrimination in
nine northern states that had occurred since the Fifty-first Congress con-
vened. After a lengthy reading of forty-two separate accounts reported in
more than twenty northern newspapers, he finally stopped, saying that he
had not come close to exhausting his supply of such cases, but he had proven
his point. He concluded: "I most sincerely trust that henceforth no man,
here or elsewhere, will have the audacity, the temerity, the reckless disre-
gard for the truth to such a degree as to assert that discriminations are
made against the negro alone in the Southern States of the Union. They are
made in the North, South, East, and West, and will continue to be so made
so long as the white man is a white man and the negro is a negro."56
The main argument for racial segregation was that it was natural and
instinctive for races to associate with their own kind. Hence, mixing the
races broke the rules of nature. Southerners and northerners alike argued
that not only did the supposed superior race recognize this natural order,
but the inferior races recognized it as well. Senator John Tyler Morgan of
Alabama explained that "It is as instinctive with the negro to admit" this
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natural order "as it is with the white race to demand and assert i t . . . . Race
separation is the only cure for race aversion."57 Senator Edward Cary
Walthall of Mississippi concurred, saying segregation "is a reciprocal ar-
rangement, is absolutely just, is supported by public sentiment and enforced
by the courts." For proof that blacks not only accepted but actually pre-
ferred segregation, he quoted L. W. Moore, a black representative in the
Mississippi legislature from Bolivar County, who said publicly that it would
keep "the average negro in Mississippi... reasonably content with his con-
dition." It was just this propensity of blacks to commune among them-
selves by choice, declared Walthall, that caused white southerners to need a
"solid South," because whenever "whites would divide upon reason . . .
blacks would unite upon race."58
White Virginian Philip A. Bruce believed that blacks had an "inde-
pendent tendency," just like whites. That is, given the choice, they would
congregate together and "live apart" from whites. Doing so ostensibly gave
blacks freedom to develop and practice their own unique culture. He cited
black churches as the prime example. They had developed their own form
of worship, a form not contrary to white religion but unique nonetheless.
When left alone to worship as they pleased, without fear of mockery or
persecution from whites, black Christians, concluded Bruce, were happy.59
Many other white southerners likewise truly believed that blacks pre-
ferred segregation to conflict. Before he died, Henry Woodfin Grady con-
vinced the whole staff of the Atlanta Constitution that segregation was the
most sensible solution to the race problem. Once Grady was gone, the pa-
per reported every instance thereafter when blacks did anything separate
from whites. It reported, for example, about a black veterans' parade in
Georgia held on January 1,1890, to celebrate the Emancipation Proclama-
tion and a black state fair held in South Carolina, to which whites were not
invited. Were not such actions proof that blacks preferred to be separate
from whites, asked the Constitution7.60
Missing from such reports of wishful-thinking whites were examples
of other black meetings refuting the argument that blacks preferred segre-
gation. The National Convention of Colored Americans, for instance, which
met in Washington, D.C., in January 1890, protested to the federal govern-
ment for the Interstate Commerce Commission laws to be strengthened to
prevent segregation on trains.61 John Edward Bruce, a black journalist, speak-
ing at the Inaugural Afro-American League Convention in Chicago resented
the white arrogance that created racial segregation. He considered white
Americans in general "modern barbarians" who flattered themselves with
false notions of their automatic superiority based upon their whiteness.62
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Yet, the argument that blacks preferred segregation gained popularity
through repeated usage by whites and by the fact that most whites miscon-
strued the statements of black leaders on the subject. Black North Carolin-
ian J. C. Price, for instance, stated unequivocally that blacks did not aspire
to social equality with whites—they merely asked for their constitutionally
protected political rights. "One is a question of law," said Price, "and the
other is a matter of choice." To put his argument in perspective, he con-
trasted the situations of "poor white trash" and black Americans, saying:
"Prior to the war a poor white man was as much a social pariah as a free
colored man. The aristocracy took no notice of him as a social equal. . . .
Since the war there has been little diminution of this feeling.... [yet] This
class of white men have all their civil and political rights, but no one asserts
that they are trying to force themselves into social equality."63 A. J. Reed of
the League of Colored Republicans in Baltimore tried to explain the differ-
ence between political rights and social equality by declaring, "We don't
want. . . to marry your daughters, but we want every right to which we are
entitled under the constitution, and for that we mean to fight. They tell us
that if this movement succeeds, that one may walk up the street and see
standing in front of some big establishment a big, buck nigger in a
policeman's uniform. I tell you the colored man aims higher in life than
that. . . [but] any man who says that the colored race is for social equality is
either densely ignorant or a rascal."64 Such explanations notwithstanding,
most white Americans could not make the distinction in 1890 between
political rights and social equality. Consequently, when they heard black
leaders renounce any claims to social equality, they construed that African
Americans wanted separation and that they were content with the racial
status quo.
Other black leaders, such as T. Thomas Fortune, W. S. Scarborough,
and Frederick Douglass, refused to sacrifice social equality in order that
blacks might keep or gain their political rights. Douglass advocated inte-
gration in all walks of life as the only solution to the race problem.
Scarborough, professor of Greek and Latin at Wilberforce University, agreed,
although without the idealism of Douglass. He called for "fair play" and
"tolerance" of racial differences not only in politics but also in society.
However, he also accepted the idea of black emigration as a last resort, while
simultaneously declaring that he believed race "prejudice . . . will gradually
fade away."65 Fortune, a mulatto who was nearly white in appearance, was
perhaps the most adamant of all black leaders of his day in demanding that
African Americans were entitled to every right and privilege afforded Anglo-
Saxon Americans. As a result, his newspaper, the New York Age, became one
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of the most successful and influential black papers in the country during
and after the 1890s.66
Complicating the issue of segregation was the fact that interspersed
throughout the nation were people of color who, like Fortune, could not
easily be classified as either black or white based on their physical appear-
ance alone. Even in 1890, years before the charge became popular, some
whites were convinced that there was a conspiracy among black leaders to
instigate worldwide racial amalgamation. Frederick Douglass, who was him-
self racially mixed, lent credence to this belief by marrying a white woman.
T. Thomas Fortune countered this charge by asking, if blacks hatched this
conspiracy, why was there so much miscegenation caused by whites during
the slave era? He berated the white supremacists who feared amalgamation
by explaining that the "best white blood has for two hundred years gone
into the black race; and if it now and in the future returns to plague those
who sowed to the wind," they should not now begin to "whine like babies
over their supposed misfortune, and appeal to the rest of mankind for sym-
pathy."67 Although Fortune certainly won the battle of words on the sub-
ject, segregationists won the war. They solved the complex problem of
classifying racially mixed Americans in a simple way: they conveniently con-
sidered everyone who was not lily white to be black, thus depriving them of
both civil rights and social equality.
The issue of segregation was more complex than the racists of the day
made it out to be. Some forward-thinking individuals looked not at the
likely results of segregation in their own day and time but to the probable
effect of segregation on the black race in the future. As the United States'
commissioner of education, W. T. Harris of St. Louis theorized that the
continuation of racial segregation over a period of time would lead to black
Americans reverting to African savagery, barbarism, belief in outrageous
superstitions, and the practice of "voudooism." Thus, if some degree of
racial integration could be achieved without causing racial amalgamation,
that would be a positive change.68
The fear of racial amalgamation that gripped the thoughts of so many
southerners at this time seems, like many other aspects of race relations
discussed in this study, irrational by modern standards. It seemed quite
rational in its day, however, owing again to the widespread dissemination
of the primitive scientific knowledge available. Reverend John Thomas
Gulick, a noted Darwinian scholar, published a series of reports between
1887 and 1891 explaining that interbreeding of the human races might
appear harmless in the first generation, but continued interbreeding re-
sulted in partial sterility in the second generation, and in "the third or fourth
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generation the family dies out." Moreover, the children produced after the
first generation appeared "generally weakly" and suffered from a variety of
characteristics that diverged from either of the original races, such as bald-
ness and lack of body hair. Although he based his findings primarily upon
a study of two Japanese ethnic groups that had begun amalgamating, his
work implied that similar results must necessarily follow for other instances
of racial mixing. He also discussed many types of "segregation" among
various animal populations around the world, using the word "races" in
place of "species," again showing that unnatural interbreeding often pro-
duced unhealthy or otherwise undesirable offspring. Gulick's scientific data
and consequent interpretations received, arguably, the ultimate stamp of
approval when the U.S. government published his work in the Annual Re-
port of the Smithsonian Institution for the year 1891. President Harrison, as
well as various members of his administration and of Congress, signed this
report.69
The Billion Dollar Congress became the point of confluence for all of
the multifarious streams of racism that ran through America around the
year 1890. Democrats and southerners used the pro-segregationist, pro-
Social Darwinist, pro-Anglo-Saxon, and anti-immigrational stances of the
North to great effect and advantage in all three debates over the southern
race problem. With one breath they lamented the condition of "The poor
negro!" against whom "God, nature, and man all seemed to conspire" be-
cause he was under the "curse of Ham." With the next breath they lam-
pooned him as "undisciplined, full of unbounded expectations, imaginative
[superstitious], without judgment, lacking the faculty of using the proper
means for certain ends, fond of dress and pleasure, living only for the
present," and requiring "a century of civilization to . . . make him a fitting
factor in our enlightened system of government."70
Democrats and southerners also made jokes at the expense of blacks,
telling stories using the common black dialect of the day and justifying the
mockery upon the notion that no one was more willing and able to laugh
at himself than the black man.71 Above all, they stereotyped and judged the
whole race collectively as objects of pity, eulogizing the poor unfortunate
creatures who seemed destined to remain perpetually at the bottom of
American society, if they did not die out altogether. As John Tyler Morgan
put it, "The negro is a grateful man. He is a good man. [but] He is not a wise
man." And because of that indisputable fact, predicted Morgan, black
Americans would still hold relatively the same position in society seventy-
five years later.72 How prophetic Morgan proved to be. It was precisely sev-
enty-five years after he spoke those words in 1890 before black southerners
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would again be found worthy by a presidential administration and a ma-
jority in Congress to have their constitutional civil rights protected. Mor-
gan was, of course, wrong about why blacks would still occupy the bottom
rung of the social hierarchy in 1965. The real reason was that succeeding
generations of racists would cause it to be so until then.73
After the Federal Elections Bill's final hurrah in the Senate in early
1891, rarely would northerners or Republicans resurrect the race issue in
national politics again for more than a generation. So the Billion Dollar
Congress came to a close, having failed to find an acceptable solution to the
southern race problem. The white South had defended its ideology with
every ounce of fortitude it could muster. White northern Democrats, as
neo-doughfaces, had echoed the southern point of view. Western Republi-
cans had jettisoned their traditional views on the issue and joined with the
Democrats, leaving northeastern Republicans alone to bear the flickering
torch of humanitarianism. President Harrison had inexplicably become
virtually unheard and invisible on the issue, failing to rally the Republican
forces at a time when his leadership was most sorely needed. A few black
voices rose in protest, but the day when neo-abolitionist oratory could in-
spire the northern public was over. The black voices that the northern pub-
lic chose to hear affirmed the arguments of the former slaveholders in saying
that, indeed, African Americans were not yet prepared for equal citizen-
ship. The majority of African Americans, of course, either remained silent
or lacked the ways and means of making their voices heard, which seemed
to indicate to the northern public that they were, just as southern Demo-
crats claimed, reasonably content with their condition. A wearied northern
public was thus ready to move on and leave the race problem in the hands
of another generation. In the end, the racial and ethnic melting pot that
was the United States had achieved the closest thing to a consensus that a
nation of sixty-two million people was capable of: it had collectively cho-
sen the path of least resistence. Ubiquitous racism, rationalized by Social
Darwinism, Imperialism, and xenophobia would become the orthodoxy—
the socially acceptable mentality of the coming Jim Crow era, the new na-
tional Zeitgeist.
CONCLUSION
Assessing the Billion Dollar Congress and Its Effects
on American Historj and Race Relations
The Fifty-first Congress ended yesterday, and if it had a soul may the Lord
have mercy upon that soul.
—The Nashville American
The Fifty-first Congress . . . will stand in history as a shame to its members
and a warning to their successors.
—The Providence Journal
The Nation must naturally experience a feeling of relief at the death of this
Congress, as it did when the civil war ended.
—The Albany Argus
Throughout the time that the Fifty-first Congress wrestled with the south-
ern race problem, Democrats charged that Republican claims of concern
for the welfare of African Americans were disingenuous. As one put it, in
1865 the Republican Party was the "savior of the negroes," but since Re-
construction black voters had become the savior of the GOR Such charges
contained more than a grain of truth. The black vote had made the differ-
ence in Republicans winning the White House in 1872, 1876, and 1888.
The majority of white voters in these elections went Democratic. Despite
owing such victories to black support, after the close of the Billion Dollar
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Congress in April 1891, the Republican reformers abandoned all hope of
achieving federal civil rights legislation for African Americans. They cer-
tainly had their opportunities to try again. In 1896, after four economically
disastrous years of Democratic rule, they regained hegemony over the na-
tional government with the election of William McKinley as president and
a Republican majority in Congress. The GOP owed this victory not to the
black vote, however, but to the German and Irish vote, which went pre-
dominantly Republican for the first time in American history. Thus, there
no longer appeared to be a need to secure the black vote to ensure Repub-
lican victories, and, consequently, neither was there a need to continue try-
ing to find a solution to the southern race problem. The GOP, not
surprisingly, never resurrected the issue.1
Even in 1890-1891, the majority of rank-and-file Republicans among
the northern public showed only a perfunctory interest in rewarding Afri-
can Americans for their loyalty to the party of Lincoln. The humanitarian-
minded minority in the North talked a great deal about alleviating the
suffering of African Americans, but they did very little, considering the
potential for reform that existed under Republican control in the Fifty-first
Congress. The favorite plan of their political leaders—the Federal Elections
Bill—appeared partisan, sectional, and highly inflammatory to a majority
of Americans. Moreover, it seemed to be a facade hiding an ulterior motive:
a need to shore up lagging numbers in the Republican vote. The bill's spon-
sors certainly hoped to enforce black voters' constitutional rights as well,
but only if that goal could be accomplished without sacrificing any other
aspect of the GOP's Billion Dollar agenda, and only if they did not have to
apply the same racial standard to the Northeast and the West as they ap-
plied to the South. Republican intentions behind the Federal Elections Bill,
while noble, were arguably a misguided use of humanitarian sympathy,
because what African Americans really needed at the time as much as, if
not more than, the right to vote was federal economic relief. The year was
1890, after all—the eve of the Populist revolt—and most black southerners,
like their white neighbors, earned their meager livelihoods in the fields.
Unfortunately, no federal relief came. Although the nation's first "billion
dollar" Congress could have easily afforded to help suffering farmers, it did
nothing for them. Black Representative Henry P. Cheathem of North Caro-
lina believed that the GOP had its priorities out of order. He did not op-
pose the Federal Elections Bill, but he complained that, if his party was
really sincere about alleviating the suffering and deprivation among his
race, it would first pass the bill that he had introduced to reimburse deposi-
tors of the failed Freedmen's Bank and then pass either the Blair Education
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Bill or some similar federal education bill. But alas, he lamented, "Both of
these bills are quietly sleeping—'under the new rules'—notwithstanding
the fact that this Administration with its Republican majorities in the House
and Senate and [its] Republican President could have enacted both bills
into law several months ago. Gentlemen, why do you not show your sym-
pathy for the colored people in a practical manner when you have such a
favorable opportunity?"2 The Freedmen's Bank bill died the death of the
vast majority of bills that are introduced in any session of Congress: it went
to committee, where it garnered little support and thus received no serious
consideration. The Blair bill, which Cheathem so strongly advocated, re-
ceived, by contrast, a great amount of consideration, but it ultimately failed.
Contrary to popular misconception, it did not fail because of opposition
from the twelve new western senators who were sworn into office in 1890,
for ten of the twelve actually supported the bill. Instead, nine Republican
senators from the older northeastern and midwestern states switched their
votes to oppose it. Who then was responsible for the defeat of the Blair bill?
The answer is, ironically, many of the same people who pushed the Federal
Elections Bill. They were, of course, not solely responsible. Nine former
Democratic supporters likewise changed their minds on the issue of feder-
alizing education.3 Why these Democrats changed positions on the Blair
bill cannot be ascertained. From reading their speeches in the debate, how-
ever, one can reasonably speculate that their fear of the Federal Elections
Bill—which they knew was about to be introduced—forced their overreac-
tion to all other bills designed to empower African Americans, whether
politically, economically, or intellectually. In other words, the Federal Elec-
tions Bill in a roundabout way killed the Blair Education Bill.
While the Blair bill ceased to garner the nation's attention after 1890,
the Federal Elections Bill, although dead, was not allowed to rest in peace.
The Democrats used it as their main rallying point in the presidential cam-
paign of 1892. Their Campaign Textbook of the Democratic Party for the
Presidential Election, 1892, contained a full forty pages of discussion of the
"force bill." Most Republican congressmen, meanwhile, steered as far away
from the race issue in their campaign as possible.4 GOP managers even
jettisoned Vice President Levi P. Morton, who would forever be linked to
the failure of the bill, and replaced him with the editor of the New York
Tribune, Whitelaw Reid, who had supported the bill in his newspaper to
the bitter end. Ironically, once nominated, Reid spoke not a word on the
issue as a candidate. The incumbent Harrison likewise remained silent on
the issue, focusing instead on the more positive aspects of his first term.
The GOP strategy essentially called for distancing Harrison from the bill.
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Nonetheless, some supporters felt compelled to defend their candidate on
the issue. Frederick Douglass, for example, tried to spin the question, say-
ing: "The position taken by President Harrison upon the election bill, called
by our enemies in the South the 'force bill,' should endear him to the col-
ored people as long as he lives, and they should revere his memory when he
is dead. To the President the credit is due for creating the bill in the first
place, and then pushing it through the House and almost through the Sen-
ate. His moral influence, as well as his official endorsement and assistance,
were behind the measure. . . . That bill meant protection to the lives of
every colored voter in the South."5 And on another occasion, Douglass pro-
claimed that "The President of the United States is true to his trust. No
man since Gen. Grant has stood by us more firmly than has Gen. Harrison."6
Despite the Republicans' efforts to get their ticket punched in 1892—
which included spending the unheard-of sum of six million dollars on the
campaign—Harrison and Reid lost in 1892. Many congressional races fol-
lowed the same pattern. Democratic candidates from doubtful districts and
states enjoyed much success by harping upon the Federal Elections Bill,
while Republican candidates could benefit only by remaining silent on the
issue and distancing themselves from the actions of the unpopular Billion
Dollar Congress.7
The GOP suffered a permanent black eye on the issue of racial reform
from its espousal of the doomed Federal Elections Bill. This defeat caused a
tremendous shake-up in the leadership of the party and left lasting politi-
cal scars on several of the bill's sponsors. Henry Cabot Lodge, for instance,
lost decisively in his bid for reelection as overseer of Harvard College, os-
tensibly because Harvard wanted to bridge the North-South divide and
thus could not endorse a known sectionalist as its leader. He lived out the
remainder of his political career labeled as a sectional antagonist who was
from then on always on the unpopular side of the "Negro question." This
stigma prevented him from ever being seriously considered as a presiden-
tial contender, although it did not damage his reputation within Massa-
chusetts state politics: the legislature sent him to the U.S. Senate in 1893.
John J. Ingalls of Kansas, the Jayhawker crusader for the manipulation of
the black vote, lost his bid for reelection to the Senate to Farmers' Alliance
candidate William A. Pfeffer, whose only crusade was to relieve the suffer-
ing of farmers in the Sunflower State. John Coit Spooner, out of disgust
with the filibustering and obstinance of his opponents, chose not to seek
reelection in 1891, which left a great vacuum in the ranks of the Republi-
can reformers. He would later return to the Senate, but he remained essen-
tially silent about the race problem for the rest of his career. In addition to
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these, William M. Evarts, who had served the state of New York in public
office since the Civil War and who had sided with the reformers on the
Federal Elections Bill debate, retired from the Senate because of old age
and ill health, opening the door for a Democrat who vehemently opposed
any bill for civil rights reform to take his seat.8
Prominent Republican senators who strongly supported the bill but
did not face reelection any time soon included William E. Chandler, George
Frisbie Hoar, and John Sherman. Although they retained their seats, none
of them ever brought up the issue of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment
again. William McKinley alone among prominent Republicans seemed to
get a second chance at remaking his political career after the Billion Dollar
debacle. After being defeated for reelection to his House seat in 1890, he
won the governorship of Ohio in 1891 and the presidency of the United
States in 1896, but he never again championed the cause of African Ameri-
can civil rights.9
The Federal Elections Bill imbroglio also left a lasting impression upon
Democrats and African Americans. It caused a backlash of retaliatory Demo-
cratic legislation and of black defections from the party. The Democratic
majority in the Fifty-second Congress repealed forty-two of the forty-nine
sections of the old supervisory law of 1871. It is worth noting that the Re-
publican minority, still reeling from the tumultuous turnaround, simply
allowed this incredible reversal to happen without making any serious ef-
fort at resistance. They did not filibuster, and they hardly uttered a word
publicly in opposition. Frederick Douglass, shocked at his party's backslid-
ing on the issue of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment, spoke aloud what
he believed many white Republicans must have been thinking regarding
black voters at the time: "We cannot protect you, we therefore propose to
join your oppressors. Your suffrage has been rendered a failure by violence,
and we now propose to make it a failure by law."10 The GOP's abandon-
ment of the voting rights issue also drove many black leaders out of the
Republican Party, at least temporarily. Among the party's defectors were
Henry McNeal Turner, T. Thomas Fortune, and J. C. Price. These and many
others subsequently supported Grover Cleveland for president in 1892. After
Cleveland's victory, they firmly believed that the black vote had handed the
election to the Democrats. The black editor of the Kansas City World, C. H.
J. Taylor, verbally expressed the disdain that many African Americans obvi-
ously felt for the party of Lincoln after 1890-1891, calling Republican lead-
ers the "white political scum" who had always deceived his people. Most of
those who remained loyal to the party, such as Frederick Douglass, Blanche
K. Bruce, Henry P. Cheathem, John R. Lynch, and John Mercer Langston,
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were beholden to the GOP for either past or current job appointments or
their seats in Congress.11
Other results of the Federal Elections Bill fiasco included permanent
changes in parliamentary procedures in Congress. The use of filibustering,
which proved so effective for Senate Democrats in the Fifty-first Congress,
increased dramatically thereafter, a change that eventually led to the adop-
tion of a cloture rule similar to the one that Nelson Aldrich tried so desper-
ately and unsuccessfully to obtain in 1891. The increase of filibustering in
the upper house of Congress also contributed to the demand of Progressives
for direct election of senators, making these elite representatives more ac-
countable to the people, a demand that was realized with the adoption of
the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913. Another result was the immediate
adoption of the new Reed Rules in the House by the Democratic majority
of the Fifty-second Congress. Democrats winced as they implemented the
very rules that they had condemned two years earlier, but the payback made
the repulsive action worth it. Republicans, despite having brought the
disempowerment of the minority upon themselves, tried to spin the issue
in their own favor by claiming vindication for their policy of limiting de-
bate in the House. A final result of the defeat of the Federal Elections Bill
was that fraudulent elections actually increased in the United States in the
1890s. Although most of this increase resulted from the southern states no
longer fearing federal intervention and thus embarking on a wholesale cam-
paign to disfranchise black voters, some of the increase resulted from the
intense competition between the two major parties for the swing vote in
the northern states. Both parties began to apply with equal effect what might
accurately be called (to coin a term) "Quayism." Matthew Quay's machine
that helped put Benjamin Harrison into the White House and a Republi-
can majority in Congress in 1888 had arguably set a new standard for elec-
tion fraud, or at least for partisan manipulation of the electoral system.12
So, in the final analysis, what is history to make of the Billion Dollar
Congress? This extraordinary legislative body amassed the staggering sum
of more than seventeen thousand bills and resolutions—1,085 of which
passed. It was an astounding record of achievement in an era noted for
congressional gridlock and the "politics of dead center." Moreover, this Fifty-
first Congress became the only Congress in American history to be immor-
talized by a moniker (a Democratic term of derision, actually), and it came
by the name honestly. The "Billion Dollar Congress" really was a "billion
dollar" Congress, for it actually did spend more than a billion dollars, and
it was the first to do so. It spent $1,038,447,826.27 to be precise. This total
showed an increase of almost $250 million more than any previous Con-
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gress had ever spent, which was an almost unfathomable amount in an era
noted for its conservative, laissez-faire approach to national economics.
Added to the small government growth that occurred under Democratic
control from 1880 to 1888, the Billion Dollar Congress helped grow the
budget of the federal government by a whopping 300 percent from 1880 to
1890, while the American population grew at the brisk clip of 22 percent.13
In 1889, the federal treasury held the largest surplus in the nation's history
to that time, but by 1891 the Billion Dollar Congress had proudly exhausted
it on pensions, naval appropriations, public buildings, river and harbor
improvements, and a host of other local and federal projects. So adept was
this Republican Congress at spending taxpayer money that its own mem-
bers popularized the term "pork" (which had been infrequently used be-
fore this time) to describe their fiscal extravagance.14
Speaker of the House Thomas B. Reed accepted the opprobrious so-
briquet the "Billion Dollar Congress" without protest, although he did not
appreciate being called "Czar." He and the Republican majority proudly
defended their legislative record. Such astronomical spending, however, led
Democratic newspapers to pronounce with certainty against this growth
of government that "in the history of the nation, the Fifty-first Congress
has accomplished less good and perpetuated greater injury than any other
[Congress] that ever assembled to legislate for the people";15 this "Con-
gress made the worst record of any Congress in American history";16 and
"The Fifty-first Congress was reckless in many things. . . . No spendthrift
come suddenly into a fortune was ever more riotous."17 One Democratic
organ enumerated its criticisms by proclaiming that "The leaders of the
late Congress . . . shocked the country by substituting the despotism of the
Speaker for the temperate rule of the majority. They set the example of
unscrupulous disregard of public opinion They decided contested elec-
tion cases according to partisan exigencies, regardless of evidence or de-
cency. [And] They blew the embers of sectional hatred... ,"18 Senator Alfred
Colquitt of Georgia put it more succinctly—no doubt referring to General
William Tecumseh Sherman's march through his state in 1864—"A Billion
Dollar Congress! Why, an invading army would not have destroyed more
property in a ruthless march of destruction through the country."19
Republican newspapers' defenses of the GOP's legislative record clev-
erly avoided mentioning the fact that a huge majority of the bills and reso-
lutions that the Billion Dollar Congress passed concerned nothing more
than pensions or local pork-barrel projects. It did not matter, anyway. Their
defenses were overshadowed by their need to place the blame for failure on
someone. They tended to blame the Silverites for all the failure of the Fed-
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fist-
Public Indictment of the Fifty-first Congress. "Look at the leaders of the disgraceful
Fifty-first Congress!" {Puck, 1891.) Neither the Democratic press nor the majority
of the American public showed much kindness to the outgoing Fifty-first Con-
gress. Historians, however, have found it remarkable, albeit not for the reasons
that the Republican humanitarians had hoped.
eral Elections Bill, but they had no answer for why the voters overwhelm-
ingly repudiated the Republican majority in the House. Generally, in this
name-calling, the papers condemned their party's leaders for allowing their
agenda to be defeated, rather than praising them for at least trying to solve
the southern race problem. As one put it: "The Congress now awaiting burial
deserves severe condemnation. It could have redeemed the pledge made by
the Republican convention of 1888 to protect the ballot from being trampled
upon and made an instrument of fraud, and failed. That was the loss of an
opportunity which may not come again for years. Everything was ripe for
it. It can not be explained away."20
The fairest assessments of the work of the Billion Dollar Congress
came, not surprisingly, from the independent press, which tended to line
up with the Democrats on the overall record of the Congress, if not on
every item. As one independent paper explained, "The record of the late
Congress has, in a word, been a shameful record of partisan selfishness and
political scheming But the country has avenged itself."21 Another paper
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summed up the independents' attitude aptly, saying, "If the people believed
one set of partisan papers, the late Congress would be canonized. If they
believed the other set [it would be] condemned without measure. The truth
is between the extremes. A [great] deal of effective work was done by the
two houses. It is work which will tell upon the history of the country for a
long time to come."22
Indeed. But the one striking and ironic feature of the legislative record
of the Billion Dollar Congress is the absence of any legislation to relieve the
oppression of African Americans. And why? Because, as Senator John Tyler
Morgan of Alabama correctly observed, "Public opinion . . . will ultimately
neutralize statutes that violate the instincts of the white race."23 In other
words, it was not merely the resistance of Democratic politicians and a few
Republican defectors that neutralized the humanitarian agenda of this
Congress but the fact that public opinion favored the minority party's po-
sition on racial issues in 1890-1891. Of course, public opinion can be swayed
on even the most important social issues, and the politicians and propa-
gandists that make the best case for their point of view often prevail with
the people. On the issue of the South's race problem, southern Democrats
definitely proved better at purveying their beliefs to the American people
than did the Republicans.
This remarkable group of southern politicians led mainly by Senator
Morgan, but also partially by J. Z. George of Mississippi, Zebulon Vance of
North Carolina, and George Vest of Missouri, has been inexplicably all but
forgotten to history. Yet, arguably, their impact upon the course of Ameri-
can history, and particularly African American history, was just as great as
that of their more celebrated antebellum predecessors John C. Calhoun,
Henry Clay, and Jefferson Davis. In fact, these Gilded Age sages merely car-
ried on the long tradition of southern politicians dominating national poli-
tics on racial issues despite representing a section with a minority of the
American population. The ability of southern Democrats such as Morgan
and his cohorts to prevail against the odds and guide the ship of state was
thus nothing new. Frederick Douglass perhaps said it best when he deri-
sively declared, "As a matter of fact, the South has always been able to out-
wit the North in politics."24
And what happened to African Americans as a result of the victory of
these ex-Confederates and their neo-doughface sympathizers in the Bil-
lion Dollar Congress? Injustices against them increased at a phenomenal
rate, particularly in the South, with the 1890s becoming the decade when
constitutional disfranchisement, Jim Crow segregation, and lynch law all
fell like a biblical plague upon the already downtrodden race. Southern
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states, one after another, followed Mississippi's lead in rewriting their con-
stitutions to remove the majority of black voters from their voting rolls.
State laws converted segregation from a mere social custom into a strictly
enforced legal institution. National courts, northern public opinion, and
international imperialist sentiment all upheld this conversion. Finally, as
southern whites ceased to fear the intervention of outsiders in local affairs,
they committed more lynchings in the 1890s than in any other decade in
American history.25
In the wake of all such negative changes in the nation's collective ra-
cial attitude, even the most outspoken humanitarians and egalitarians aban-
doned their earlier advocacy of civil rights and fair treatment of blacks.
George Washington Cable and Albion Tourgee, for instance, became con-
spicuously silent on the issue. Lewis Harvey Blair, once a champion of equal
opportunity for blacks, changed his mind, saying, "experience and obser-
vation have convinced me of the fallacy of my premises." Tom Watson un-
derwent perhaps the most notable transformation of any national figure of
the day, shifting from a friend of blacks to one of the most virulent racist
demagogues in American history.26
African American responses to this nadir in which they found them-
selves varied greatly, but there were essentially only three courses of action
they could take. One was that some black leaders continued to protest for
civil rights, but white America in and after the 1890s increasingly ignored
them. The death of the Federal Elections Bill marked the end of the line for
those expecting the federal government to rescue African Americans by
protecting their civil rights. Although many black leaders continued to ap-
peal to both the government and white society throughout the nadir, they
reaped comparatively little reward from their labor. One white southern
Democrat summed up what must have been the collective mind-set of such
disappointed hopefuls, saying of the Republican Party: "Might not the
southern negro, when you ask him for his vote, respond by asking you,
'Where is that forty acres of ground and where is that mule'?"27
Many of the common black folk of the South turned to the remaining
choices, which were less attractive than securing the right to vote but which
would yield more immediate results. Some opted for migration out of the
South. Most who did so realized that white northerners and westerners
would not embrace them or give them social equality, but they could at
least hope to find better economic opportunities outside the South. More
than 130,000 ended up in Oklahoma, where their hopes of betterment were
largely dashed on the rocks of the ubiquitous racism of the day. A few hun-
dred managed to escape the South through emigration abroad. Most went
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to Liberia, where they lived out the remainder of their days in the harsh and
challenging situation they had chosen for themselves, rather than staying
in America and living under the difficult circumstances that white America
had thrust upon them. In 1890-1891, for the only time in American his-
tory, both obstacles that had killed all previous colonization plans—lack of
interest and lack of money—could have arguably been overcome. A rea-
sonable claim can be made that the Billion Dollar Congress, in control of
the largest government surplus in the nation's history, had both the money
to fund a massive emigration project and a majority of representatives and
senators who showed no fear of spending down the surplus.
The final option, which most African Americans took, was the path
of least resistance, otherwise known as accommodationism, although crit-
ics considered it (to coin another term) "neo-Uncle Tomism." Isaiah Mont-
gomery proved that this approach pleased white America when he defended
his white colleagues' rationale for the literacy test and poll tax in the Mis-
sissippi constitutional convention of 1890. Other notable black leaders soon
began to echo this defense of second-class citizenship for their race, par-
ticularly during the presidential campaign of 1892, on the grounds that
Democrats at least spoke their feelings about the black race truthfully rather
than acting hypocritically like the Republicans. Many blacks thus chose to
align with honest racists rather than with those who seemed to be quasi-
humanitarians, pseudo-egalitarians, and failed reformers. After Booker T.
Washington made his famous Atlanta Compromise speech in 1895, and
after the U. S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in the case of Plessy
v. Ferguson in 1896, accommodationism ultimately became the most com-
mon and acceptable strategy for coping with the nadir.28 And so it remained
for more than a generation, as white supremacy became the national Zeit-
geist. Blacks could only wait. For as New York missionary Reverend Henry
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